Empirical essays on tax planning and transfer pricing by Quinkler, Valentin Hermann Carl
Empirical Essays on Tax Planning and Transfer Pricing
Von der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
- Doctor rerum politicarum -
genehmigte Dissertation
von
Valentin Hermann Carl Quinkler, M.Sc.
geboren am 03.05.1991 in Bergisch Gladbach 
2019
II
Referenten:
Prof. Dr. Jost H. Heckemeyer
Prof. Dr. Kay Blaufus
Tag der Promotion:
26. September 2019
III
Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation beinhaltet drei empirische Studien, die sich mit der Steuerplanung von 
multinationalen Unternehmen und Verrechnungspreisen befassen.
Die erste Studie untersucht den Einfluss der Besteuerung auf die geographische Allokation 
von Markenrechten großer Unternehmen innerhalb der USA. Die Studie belegt, dass der US-
Bundesstaat Delaware hierbei eine führende Rolle einnimmt und die Mehrheit der Markenrechte 
dort registriert wird. Außerdem analysiert die Studie die Effektivität einer Gruppenkonsolidie-
rung („Combined Reporting“) und zeigt, dass mit diesem Regime ein Rückgang des Anteils der 
in Delaware registrierten Markenrechte einhergeht. Dennoch scheint das steuerplanerische Ge-
staltungspotential, das Delaware bietet, nicht vollends beseitigt zu sein.
Die zweite Studie analysiert die Nutzung von Informationstechnologien innerhalb des un-
ternehmensinternen Verrechnungspreissystems. Die Studie analysiert insbesondere die Rolle 
solcher Informationstechnologien für den Fall, dass die Ziele, die durch das Verrechnungspreis-
system in Bezug auf die Steuerplanung sowie die Unternehmenssteuerung verfolgt werden, in-
nerhalb des Unternehmens konfligieren. Die Studie belegt empirisch, dass bei Unternehmen mit 
einem solchen Zielkonflikt die intensivere Nutzung von Informationstechnologien mit einer ge-
steigerten Steuereffizienz und Profitabilität einhergeht.
Die dritte Studie analysiert, ob ein strikteres Regelwerk für Verrechnungspreise sowie die
striktere Durchsetzung dieses Regelwerks einen messbaren Effekt auf den konzerninternen Han-
del multinationaler U.S.-Unternehmen hat. Sie belegt, dass striktere Regeln für Verrechnungs-
preise die Steuer-Sensitivität des konzerninternen Handels senken und somit die damit verbun-
denen Steuerplanungspotentiale reduzieren.
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Summary
This dissertation consists of three empirical studies contributing to the literature on tax 
planning and transfer pricing.
The first study investigates the impact of U.S. state taxation on the geographical allocation 
of the intra-U.S. trademark ownership of large U.S. multinationals. The study documents that the 
U.S. State of Delaware has a leading position as a trademark holding location and that the major-
ity of trademarks are registered there. Moreover, it contains an analysis of the effectiveness of 
group consolidation (combined reporting) and provides evidence that combined reporting signif-
icantly reduces the share of trademarks allocated to Delaware. Nevertheless, the identified effects 
indicate that Delaware-based trademark strategies have not been entirely abandoned. 
The second study examines the use of information technologies in a firm’s transfer pricing 
system. In particular, it investigates the role of firms’ information environment in mitigating the 
conflict of managerial and tax objectives in transfer pricing. The study provides empirical evi-
dence that if firms facing conflicting objectives make intensive use of information technologies, 
they are more profitable, report lower effective tax rates, and face lower tax risk.
The third study analyzes whether the strictness of transfer pricing regulations and their en-
forcement affect intrafirm trade of U.S. multinational firms. In particular, the results suggest that 
stricter transfer pricing in a country decrease the tax rate sensitivity of bilateral U.S. intrafirm 
trade. Thus, the possibilities of U.S. multinationals to engage in transfer pricing related tax plan-
ning schemes are effectively reduced.
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11.Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Motivation 
A firm’s central goal is to maximize its after-tax profits. Besides optimizing operational 
efficiency and exploiting additional sources of revenue, reducing the tax bill is an effective
way to achieve this objective as tax liabilities represent one of the largest blocks of costs at 
most firms. Thus, many multinational firms engage in tax planning activities and shift shares 
of their group profit to subsidiaries facing relatively low corporate income tax rates (e.g., 
Hines and Rice 1994; Huizinga and Laeven 2008). 
One of the main channels of tax-induced profit shifting is transfer pricing. When goods, 
licenses or services are transferred between affiliated subsidiaries of the same multinational 
group, these related-party transactions need to be priced to ensure that each legal entity can 
file its individual taxable profits. The prices charged for these transactions are referred to as 
transfer prices. The strategic use of transfer pricing enables multinational firms to utilize tax 
rate differentials by charging affiliates in low-tax countries with the lowest possible prices 
while the highest possible transfer prices are applied for intrafirm transactions with affiliates 
located in high-tax countries. As a result, a higher share of the multinational’s overall profits 
is subject to lower tax rates. Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) find in a meta-study that trans-
fer pricing is a dominant profit-shifting channel.
Clausing (2006) shows that international tax avoidance and the exploitation of tax rate 
differentials is a determining factor for intrafirm trade patterns and transfer pricing of U.S. 
multinationals. To limit the tax planning potential stemming from transfer pricing, a large 
majority of countries implemented transfer pricing regulations governing how affiliated com-
panies set prices for the intrafirm transfer of goods, services, or licenses. According to most of 
these regulations, transfer prices must comply with the arm’s length principle requiring an 
intrafirm transaction among related companies to be placed on par with transfers among unre-
2lated, uncontrolled firms. However, there is substantial variation across countries and time 
with respect to their transfer pricing regulations, the level of enforcement, and the countries’ 
transfer pricing audit practices. So far, there is not yet any empirical study investigating the 
impact of this heterogeneity of transfer pricing strictness on intrafirm trade.
Besides intrafirm trade, intangibles are frequently used for tax planning purposes. In-
tangibles such as patents and trademarks are essential drivers of firm value (Hall et al. 2005; 
Sandner and Block 2011). They are often related to product innovation and marketing and, 
thus, are typically referred to as a key for efficient corporate production processes and com-
petitive success (e.g., Hall 2001; Edmans 2011). Concerning tax planning, valuable intangi-
bles offer high potential as they can produce mobile income through licensing. In combination 
with the intransparent transfer pricing and valuation process of intangibles, trademark licens-
ing models constitute a major source of income shifting opportunities in multinational firms. 
A rich body of empirical literature investigates such tax avoidance behavior and finds that the 
location of intangibles is biased towards low-tax affiliates and that the tax rate in a specific 
jurisdiction exerts a negative effect on the allocation of intangibles in the respective jurisdic-
tion (Dischinger and Riedel 2011; Karkinsky and Riedel 2012; Griffith et al. 2014; Pfeiffer
and Voget 2016; Heckemeyer et al. 2018). However, in addition to federal taxation, corpora-
tions in the U.S. are subject to state corporate income taxation with state-specific tax codes 
and tax rates, varying between 0 and 12 percent. This considerable variation entails a substan-
tial potential for corporate tax avoidance. Anecdotal and previous empirical evidence suggests 
that U.S. firms particularly focus on the State of Delaware in their strategic tax planning due 
to its attractive tax and legal environment. Despite great public attention on this issue, the 
empirical literature has, so far, not gathered any direct quantitative evidence on Delaware’s 
role as a location for intangibles. Moreover, the effects of anti-avoidance policies, such as the 
group consolidation regime combined reporting, which was implemented by many states to 
curb Delaware-based tax strategies, on these allocation patterns are not investigated yet.
3However, transfer pricing is not exclusively important for tax planning activities. An-
other core function of transfer pricing is the coordination of internal trade between business 
units in decentralized firms. Therefore, transfer pricing is used to establish levels of intrafirm 
trade and resource allocation that maximize firm-wide profits. This coexistence of managerial 
and tax objectives carries a substantial potential for conflicts within multinational firms and 
leads to an immanent trade-off between strategies that achieve the highest tax efficiency and 
those that establish profit-maximizing levels of production and intrafirm trade. When divi-
sional managers act to maximize pre-tax KPIs but tax managers strive to lower a firm’s global 
tax burden, the central management may benefit from a better information environment to 
balance these objectives. Adopting advanced information and communication technologies is 
a common strategy to improve the firms’ information environment. Despite the rising uptake 
of digitalization and the increasing data availability and relevance in the digital economy, 
there is no empirical evidence on the role of information technology in transfer pricing and its 
effectiveness in improving managerial decision-making.
1.2. Summary of main contributions and findings
This thesis consists of three separate essays. Table 1.1 provides an overview of these es-
says’ titles, co-authors (if any), and their current status of publication.
Table 1.1: Essay overview.
Ch. Title Co-authors Status of publication
2
Closing the ‘Delaware Loophole’? The 
Impact of Group Consolidation on the 
Location of U.S. Trademarks
Jost Heckemeyer, 
Michael Overesch
Preparation for 
submission
3
Effective Transfer Pricing and Infor-
mation Technology – Evidence from the 
Field
Sven-Eric Bärsch, 
Marcel Olbert
Under review:
The Accounting Re-
view
4
Transfer Pricing Strictness and Cross-
Border Intrafirm Trade: Evidence from 
U.S. Multinational Firms
- Working Paper
Notes: This table presents the essays of the thesis with the corresponding chapter (ch.), the title, the co-authors 
(if any) as well as the current status of publication.
4The first study of this dissertation (Closing the ‘Delaware Loophole’? The Impact of 
Group Consolidation on the Location of U.S. Trademarks) presented in chapter 2 investigates 
whether U.S. state taxation determines the intra-U.S. allocation of trademark ownership with-
in large U.S. multinationals listed in the Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P 500) index. We center 
our analysis on the State of Delaware and examine its role as a domestic U.S. state tax haven. 
In particular, we investigate whether combined reporting which has recently been introduced 
by several U.S. states as a countermeasure against Delaware-based tax planning schemes re-
duces the use of Delaware as trademark location. We find that large U.S. firms indeed locate 
their U.S. trademarks in Delaware with a disproportionally high frequency. 53.7 percent of 
our sample U.S. trademarks owned by the S&P 500 firms are registered in Delaware. Our 
analysis also reveals that combined reporting significantly reduces the share of trademarks 
allocated to Delaware. Nevertheless, Delaware maintains its dominant position as trademark 
holding location.
The second study of this dissertation (Effective Transfer Pricing and Information Tech-
nology – Evidence from the Field) presented in chapter 3 examines the role of firms’ infor-
mation environment in mitigating the conflict of managerial and tax objectives within a firm’s 
transfer pricing system. Specifically, we utilize unique survey data to investigate whether a 
more intensive use of information technology improves transfer pricing efficiency when the 
underlying objectives conflict. We find that firms facing conflicting objectives are generally 
less profitable and less successful in tax planning. If such firms, however, use information 
technology more intensely, these associations are attenuated as the firms are, on average,
more profitable, report lower effective tax rates, and report more sustainable tax positions. 
Moreover, we also provide first evidence supporting theory that predicts higher financial per-
formance under cost-based transfer pricing in case of a superior information environment. 
Altogether, our analyses indicate that an intensive use of information technology facilitates 
transfer pricing strategies that reconcile managerial control with tax efficiency.
5The third study of this dissertation (Transfer Pricing Strictness and Cross-Border In-
trafirm Trade: Evidence from U.S. Multinational Firms) presented in chapter 4 investigates 
the role of transfer pricing regulations on intrafirm trade of U.S. multinational firms. For this
analysis, I utilize country data on intrafirm trade of U.S. multinational firms collected by the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. I match these data with an index variable proxying the 
degree of strictness of a country’s transfer pricing regulations and enforcement across time 
which was provided by Kenneth Klassen and Devan Mescall. This allows me to examine 
whether the enforcement of stricter transfer pricing regulations is associated with a reduced 
tax rate sensitivity of intrafirm trade. In line with prior research, I find that U.S. multinationals 
conduct, on average, more intrafirm trade with low-tax countries. Additionally, I find that 
U.S. intrafirm imports are particularly high and, accordingly, intrafirm trade balances lean 
towards imports with low-tax countries. However, my analyses suggest that these relation-
ships are driven by affiliates resident in countries that have particularly lenient transfer pricing 
regimes. If stricter transfer pricing regulations are enforced, those associations are mitigated 
as the sensitivity to tax rate changes is significantly reduced.
62.Chapter 2: Closing the ‘Delaware Loophole’? The 
Impact of Group Consolidation on the Location of 
U.S. Trademarks
Abstract
This study investigates whether tax factors determine the intra-U.S. allocation of trademark 
ownership within large U.S. multinationals. In particular, we focus on the state of Delaware 
and its role as a domestic U.S. state tax haven. We are interested in whether group consolida-
tion in the form of combined reporting, which has been implemented by a large number of 
U.S. states to protect against tax base erosion, show identifiable consequences for trademark 
allocation. Utilizing rich trademark data, we empirically document that Delaware’s known 
dominance in parent and subsidiary incorporations carries over to a leading position in trade-
mark ownership. However, an explorative analysis and regression results reveal that group 
consolidation significantly reduces the share of trademarks allocated to the state of Delaware. 
Nevertheless, the identified effects do not suggest that Delaware-based trademark strategies 
have been entirely abandoned. Delaware maintains its key role in the allocation of intangible 
property ownership. In an additional analysis, we find that investors reward the trademark 
allocation to Delaware as it increases firm value.
This chapter is joint work with Jost H. Heckemeyer and Michael Overesch.
72.1. Introduction
We investigate the impact of state taxes on the allocation of trademark ownership within 
large U.S. multinationals. We empirically document that Delaware’s known status as a do-
mestic U.S. state tax haven translates into dominance in trademark allocation. Moreover, we 
analyze the effectiveness of combined reporting that has been implemented by the majority of 
U.S. states to protect against base erosion.
Corporations doing business in the United States are, in addition to federal taxation, 
subject to state corporate income taxes with rates varying between zero and 12 percent. This 
considerable intra-U.S. tax rate variation entails substantial potential for corporate tax avoid-
ance. Anecdotal and previous empirical evidence suggests that U.S. firms particularly focus 
on one state, Delaware, and its attractive tax and legal environment in their strategic planning. 
Delaware offers a beneficial tax regime that exempts so-called passive investment companies
(PICs), i.e., entities generating income related to intellectual property (IP), from state corpo-
rate income taxation. Delaware-based state tax avoidance strategies involving PICs have been 
in the media spotlight for a long time. In 2002, the Wall Street Journal published a front-page 
story on corporate state tax planning schemes using Delaware trademarks and provided a list 
of 49 firms who evidently applied the PIC strategy (Simpson 2002). Additionally, the New 
York Times repeatedly pointed out Delaware’s role as a domestic tax haven in several articles 
(Browning 2009; Wayne 2012).
As Delaware-based IP tax planning schemes come with substantial tax revenue losses 
for other U.S. states, they have been a thorn in some states’ sides for decades. California was 
the first state to address this issue in the 1930s. Hollywood filmmakers sold their California-
made movies to out-of-state distribution subsidiaries and eroded taxable income in California 
significantly (Huddleston and Sicilian 2008). To fight this tax-avoiding behavior, California 
implemented a so-called combined reporting system that is seen today as potentially the most 
effective countermeasure against the PIC strategy (see, e.g., Fox and Luna 2011; Cline 2008; 
8Mazerov 2009). Under this reporting system, related companies that form a unitary business 
are required to file one single return to determine state tax liability in the combined reporting 
state. Therefore, intragroup transactions are effectively eliminated. This feature of combined 
reporting removes the incentive to allocate profits to a no-tax state such as Delaware since 
those profits are still taxable in the high-tax state. Many other states followed California and 
implemented combined reporting provisions. There was an unprecedented wave of combined 
reporting adoptions among the states, especially between 2005 and 2011, when the number of 
combined reporting states grew from 16 to 23. In total, combined reporting was proposed in 
13 states during 2009 and 2010 (Fox and Luna 2011). Since 2011, a majority of states that 
levy corporate income taxes have used a combined reporting system.
Considering the great media and public attention Delaware has attracted as a U.S. do-
mestic tax and legal haven, the empirical literature has gathered surprisingly little direct quan-
titative evidence about Delaware’s role as a location for intangible assets and the effect that 
policies targeted to curb Delaware-based tax strategies have had on these allocation patterns. 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) show that almost 60 percent of U.S. parent firms are incorporated 
in Delaware. Dyreng et al. (2013) focus on subsidiary location. They empirically document 
that Delaware’s status as a combined domestic tax and legal haven has turned it into the pre-
ferred place for subsidiary incorporations. Moreover, they are able to show that combined 
reporting negatively impacts the probability of locating subsidiaries in Delaware.
In this study, we utilize a dataset containing the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s 
(USPTO) case files with matched corporate group structures of the Standard & Poor's 500 
(S&P 500) firms. We investigate the allocation of trademark rights towards Delaware by large 
U.S. multinational enterprises (MNEs) during the period from 2003 to 2012. As essential 
drivers of firm value, trademarks carry a particularly high potential for tax planning. The tax 
rate elasticity of trademark allocation has turned out to be generally high in an international 
setting (Pfeiffer and Voget 2016). Interestingly, however, our data show that 95 percent of the 
9U.S. trademarks owned by S&P 500 firms are held in the U.S. rather than offshore. This 
strong home bias in the location of U.S. trademarks, which has previously been documented 
by Heckemeyer et al. (2018), raises the still unanswered question of which domestic tax con-
siderations are actually decisive for the intra-U.S. allocation of trademarks.
Considering our results, we find that large U.S. firms indeed locate their U.S. trade-
marks in Delaware with a disproportionally high frequency. A total of 53.7 percent of our 
sample U.S. trademarks owned by the S&P 500 firms are registered in Delaware, while it only 
contributes to the U.S. national GDP with approximately 0.5 percent. However, Delaware’s 
share in the U.S. trademark portfolio diminished from 2004 to 2012 by approximately 12 per-
cent. Strikingly, the marked declines coincide well with waves of combined reporting adop-
tion during our sample period. Our regression estimates show a negative association between 
the probability of registering a trademark in Delaware and the registrant’s business activity in 
combined reporting states. Quantitatively, our results suggest that a 10 percent increase in 
business activity under combined reporting reduces the probability of filing a trademark in 
Delaware by 0.36 percentage points. While the response to the spread of combined reporting 
is statistically significant, the magnitude does not suggest that Delaware-based trademark 
strategies have been fully abandoned. Accordingly, our estimation results identify a robust 
positive effect of a firm’s weighted average statutory corporate state tax rate across the group 
on the probability of choosing Delaware as a trademark holding location. The probability is 
higher for those firms that are particularly well placed for effective PIC strategies due to low 
business activity in combined reporting states, a high presence in Delaware, and high market-
ing intensity. Taking the skewed distribution of trademark values into account, we find that 
firms are particularly likely to locate their valuable trademarks in Delaware. Moreover, we 
find in an additional analysis that investors reward the decision to allocate trademarks to Del-
aware as it increases firm value, particularly if those trademarks allocated to Delaware carry 
higher value.
10
Our study contributes to the literature on corporate income shifting. A rich body of em-
pirical literature examines the effects of corporate taxation on the international allocation of 
intangible assets. Grubert and Slemrod (1998) and Desai et al. (2006) show that U.S. MNEs 
with high IP intensity are likely to invest in tax haven affiliates. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) 
provide empirical evidence that the location of IP within European MNEs is biased towards 
low-tax affiliates. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and Griffith et al. (2014) show that the tax 
rate in a specific jurisdiction exerts a negative effect on the number of patent registrations in 
the respective jurisdiction. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to empirically inves-
tigate the pattern of domestic U.S. IP allocation within U.S. firms as well as the impact of 
state tax incentives and countermeasures. Our research is informative to the ongoing debate 
on national state tax planning strategies by U.S. firms involving trademarks. U.S. state poli-
cymakers have increasingly raised concerns about state tax avoidance strategies and the allo-
cation of intangible assets to low-tax states due to the decline in states’ corporate tax revenues 
over the last decades. While the percentage of state tax revenue sourced by corporate income 
tax was stable at almost 10 percent in the 1970s, it is now halved to 5 percent.
1
Moreover, our results also push forward the current debate in the European Union on in-
troducing an apportionment system formula among their member states, as its design and 
general idea resemble the combined reporting mechanism within the U.S. state tax system. 
Prior literature finds that tax systems based on formula apportionment are, compared to tradi-
tional systems based on separate accounting rules, less vulnerable to tax base manipulation 
(Clausing et al. 2011), particularly for those tax avoidance strategies using a tax-efficient 
transfer pricing system (Hellerstein 2005) or intragroup financing (Mintz and Smart 2004). 
However, there has been no study prior to ours that empirically investigates the effect of 
group consolidation on the allocation of the ownership of intangibles.
                                                
1 The Bureau of the Census provides historical tax revenue data on its website (https://www.census. 
gov/programs-surveys/qtax/data/tables.html). For instance, in 1977, the share was 9.7 percent while it de-
creased to 5 percent in 2016.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the fundamen-
tals of the U.S. corporate income state tax system, explains the Delaware-based tax planning 
strategy, and describes combined reporting as an effective countermeasure against this form 
of tax avoidance. Moreover, it demonstrates our data and presents a comprehensive explorato-
ry analysis. Section 2.3 explains our research design to examine determinants of the probabil-
ity of filing a trademark in Delaware, i.e., a discrete choice analysis at the level of individual 
trademarks, and presents our empirical results. Moreover, it contains several robustness tests. 
Section 2.4 contains an additional analysis whether the allocation of trademarks to Delaware 
has implications for firm value. Section 2.5 concludes the paper.
2.2. U.S. state corporate income taxation and trademark ownership
2.2.1. Context and prior literature
Through successful marketing and brand building, trademarks can carry substantial val-
ue reflecting reputation and consumer recognition (Cohen 2008). If a firm launches a new 
trademark, it has to decide whether it will be registered and to which group entity trademark 
ownership is allocated. Registering a trademark at the USPTO publicly documents the regis-
trant's claim and creates the legal presumption of ownership, establishing a right of priority 
covering the entire United States. Consider, for example, that a firm's new trademark is regis-
tered at the USPTO by one of its affiliates that is a resident in a low-tax U.S. state. Conse-
quently, this affiliate becomes the legal owner of the trademark. Since legal ownership and 
the trademark’s actual use in commerce are separable, the affiliate can license the right to use 
the trademark to other operating units of the firm. Considerable state tax benefits are achieved 
if the royalties paid for the license to use the trademark are deductible from the operating 
unit’s state tax base, while the associated royalty income is subject to comparably low state 
taxation at the level of the affiliate holding the trademark (Mazerov 2007).
It is an empirically well-documented fact that intangible assets carry a high potential for 
tax planning as they are, at the same time, essential drivers of firm value and can produce mo-
12
bile income through licensing (Grubert and Slemrod 1998; Dischinger and Riedel 2011). Pre-
vious empirical studies find that the geographical allocation of patent ownership within multi-
national enterprises indeed reflects international tax incentives (Karkinsky and Riedel 2012; 
Griffith et al. 2014). Considering the existing empirical evidence, IP-related income-shifting 
techniques involving tax-efficient transfer pricing and licensing are the dominant profit-
shifting channels (Heckemeyer and Overesch 2017). Hence, even small cross-jurisdictional 
tax rate differences can entail significant shifts in the allocation of IP ownership. Karkinsky 
and Riedel (2012) estimate that a one-percentage-point decrease in the corporate tax rate in-
creases the number of patent applications by 3.5 percent. Under certain conditions, the inter-
national tax effects for trademarks can be at least as high (Pfeiffer and Voget 2016). Consider-
ing the U.S. context, however, Heckemeyer et al. (2018) find that the majority of U.S. trade-
marks owned by the S&P 500 firms is actually held in the U.S. and not in foreign tax havens.
Actually, there is considerable variation in state corporate income tax rates in the U.S. 
In addition to federal income taxation, 44 U.S. states and the District of Columbia levy a cor-
porate income tax with top tax rates ranging from 4.6 percent in Colorado to 12.0 percent in 
Iowa. In Delaware, the general state tax rate is 8.7 percent. However, Delaware's Passive In-
vestment Company (PIC) regime fully exempts so-called investment companies from corpo-
rate income taxation under Section 1902(b)(8) of the Delaware Code. An investment company 
is defined as a company that confines its activities to the maintenance and management of its 
intangible investments. Section 1902(b)(8) of the Delaware Code explicitly includes trade-
marks in intangible investments. Underscoring the important role of these intangible assets, 
Mazerov (2007, p. 23) generally refers to Delaware’s passive investment companies as 
trademark holding companies. In this study, we conduct an in-depth microdata analysis while
focusing on strategic patterns of trademark allocation.
13
Table 2.1: Overview of U.S. state tax rates (as of 2012).
State
CIT 
(2012)
State
CIT 
(2012)
State
CIT 
(2012)
Delaware 0.0%a Montana 6.8% California 8.8%
Colorado 4.6% No. Carolina 6.9% Maine 8.9%
Mississippi 5.0% Arizona 7.0% Connecticut 9.0%b
S. Carolina 5.0% Kansas 7.0% New Jersey 9.0%
Utah 5.0% New York 7.1% Rhode Island 9.0%
No. Dakota 5.2% Idaho 7.6% Alaska 9.4%
Florida 5.5% New Mexico 7.6% Illinois 9.5%c
Georgia 6.0% Oregon 7.6% Minnesota 9.8%
Kentucky 6.0% Nebraska 7.8% Pennsylvania 10.0%
Michigan 6.0% W. Virginia 7.8% Distr. of Col. 10.0%
Oklahoma 6.0% Wisconsin 7.9% Iowa 12.0%
Virginia 6.0% Louisiana 8.0% Nevada -
Missouri 6.3% Massachusetts 8.0% S. Dakota -
Hawaii 6.4% Maryland 8.3% Wyoming -
Alabama 6.5% Indiana 8.5% Ohio -
d
Arkansas 6.5% N. Hampshire 8.5% Texas -
d
Tennessee 6.5% Vermont 8.5% Washington -
d
Notes: In this table, we present the top corporate income tax rates as of 2012.
a The statutory tax rate is 8.7%. However, in Section 1902(b)(8) of the Delaware Code, so-called investment 
companies (companies that confines its activities to the maintenance and management of its intangible 
investments, such as trademarks) are fully exempt from the corporate income tax.
b Includes a 20% surcharge which is levied on companies with an annual gross income of more than 
$100mil.
c Includes two separate corporate income taxes, one at a 7% rate and one at a 2.5% rate.
d Ohio, Texas, and Washington do not levy corporate income taxes. Instead, these states levy a corporate 
gross receipts tax
To illustrate the achievable tax benefits, for example, through licensing, Table 2.1
shows the U.S. state CIT rates as of 2012. Firms likely to have a Delaware-based PIC strategy 
in place, labeled by some as the most well-known aggressive tax planning technique with re-
spect to U.S. state-level CIT rates (Bankman 2007, p. 778), are able to reduce their state-level 
income taxes by between 15 and 24 percent relative to other firms (Dyreng et al. 2013). Im-
portantly, these state tax savings have always been permanent while tax savings from cross-
border tax planning under the former U.S. system of worldwide taxation with foreign divi-
dend tax credits were temporary and reversed upon repatriation of foreign profits to the U.S.
2
                                                
2 The U.S. indirect tax credit mechanism applied until 2017 to foreign dividends received by U.S. parent corpo-
rations leveled up the tax burden on foreign profits from low-tax countries to the U.S. tax rate. As the national 
tax system does not have such a mechanism, state tax savings from profit shifting strategies within the U.S. 
have always been definite.
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Delaware stands out not only for the tax advantages it offers but also for the significant legal 
and governance benefits available to firms incorporated there (Bebchuk et al. 2002; Roe 
2003). In 1899, Delaware liberalized its corporate law code to attract business to generate 
franchise fees and tax revenues (Larcom 1937). Today, Delaware has well-developed case 
law and many precedents. In particular, parent firms are attracted by Delaware’s body of anti-
takeover case law that allows for the flexible use of defense tactics. Its legal efficiency also 
results from the Court of Chancery system with experienced judges specialized in corporate 
matters and without a jury (Roe 2003). Altogether, Delaware’s status as a combined domestic 
tax and legal haven has turned it into the preferred place for parent (Bebchuk and Cohen 
2003) and subsidiary (Dyreng et al. 2013) incorporations.
3
These circumstances also add to 
the state’s attractiveness as a holding location.
2.2.2. Data
The data required to analyze the patterns of U.S. trademark allocation are obtained from 
the USPTO.
4
The USPTO database contains information about the legal owner of any regis-
tered trademark
5
, including its name, its address, and the U.S. state where it has its legal dom-
icile. The USPTO case files also document, among other things, the registration date and fur-
ther trademarks cited in the application. Specifically, we consider successful USPTO trade-
mark registrations that took place between January 2003 and December 2012.
6
Next, we combine this information on legal trademark owners with data covering the 
group structures of U.S. companies listed in the S&P 500 Index. The required information is 
obtained from Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K, which the companies must publicly file with the U.S. 
                                                
3 Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) show that almost 60 percent of U.S. parent firms are incorporated in Delaware, 
while Dyreng et al. (2013) find that approximately 58 percent of U.S. domestic subsidiaries are incorporated 
there. 
4 The full dataset of all historic trademark filings in the U.S. (from January 1870 to February 2018) is made 
available for download by the USPTO at https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-
products/trademark-case-files-dataset-0. 
5 A trademark application at the USPTO needs to be filed by the trademark’s legal owner (Graham et al. 2013). 
According to the USPTO manual, the data coverage is 100 percent from 1982 on.
6 We exclude renewal registrations because trademark renewal often follows the primary filing, potentially lead-
ing to a strong dependence of the respective data points and problems of double counting. We also exclude in-
trafirm reallocations of an already registered trademark.
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Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC).
7
Exhibit 21 discloses information about a compa-
ny's significant subsidiaries and their countries of incorporation.
8
For this information, we 
refer to the fiscal year 2007, which is the median year of our sample. We include all U.S. sub-
sidiaries. To match the subsidiary data with the trademark data obtained from the USPTO, we 
use the trademarks' legal owners and the Exhibit 21 subsidiary names with the respective 
states of incorporation as identifiers.
A detailed description of the data collection and matching process is given in Appendix 
2.2. In total, our final dataset includes 81,488 new trademarks registered by U.S. entities of 
the S&P 500 for use in United States commerce by 497 S&P firms during the time period 
from 2003 to 2012.
2.2.3. Delaware’s dominance as a trademark holding location
In the following, we will provide first descriptive statistics exploring the role of Dela-
ware as a dominant holding location for U.S. trademarks. Figure 2.1 illustrates the regional 
distribution of our sample trademarks and shows that Delaware by far dominates all other 
U.S. states with respect to U.S. trademark registrations. In aggregate, the S&P 500 firms reg-
istered 53.7 percent of their U.S. trademarks in Delaware during our sample period from 2003 
to 2012.
9
                                                
7 Data extracted from Exhibit 21 has been used previously, for example, by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), Lindsey 
and Wilson (2015), Dyreng et al. (2013), and Heckemeyer et al. (2018). The data are available from the SEC’s 
database EDGAR: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/ companysearch.html.
8 According to SEC Regulations (17 CFR 210.1-02(w)), a subsidiary can be deemed not to be a significant sub-
sidiary if all of the following three conditions are met: (1) the parent company’s and its other subsidiaries’ in-
vestments in the subsidiary do not exceed ten percent of the parent company’s total assets; (2) the parent com-
pany’s and its other subsidiaries’ proportionate share of the assets of the subsidiary do not exceed ten percent 
of the consolidated firm’s total assets; and (3) the parent company’s and its other subsidiaries’ proportionate 
share of the subsidiary’s pre-tax income from continuing operations does not exceed ten percent of the consol-
idated income from continuing operations.
9 This share is much higher in our sample than for the total USPTO dataset of all trademarks located in the U.S. 
where the ratio of Delaware-trademarks is only 24 percent in the sample period. 
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Figure 2.1: State distribution of trademarks registered by S&P 500 firms from 2003 to 2012.
Notes: This figure presents the total number of successful trademark registrations filed by affiliates of S&P 500 
firms aggregated per U.S. state between 2003 and 2012 for the top seven states. We obtain the location of each 
firm’s subsidiaries from the USPTO case file dataset. 
Table 2.2: Aggregated frequency of trademark ownership location choice of S&P 500 firms 
by state (2003-2012) in relation to GDP contribution. 
State N Trademarks %Total (I) GDP ($ Bill.) %Total (II)
Ratio of %Total: 
(I) / (II)
Difference
(I) – (II)
Delaware 43,770 53.7% 55 0.4% 136.2 53.3%***
California 4,549 5.6% 1,880 13.4% 0.4 -7.8%
New York 3,555 4.4% 1,110 7.9% 0.6 -3.5%
Ohio 2,701 3.3% 486 3.5% 1.0 -0.2%
Illinois 2,387 2.9% 628 4.5% 0.7 -1.6%
New Jersey 2,377 2.9% 471 3.4% 0.9 -0.5%
Nevada 2,145 2.6% 118 0.8% 3.1 1.8%
Minnesota 1,908 2.3% 258 1.8% 1.3 0.5%
Washington 1,656 2.0% 332 2.4% 0.9 -0.3%
Florida 1,252 1.5% 715 5.1% 0.3 -3.6%
Michigan 1,222 1.5% 392 2.8% 0.5 -1.3%
… … … … … … …
Total 81,488 100.0% 14,016 100.0%
0.3
(median)
-0.7%
(median)
Notes: In this table, we examine the frequency of trademark registrations by S&P 500 firms from 2003 to 2012 
aggregated on state-level and put it in relation to the GDP contribution of each state. In column (I), we present 
each state’s percentage of the total count of our sample trademarks. We obtain the trademark information from 
the USPTO case file dataset. In column (II), we present each state’s average percentage of total U.S. GDP be-
tween 2003 and 2012. Real average GDP by state between 2003 and 2012 (measured in 2009 USD) is taken 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). In the two rightmost columns, we present the ratio of columns (I) 
and (II) and the difference between columns (I) and (II). Moreover, we assess the statistical significance of the 
difference by dividing the difference for each state by the standard deviation of the differences for all the states. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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In Table 2.2, we compare the respective proportion of trademark registrations to the 
state's share of the total GDP for Delaware and ten other top U.S. states. We find that Dela-
ware accounts for more than 136 times the number of trademarks we would expect based up-
on its relative share of the U.S. GDP.
10
The state that comes second in this ranking is Nevada 
– with a proportion of trademark registrations exceeding its proportion of GDP by a factor of 
three. Like Delaware, Nevada also refrains from taxing royalty income. In the last column of 
Table 2.2, we report the differences in means between the trademark share and the GDP con-
tribution as well as the statistical significance of these differences using t-statistics.
We observe that Delaware strongly dominates the other states as a trademark filing lo-
cation. The difference between the proportion of trademarks located in Delaware and its pro-
portion of the total GDP is highly significant at the 1 percent level. Altogether, these bivariate 
statistics provide the first evidence that the frequency of Delaware-owned trademarks is dis-
proportionally high relative to what Delaware's economic size would predict. We conclude 
that, at least to some extent, this evidence is consistent with tax considerations rather than 
economic factors motivating trademark allocation to Delaware.
Figure 2.2 shows industry differences in the importance of Delaware as a trademark 
holding location. Specifically, this figure provides an industry breakdown of the average per-
centage share of trademarks that firms allocated to Delaware between 2003 and 2012.
11
The 
overall industry average share of trademarks held in Delaware is highest for the manufactur-
ing industry (56 percent), while it is lowest for the finance, insurance and real estate industries 
(37 percent). Moreover, we compute the overall sample mean of trademarks allocated to Del-
aware (lower dotted line) as well as the average share of Delaware trademarks for firms active 
in industries that turn out to be particularly functional for profit shifting (upper dotted line) 
                                                
10 Interestingly, this dominance of Delaware seems to be more pronounced by far with respect to trademarks than 
with respect to patents. Dyreng et al. (2013) showed a ratio of only 4.58 in a similar comparison for patents.
11 The industries are grouped according to their industry divisions (https://www.naics.com/sic-codes-industry-
drilldown/).
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according to research by De Simone, Mills and Stomberg (2014).
12
The average Delaware 
share of trademarks for these mobile-income industries is indeed approximately 15 percentage 
points higher than the overall average, i.e. 62.4 percent vs. 47.6 percent.
Figure 2.2: The use of Delaware as trademark location across industries. 
Notes: This figure shows a SIC division breakdown of the firms’ average percentage share of trademarks allo-
cated to Delaware between 2003 and 2012. The lower dotted line is the overall firm average share of trademarks 
that firms allocated to Delaware between 2003 and 2012. The upper dotted line is the firm average share of Del-
aware-trademarks for firms from specific industries that turn out to be particularly functional for profit shifting 
according to research by De Simone, Mills and Stomberg (2014), i.e. firms which have one the following three-
digit SIC codes: 283 (Pharmaceutical), 357, 367, 737 (Computers) and 738 (Services).
Figure 2.3 illustrates the apportionment of trademark registrations for a selection of 30 
S&P 500 firms. Figure 2.3 shows considerable variation in the total number of U.S. trade-
marks that S&P 500 firms have registered between 2003 and 2012 as well as in the fraction of 
registrations that they have filed from Delaware. For example, we identify 4,216 U.S. trade-
marks that have all been registered by the toy manufacturer Mattel Inc. from its Delaware-
based entities. Moreover, according to our data, fashion retailer L Brands Inc. registered 831 
U.S. trademarks during the sample period, of which the ownership of 97 percent (i.e., 807) 
was allocated to Delaware subsidiaries. This is in line with anecdotal evidence published in 
                                                
12 These are firms which have one the following three-digit SIC codes: 283 (Pharmaceutical), 357, 367, 737 
(Computers) and 738 (Services).
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the Wall Street Journal
13
, presenting this company as one of the most striking examples of a 
Delaware-based tax strategy that inflicts tax revenue losses on other U.S. states, considering 
that L Brands holds trademarks for its famous Limited chains, such as Bath & Body Works
and Victoria’s Secret, in its Delaware PICs.
Figure 2.3: Trademark portfolios of selected S&P 500 firms.
Notes: This figure shows the fractions of the U.S. trademark portfolios allocated to Delaware (vs. other U.S. 
states) between 2003 and 2012 for the Top-20 firms in terms of trademark registrations and, if not already in that 
group, the Top-10 firms in terms of average advertising expenditure.
                                                
13 See Simpson (2002). The article lists further examples of extensive Delaware-owned trademark registrations 
that we can confirm on the basis of our data. These are TJX Companies Inc., Staples Inc., Sherwin Williams 
Co., Kimberly Clark Corp., Honeywell International Inc., Tyson Food Inc., Snap-on Inc., ConAgra Foods Inc., 
and McCormick & Co. Inc. According to our data, these firms feature a Delaware-share of trademark registra-
tions that ranges between 60 and 99 percent.
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2.2.4. Combined reporting as a countermeasure
U.S. states are well aware of the tax revenue shortfalls associated with Delaware-
centered intangible licensing models. The most prominent method to fight this type of state 
tax avoidance strategy is the adoption of mandatory combined reporting for state tax purposes 
(see, e.g., Fox and Luna 2011; Cline 2008; Mazerov 2009).
14
Combined reporting is a filing 
method that requires a group of related affiliates to act as one taxpayer and file only one com-
bined tax return for state tax purposes. Consequently, the consolidated income of the group, 
instead of each separate legal entity, is apportioned among the states where the group has 
business activity. In line with the state tax guidelines recommended by the Multistate Tax 
Commission, most jurisdictions apply a formula consisting of three factors to apportion the 
firms’ state tax income among the states: property (which usually does not include intangible 
property), payroll and sales (Swenson et al. 2004).
15
Importantly, the consolidation of tax re-
turns eliminates intercompany transactions. Thus, it defeats the PIC strategy by netting out 
trademark-related royalty payments within the group. In this case, interposing a Delaware-
based affiliate no longer shields income from taxation in the states of operating activity be-
cause the group profit is apportioned to the operational parts of the unitary business. As a con-
sequence, a trademark holding does not lower the state taxable income of the group, and the 
incentive to allocate trademarks and associated royalty income to Delaware should be elimi-
nated by this countermeasure (Fox and Luna 2011).
                                                
14 Other countermeasures against Delaware-based state tax avoidance strategies are, for example, the economic 
nexus approach, expense disallowance provisions, sham transactions laws, discretionary combination authori-
ty, and transfer pricing audits. According to the literature, most of those other countermeasures are watered 
down or applied very heterogeneously, so we focus on combined reporting (Mazerov 2007). In a robustness 
check, we test the effectiveness of the economic nexus doctrine.
15 In those formulas, each factor is expressed in a fraction where the numerator is the amount of each factor in a 
state, while the denominator is the firm’s overall amount of each factor. The weightings of each factor, howev-
er, are not consistent. While some states weight each factor in equal parts, some states put more emphasis on 
(or exclusively consider) the sales factor. The Federation of Tax Administrators provides an overview of each 
state’s weightings (https://www.taxadmin.org/assets/docs/Research/Rates/apport.pdf). 
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Table 2.3: Combined reporting and separate reporting states in the U.S.
Combined reporting states (year of adoption) Separate reporting states
California (1963) Illinois (1993) Alabama New Jersey
Oregon (1975) Utah (1993) Arkansas New Mexico
Montana (1977) Hawaii (1995) Delaware North Carolina
N. Hampshire (1981) Vermont (2006) Florida Ohio
Minnesota (1982) New York (2007) Georgia Oklahoma
Idaho (1984) Michigan (2008) Indiana Pennsylvania
Kansas (1984) Massachusetts (2009) Iowa South Carolina
Nebraska (1984) W. Virginia (2009) Kentucky South Dakota
Colorado (1985) Wisconsin (2009) Louisiana Tennessee
Arizona (1986) Washington D.C. (2011) Maryland Texas
Maine (1986) Rhode Island (2015) Mississippi Virginia
North Dakota (1990) Connecticut (2016) Missouri Washington
Alaska (1993) Nevada Wyoming
Notes: In this table, we present the year of implementation of a combined reporting regime in each state, if ap-
plicable (source: own research). Adoptions that lie within our sample period 2003-2012 are marked in grey.
As Table 2.3 shows, combined reporting has become increasingly popular among the 
U.S. states. Between 2003 and 2012, the number of states that have mandatory combined re-
porting in place has risen by 44 percent, i.e., from 16 to 23 percent. As of 2012, the market 
size of combined reporting states represents 45 percent of the national U.S. GDP. The seven 
jurisdictions that adopted combined reporting between 2003 and 2012 are the states of Ver-
mont, New York, Michigan, Massachusetts, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of 
Columbia.
16
These seven combined reporting adopters contribute 17 percent to U.S. national 
GDP. Table 2.3 shows which states have implemented combined reporting provisions and the 
year of implementation.
According to empirical findings presented in Dyreng et al. (2013), firms with business 
activity in combined reporting states feature an increased state income tax burden, which 
might be explained by their reduced leeway to exploit Delaware-based tax avoidance strate-
gies. Consistently, the likelihood of a firm having at least one subsidiary in Delaware is posi-
tively related to the number of its subsidiaries in separate (vs. combined) reporting states. 
Mukherjee et al. (2017) find that a corporate income tax increase is associated with less inno-
                                                
16 Moreover, nine other states considered adoption (see, e.g., Fox and Luna 2011).
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vative activities, as measured by patent filings, only for firms headquartered in a combined 
reporting state. The innovation of firms domiciling in separate filing states is not permanently 
hindered. The authors interpret their findings as evidence for the reduced effectiveness of pa-
tent shifting towards low-tax states under combined reporting.
Previous findings thus indirectly support the view that the expansion of combined re-
porting has reduced the effectiveness of Delaware-based tax strategies involving intangible 
investment. Yet, we expect the effects of combined reporting on these schemes to be most 
directly observable at the level of intangible asset allocation. Precisely, we hypothesize that 
the substantial expansion of combined reporting during our sample period has negatively af-
fected the allocation of S&P 500 trademark ownership to Delaware. To the best of our 
knowledge, no study has analyzed this direct effect of combined reporting on the intangible 
asset allocation towards Delaware.   
To provide first graphical evidence of the impact combined reporting has on trademark 
allocation to Delaware, Figure 2.4 relates the average share of trademarks held in Delaware to 
the number of a firm’s subsidiaries in combined reporting states. Firms in the first sample 
quartile, i.e., with a relatively low business presence in combined reporting states, have a Del-
aware concentration of trademark ownership of 54.5 percent. This number is considerably 
higher than the 40.6 percent share of Delaware-owned trademarks in the group of firms with a 
relatively high presence in combined reporting states. Firms that have a number of subsidiar-
ies within the second and third quartiles of the count of subsidiaries in combined reporting 
states feature shares of Delaware ownership that lie in between these numbers.
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Figure 2.4: Degree of firms’ business presence in combined reporting states and the use of 
Delaware as trademark location.
Notes: This figure shows the average ratios of trademarks that firms allocated to Delaware between 2003 and 
2012 in percent for firms in the 1st to the 4th quartiles with respect to the average number of subsidiaries a firm 
has in combined reporting states over the sample period. The dotted line is the overall firm average ratio of 
trademarks that firms allocated to Delaware between 2003 and 2012. We obtain the trademark information from 
the USPTO case file dataset. Firms’ state-level subsidiary information based on their Exhibit 21 disclosures is 
collected from Scott Dyreng’s website (https://sites.google.com/site/scottdyreng/).
Figure 2.5 shows that the overall share of Delaware-owned trademark registrations de-
creases between 2004 and 2012 by approximately 12 percent, decreasing from 56 to 49 per-
cent. Noticeably, this decline correlates strongly with the rise of combined reporting among 
U.S. states. During our sample period, the share of the total U.S. GDP that combined report-
ing states contribute increased from 29 to 45 percent. The strongest rise occurred after 2009 
when Massachusetts, West Virginia, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia adopted the new 
regime. According to the graph in Figure 2.5, the rise of combined reporting coincides with 
Delaware's most significant drop in the frequency of trademark assignment. The correlation 
coefficient of Delaware's share of trademark registrations and the number of combined report-
ing jurisdictions is -0.70. These aggregate patterns are consistent with the conjecture that 
combined reporting indeed bears fruit and, to a certain extent, represses state tax avoidance 
strategies involving Delaware-held trademarks.
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Figure 2.5: The rise of combined reporting and the use of Delaware as trademark location.
Notes: This figure presents the part of the sample trademark that is registered in Delaware relative to the total 
U.S. registrations per year in percent. We obtain the trademark information from the USPTO case file dataset. 
Moreover, it shows the number of U.S. states which have implemented combined reporting provisions in the 
respective year.
Consistent with the decrease in the aggregate share of Delaware-owned trademark 
registrations shown in Figure 2.5, we see in Figure 2.6 that the share of S&P 500 firms that 
have registered at least one new trademark in Delaware drops from 79 percent in 2003 to 73 
percent in 2012.
Figure 2.6: The share of firms using Delaware as trademark holding location (2003 vs. 2012).
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of S&P 500 firms that filed at least one of their trademark registrations 
in Delaware (vs. firms that filed trademark registrations, but none of those at a Delaware subsidiary) for the 
years 2003 and 2012.
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Figure 2.7: Change in the percentage of Delaware-trademarks (2003 vs. 2012) of selected 
S&P 500 firms.
Notes: This figure shows the percentage change of the share of the trademarks allocated to Delaware in relation 
to all registered U.S. trademarks (2003 vs. 2012) at the Top-20 firms in terms of trademark registrations and the 
Top-10 advertising firms in terms of the average advertising expenditures between 2003 and 2012 (five firms 
meet both criteria). Coca-Cola Co has 0 percent in 2003, so its value is actually not defined.
Interestingly, considering once again the selection of firms presented in Figure 2.3, we 
find in Figure 2.7 that the developments in trademark registrations over time turn out to be 
somewhat heterogeneous. On the one hand, we observe sharp decreases in Delaware shares 
for the majority of firms. For example, International Game Technology Plc, had a 91 percent 
drop in Delaware registrations. On the other hand, other firms feature constant or even slight-
ly increasing fractions of Delaware ownership. Thus, in Section 2.3, we utilize a regression 
analysis of the determinants affecting the S&P 500 firms' decision to assign their trademarks 
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to Delaware subsidiaries with special focus on the effect that results from the expansion of 
combined reporting among U.S. states.
2.3. Multivariate analysis
We aim to investigate the determinants that affect and drive the S&P 500 firms' decision 
to use Delaware-based tax strategies involving their trademarks. We are particularly interested 
in the impact that combined reporting has on this choice. For this purpose, we utilize 81,488 
trademark registrations at the USPTO and investigate the binary choice whether to locate 
trademark ownership in Delaware or elsewhere in the U.S.
17
2.3.1. Methodology
To assess potential determinants of the binary decision whether to locate trademark 
ownership in Delaware or elsewhere in the U.S., we specify the following linear probability 
model (LPM).
            =    +       (      .             )   +       (      .       .   )  
+       .             +           +                         
+                    +        +              +                  
+          +              +  
(Eq. 2.1)
Delawarejkt is the binary dependent variable and takes on the value of one if firm k as-
signs the ownership of a new trademark j in year t to a Delaware subsidiary and zero other-
wise. The explanatory variables included also encompass factors that reflect the tax incentives 
to allocate trademarks to Delaware but also restrictions to this type of strategy. In particular, 
we consider the count of firm k’s subsidiaries in combined reporting states (Log(N Subs. in 
CR States)). Combined reporting impedes profit shifting with royalty payments for trade-
marks. Accordingly, we expect that the more a firm's business activity takes place in com-
bined reporting states, the more the firm may refrain from locating its trademarks in Dela-
ware.
                                                
17 Only 4.7 percent of the trademarks the S&P 500 firms have registered at the USPTO during our sample period 
are owned by offshore affiliates.
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Moreover, we consider the natural logarithm of the number of subsidiaries in foreign tax 
haven countries, Log(N Subs.in for. TH).
18
The variable reflects a firm's presence in offshore 
tax havens outside the U.S. While only a small fraction of U.S. trademarks is owned outside 
the U.S. (Heckemeyer et al. 2018), the use of offshore tax havens may still be a substitute for 
Delaware in a company's tax avoidance scheme.
Avg. state CIT is a variable capturing the weighted average of the statutory state tax 
rates across all locations of a corporate group.
19
We expect that a higher average state CIT 
rate provides incentives for firms to engage in Delaware-based tax strategies. A higher tax 
level implies a higher tax-saving potential using PIC schemes. Thus, we predict a positive 
influence of a firm's weighted average state CIT rate on the decision to locate trademark own-
ership in Delaware.
Moreover, we follow Dyreng et al. (2013) and construct a binary variable PIC to identi-
fy firms that are likely to be using a Delaware-based PIC strategy. According to our defini-
tion, this indicator takes the value of one for a firm k if three conditions are cumulatively ful-
filled: (1) the firm has a relatively large proportion of subsidiaries incorporated in Delaware, 
(2) the firm has a relatively small proportion of subsidiaries incorporated in combined-
reporting states, and (3) the firm has a relatively high marketing intensity.
20
We expect the 
coefficient on the PIC indicator variable to be positive.
Furthermore, we include a proxy for trademark value. A broad body of literature doc-
uments that the value distribution of intellectual property rights is highly skewed. This holds 
true for patents (e.g., Hall et al. 2007; Griffith et al. 2014), and it is also true for trademarks 
                                                
18 Countries are defined as tax havens when three of the following four sources list them as a tax haven: (1) Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), (2) the U.S. Stop Tax Havens Abuse Act, 
(3) The International Monetary Fund (IMF), and (4) the Tax Research Organization. This categorization is in 
line with Dyreng and Lindsey (2009).
19 For each firm, state CIT rates are weighted by the proportion of its subsidiaries domiciled in that particular 
state, proxying for the state's share in the firm's business activity. We exclude Delaware subsidiaries when cal-
culating the weights.
20 Dyreng et al. (2013) use the market-to-book ratio instead of marketing intensity to capture firms with relative-
ly high intangible assets. As we focus on trademarks, we modified this proxy and use marketing intensity. In 
an untabulated robustness test, we also estimate a specification with a proxy using the market-to-book ratio 
and find comparable results.
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(see, e.g., Sandner and Block 2011; Barth et al. 1998). If companies employ tax avoidance 
strategies involving royalty payments, the tax savings correlate with the value of the underly-
ing IP. Thus, we predict that Delaware-based strategies particularly involve valuable trade-
marks.
To proxy for the value of a trademark, we consider two features. First, we check 
whether the mark has been cited by other subsequent trademarks. Citations have been fre-
quently used as value indicators in patent research (Hall et al. 2005; Ernst et al. 2014). Gra-
ham et al. (2013) consider forward citations as an indication of trademark value. We thus ar-
gue that trademarks that are cited in subsequent registrations are an indication of umbrella 
brands.
21
Second, we check whether a trademark has been filed for global protection. As filing 
for international trademark protection through a Madrid International Registration signals 
global use in commerce, a trademark that is protected worldwide might be more valuable than 
a local one (Griffith et al. 2014; Ernst et al. 2014). Eventually, our indicator variable Valuable
takes a value of one if the mark is cited
22
and/or internationally protected.
Finally, we control for a set of firm characteristics that may have an impact on the deci-
sion to allocate trademark ownership to Delaware. Specifically, we include Size, defined as 
the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets, Marketing Intensity, defined as the firm’s ad-
vertising expenses divided by its total assets, and Profitability, defined as the firm’s gross 
profits divided by its total sales. Moreover, we include fixed effects for the year, the state of 
parent incorporation, and the industry. We compute standard errors that are robust to cluster-
ing of trademark choices within firms. Summary statistics for all variables used in equation 
(1) are reported in Table 2.4.
                                                
21 For example, the sample trademark protecting the use of the slogan Made for iPhone (Serial No. 85025627, 
registered in 2010) cites the sample trademark for the product name iPhone (Serial No. 77975076, registered 
in 2009), which is a valuable umbrella trademark and the basis for many other trademarks. Another illustrative 
example is the filing for the sample trademark protecting the product name Apple TV (Serial No. 77152380, 
registered in 2007), which cites the trademark Apple (Serial No. 73120444, registered in 1977) as its prior 
mark.
22 We consider trademark citations until 2015.
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Delaware 63,436 0.54 0.50 0 1
N Subs. in CR-states 63,436 17.68 46.36 0 650
N Subs. in EN-states 63,436 28.63 58.72 0 758
N Subs. in for. TH 63,436 37.74 71.20 1 801
Avg. state CIT 63,436 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.10
Size 63,436 10.15 1.62 5.21 14.67
Marketing intensity 63,436 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.20
Profitability 63,436 0.41 0.59 -9.52 2.11
PIC 63,436 0.09 0.23 0 1
PIC (EN) 63,436 0.13 0.34 0 1
Valuable 63,436 0.25 0.43 0 1
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in the regression model presented in Ta-
ble 2.5. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.1.
2.3.2. Results
Table 2.5 reports the results of our empirical analysis. Specification (1) puts a focus on 
the firm-specific tax factors, with Log(N Subs. in CR states) as our main explanatory variable 
of interest. In column (2), we augment the specification and include our PIC indicator as well 
as our trademark value indicator Valuable. In the subsequent specification (3), we test for 
potential nonlinearities in the influence of value on the decision to locate trademark owner-
ship in Delaware. Specifically, we test whether firms prone to Delaware PIC strategies are 
especially likely to assign their most valuable trademarks to Delaware. In columns (4) and (5), 
we check for the robustness of our results to alternative estimation techniques. Specifically, 
we estimate our baseline specification using nonlinear logit and probit estimation.
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Table 2.5: Determinants of the probability to choose Delaware as trademark location. 
Combined Reporting Economic Nexus
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Delaware LPM LPM LPM Logit Probit LPM LPM
Log(N Subs. in -0.038** -0.027* -0.027* -0.208** -0.122***
    CR states) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.081) (0.046)
Log(N Subs. in EN -0.036*** -0.033***
    states) (0.012) (0.011)
Log(N Subs. in -0.016* -0.018* -0.018* -0.103* -0.058* -0.014 -0.009
    for. TH) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.060) (0.033) (0.010) (0.012)
Avg. state CIT 1.125** 1.304*** 1.312*** 6.096** 3.647** 1.336*** 1.437***
(0.466) (0.474) (0.474) (2.776) (1.624) (0.491) (0.477)
Size 0.046** 0.044** 0.044** 0.267** 0.148** 0.041** 0.033*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.109) (0.061) (0.018) (0.019)
Marketing intensity 0.721 0.354 0.350 3.751 2.324 0.715 0.778
(0.831) (0.825) (0.826) (4.618) (2.566) (0.830) (0.820)
Profitability -0.030* -0.029* -0.029* -0.145** -0.088* -0.029* -0.031*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.073) (0.046) (0.017) (0.018)
PIC 0.272*** 0.258***
(0.096) (0.098)
Valuable 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.023**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
PIC x Valuable 0.059*
(0.033)
PIC (EN) 0.067
(0.049)
PIC (EN) x 0.038*
     Valuable (0.022)
Constant -0.697*** -0.680*** -0.677*** -2.903*** -1.638*** -0.615*** -0.589***
(0.221) (0.238) (0.239) (0.985) (0.556) (0.219) (0.227)
Observations 63,436 63,436 63,436 63,108 63,108 63,422 63,422
R2 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent-State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a linear (1-3, 6-7), a logit (4) and a probit (5) regression mod-
el on trademark level with a binary dependent variable taking the value of one if a trademark is filed in Delaware 
(Delaware). All variables are defined in Appendix 2.1. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (all two-tailed), 
respectively.
Turning to the estimation results, we consistently identify a negative coefficient of 
Log(N Subs.in CR States). Hence, combined reporting effectively reduces the attractiveness of 
Delaware as a trademark holding location. The more a firm's business activity takes place in 
states with combined reporting, the less likely it is to choose a Delaware subsidiary to own its 
trademark rights. This empirical finding confirms our expectation and the explorative analysis 
illustrated with Figures 2.4 and 2.5 in Section 2.2.
Taken at face value, the estimated coefficient of Log(N Subs.in CR States) presented in 
column (1) suggests that, on average, a 10 percent increase in business activity under com-
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bined reporting reduces the probability that a firm will file a trademark in Delaware by 0.36 
percentage points (= ln(1.1) ∗ 0.038).
23
While statistically significant, the direct effect from 
the number of subsidiaries subject to regimes of combined reporting empirically explains only 
part of the 12 percent drop in the aggregate share of Delaware-owned trademark registrations 
(see Figure 2.5), which is also absorbed by the set of further observable and unobservable 
factors controlled for in our regressions.
Furthermore, the probability that a firm assigns a Delaware entity to own a trademark 
registration turns out to be significantly reduced if a firm is present in offshore tax havens. 
The estimates for the variable Log(N Subs.in for. TH) are negative and significant at a 10 per-
cent level. Interpreted at face value, the coefficient in column (1) suggests that one additional 
subsidiary in a foreign tax haven decreases the probability of choosing Delaware as a trade-
mark location by approximately 0.1 percentage points at the average S&P 500 firm. This re-
sult suggests that domestic and offshore tax havens, to a certain degree, act as substitutes in 
firms' tax planning considerations.
Moreover, we consider potential determinants that favor the use of Delaware-based tax 
strategies. An increasing savings potential of state taxes, as reflected by the group's average 
tax level, seems to incite firms to choose Delaware as a holding location for trademarks. Re-
ferring to columns (1) to (3) of Table 2.5, an increase in a group's weighted tax rate by one 
percentage point is, on average, associated with a 1.1 to 1.3 percentage point increase in the 
probability to locate trademark rights in Delaware. Moreover, we estimate a positive coeffi-
cient of the binary PIC indicator marking firms that are particularly prone to implement a 
Delaware-based state tax avoidance strategy. Quantitatively, the estimated coefficients of PIC
in Table 2.5 suggest that the probability of locating trademark ownership in Delaware in-
                                                
23 The log-transformation for zero values is not defined. In an untabulated robustness check, we add a small 
constant (=0.1) to avoid losing firms that do not show any business presence in combined reporting states. This 
approach is in line with previous studies (e.g., Plassmann and Tideman 2001; Hilary and Lennox 2005; 
Weichenrieder 2009; Dischinger and Riedel 2011). The results remain comparable to our baseline results.
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creases by 26 to 27 percentage points if a firm is positioned to benefit from a PIC strategy. 
This effect is consistently significant at the 1 percent level.
Considering the estimated coefficients of our value indicator Valuable in columns (2) 
and (3) of Table 2.5, we find that a higher trademark value significantly increases the proba-
bility of locating trademark ownership in Delaware. Quantitatively, the probability to register 
it in Delaware is increased by approximately 2.4 to 2.8 percentage points if the trademark is 
considered valuable.
Finally, we investigate whether the relationship between trademark value and its own-
ership location in Delaware is particularly strong for firms that are more exposed to the PIC 
strategy. Including an interaction of the binary variables Valuable and PIC, we find in column 
(3) of Table 2.5 that the positive effect of trademark value more than triples in the case of PIC
firms. More specifically, the coefficients suggest that the probability of filing a trademark in 
Delaware is 8.3 percentage points higher for PIC firms.
With respect to the remaining firm-level control variables, we find that larger firms are 
significantly more likely to choose Delaware subsidiaries to own their trademarks. Profitabil-
ity has a negative effect, and marketing intensity has no statistically significant influence on 
trademark allocation.
Considering our robustness checks, the results from both the logit and the probit estima-
tions in columns (4) and (5) of Table 2.5 confirm our main inferences from the linear proba-
bility model. Considering, for example, the results from the logit estimation, the coefficient of 
-0.208 suggests that a 10 percent increase in business activity under combined reporting re-
duces the probability of filing a trademark in Delaware by 0.32 percentage points. This esti-
mated effect is very similar to our baseline specification using LPM.
In columns (6) and (7) of Table 2.5, we extend our analysis and consider the effects of 
the so-called economic nexus doctrine on Delaware-based tax avoidance strategies involving 
the use of trademarks. In states with this type of state tax regime, the liability to state tax de-
33
pends on a firm's economic footprint in the jurisdiction. Thus, nexus might already be estab-
lished by the generation of revenues, whereas the usually required physical presence, for ex-
ample, embodied by property or employees, is not necessary. If nexus is given, the applying 
state may deny the deduction of royalty expenses and include the income associated with 
trademark use in its state tax base.
24
To investigate the effect of the nexus approach on trade-
mark allocation to Delaware, we adjust the count of subsidiaries in combined reporting states 
to additionally take into account affiliates active in economic nexus states, i.e., Log(N subs in 
EN-states). The estimated coefficient of such a modified subsidiary count reported in columns 
(6) and (7) is slightly more negative than that in our baseline approach (column (1)) and high-
ly significant. This finding suggests that the additional restriction adds to the suppression of 
Delaware-based trademark strategies.
2.3.3. Robustness test: Poisson estimation at the firm-year level
In a further robustness check, we redefine our general data structure. Instead of consid-
ering observations at the trademark level, we take a firm-level perspective and consider 
trademark counts. In this redefined dataset, the dependent variable is the number of trade-
marks located in Delaware for each firm-year included in our data.
To acknowledge the count nature of these data, we use a Poisson regression model, 
which is a natural starting point for analyzing count data (Cameron and Trivedi 2013), for our 
investigation.
25
To control for time-constant, unobservable, firm-specific factors as well as to 
control for aggregate fluctuations over time, we estimate a fixed-effect Poisson model with 
firm and time-fixed effects. As a consequence, time-invariant explanatory variables such as 
our PIC indicator are omitted in this specification.
                                                
24 In addition to the states that already enforced combined reporting that, by definition, follow this doctrine, 
Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and South Carolina 
assert an economic nexus doctrine throughout the entire sample period. During the sample period, Louisiana, 
Ohio (both 2004), Oklahoma (2005), Kentucky (2007), Alabama (2008), and Connecticut (2010) adopted this 
doctrine.
25 We follow, for instance, Papke (1991), who uses a Poisson model to investigate the impact of tax rate differ-
ences within the U.S. on the location decisions of companies.
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Table 2.6: Firm-level robustness test.
Dep. Var.: (1) (2)
Delaware_count Poisson FE Poisson FE
N Subs. in CR states -0.0014***
(0.001)
Ratio of Subs. in CR states -0.287**
(0.144)
N Subs. in for. TH 0.001* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Avg. state CIT 1.311 1.791
(1.197) (1.236)
Size 0.007 0.012
(0.083) (0.082)
Marketing intensity 1.176 1.204
(2.126) (2.075)
Profitability -0.038*** -0.038***
(0.007) (0.007)
Observations 3,585 3,585
Year FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a Poisson fixed effects model on firm-year level with a Del-
aware-trademark count as dependent variable (Delaware_count). All variables are defined in Appendix 2.1. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
Table 2.6 presents the regression results for this count data model. As shown in column 
(1), we can generally confirm our main finding. The number of trademarks that a firm allo-
cates to Delaware decreases when its number of subsidiaries in combined reporting states in-
creases. Quantitatively, ten more subsidiaries in combined reporting states lead to a decrease 
of 1.4 percent (i.e., e
10*-0.0014 
– 1) in the number of trademarks allocated to Delaware in the 
respective year.
Additionally, we analyze a modified proxy measuring the business presence in com-
bined reporting states and take into account the share (instead of the count) of subsidiaries 
located in combined reporting states in column (2). Our results suggest that a one-percentage-
point increase in this ratio brings about a 0.29 percent decrease in the number of trademarks 
allocated to Delaware.
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2.4. Additional analysis: Firm value implications of Delaware trademarks
2.4.1. Methodology
A large body of research examines the firm value implications of patents and trade-
marks (e.g., Hall et al. 2005; Hall et al. 2007; Sandner and Block, 2011). Moreover, Dhar-
mapala (2009) finds that corporate tax avoidance has firm value implications. Thus, we exam-
ine in an additional analysis if the choice to locate its trademark stock in Delaware is a deter-
minant of the registering firm’s value. Therefore, we estimate an OLS model of the following 
form.
   (         )   =    +            /         +     &       /         +           
+         +         +    
(Eq. 2.2)
The dependent variable of this analysis is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q which we 
calculate as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets.
26
Originally, this 
approach stems from the corporate finance literature which uses Tobin’s Q as the most com-
mon measure to capture firm value.
27
However, Tobin’s Q has also proven to be a suitable 
proxy for firm value in studies related to our setting. In particular, we follow Hall et al. (2005) 
and Hall et al. (2007) which focus on the effects of capitalized research and development 
(R&D) expenses and patent stocks on firm value.
28
Marketing activity can be considered as an investment activity in a firm’s brand and 
trademark stock value. Thus, investors should positively account for a firm's trademark stock 
and its trademark investments. To capture this, we construct several variables measuring input 
and output of marketing activities, i.e., the capitalized advertising expenses Marketing Stock
and the trademark stock TM Stock, each scaled by the firm’s total assets. Moreover, we com-
                                                
26 Market value of assets is the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the sum of the 
book value of common equity (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009).
27 Desai and Dharmapala (2009) call it the commonly accepted ‘standard’ in corporate finance literature since 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) to use Tobin’s Q as measure for firm value.
28 Moreover, Sandner and Block (2011) tested firm value implications of trademark stocks in general. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009) use Tobin’s Q to analyze the value implications of corporate tax avoidance.
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pute the firm’s cumulated R&D activity which represents an investment activity of the firm to 
gain a valuable patent as an output. As a patent contributes positively to the firm's observed 
market value, investors should positively account for a firm's R&D investments and capitalize 
it in the firm value.
29
In our analysis, we mainly focus on the trademark stock variables. First, we determine 
the total stock of U.S. trademarks a firm holds in a given year. In line with Sandner and Block 
(2011), we predict that firms increase their firm value with generally increased trademark 
intensity. Second, we split the stock and distinguish between trademarks located in Delaware 
and trademarks located in any other state. We expect that the positive effect on firm value is 
higher for Delaware-located trademarks than for those located in other states. This is based on 
the assumption that (i) firms locate their most valuable trademarks to Delaware, and that (ii) 
the location choice Delaware enables the firm to use the PIC strategy to reduce state tax liabil-
ities which may increase the market value of the firm (Dyreng et al., 2013). Third, we only 
consider the firm’s stock of valuable U.S. trademarks and distinguish between those held by a 
U.S. subsidiary incorporated in Delaware and those held in any other state. We also expect 
that the positive effect on firm value is higher for Delaware-located trademarks than for those 
located in other states. Compared to the previous measure, the positive effect of Delaware-
based valuable trademarks should be stronger.
Our empirical model includes a full set of firm fixed effects. This controls for unob-
served heterogeneity constant over time. Moreover and in line with Hall et al. (2007), we in-
clude the natural logarithm of the firm’s sales as a control for size. Additionally, we include a 
full set of year dummies. We compute standard errors that are robust to clustering within 
firms. Summary statistics for all variables used in Equation 2.2 are reported in Table 2.7.
                                                
29 See Appendix 2.3 for a detailed variable description.
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Table 2.7: Summary statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log(Tobin’s Q) 2,246 0.67 0.44 -0.53 2.62
TM (US) stock / assets 2,246 0.04 0.08 0.00 1.15
TM (DE) stock / assets 2,246 0.02 0.07 0.00 1.15
TM (non-DE) stock / assets 2,246 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.62
Valuable TM (DE) stock / assets 2,246 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.34
Valuable TM (non-DE) stock / assets 2,246 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.14
R&D stock / assets 2,246 0.23 0.28 0.00 2.33
Marketing stock / assets 1,346 0.43 0.66 0.00 6.46
Sales 2,246 8.94 1.31 5.08 13.05 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in Equation (2). Variables are defined in 
the Appendices 2.1 and 2.3.   
2.4.2. Results
Table 2.8 reports our regression results for the analysis of whether the decision to locate 
(valuable) trademarks in Delaware influences the firm value of the registering S&P 500 com-
pany. We first test some general value implications of input factors for the creation of intan-
gible assets. We focus on (i) R&D activity as an input factor for patents and on (ii) marketing 
activity as an input factor for trademarks. As shown in column (1), a company‘s firm value is, 
on average, positively associated with an increase in each, R&D and marketing stock scaled 
by total assets. Thus, it confirms Hall et al. (2005) and Hall et al. (2007) who find this asso-
ciation with the R&D expenditure stock. Moreover, it extends their findings because we show 
that this association also exists with the capitalized advertising expenditure stock.
As we are primarily interested in the effects of the output of marketing activity, namely 
successful trademark registrations, we replace the input factor marketing stock by the total 
stock of U.S. trademarks that the firm registered at its U.S. subsidiaries scaled by total assets.
We find that, on average, firm value is positively associated with an increase in a firm’s
trademark stock. This finding is in line with Sandner and Block (2011) who also show that 
trademarks have a positive effect on firm value.
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To analyze whether the effect is different if there is a concentration of Delaware-
trademarks, we split the stock of trademarks and provide regression results of the estimated 
effect of the stock of trademarks located in Delaware and the stock of trademarks located in 
any other U.S. state. We report the corresponding regression results in columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 2.8. We find that the positive effect of Delaware-trademarks on firm value is 16 to 18 
percent stronger than the one of total trademarks. This finding is in line with our expectations 
and indicates that (i) firms tend to locate those trademarks to Delaware which contribute the 
most to firm value, and that (ii) investors value the decision to use Delaware as trademark 
location due to state tax avoidance opportunities. Interestingly, we cannot find that the stock 
of non-Delaware trademarks has a positive effect. This suggests that the Delaware-trademarks 
might be the driver for the overall positive effect trademarks have on firm value. 
Table 2.8: Firm value implications of the trademark allocation to Delaware.
Dep. Var.: 
Log(Tobin’s Q)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TM (US) stock / assets 1.212*
(0.633)
TM (DE) stock / assets 1.432* 1.403*
(0.860) (0.849)
TM (non-DE) stock / assets 0.572
(1.749)
Valuable TM (DE) stock / assets 3.671*
(2.185)
Valuable TM (non-DE) stock / assets -3.701
(3.129)
R&D stock / assets 0.266** 0.255*** 0.273*** 0.264*** 0.287***
(0.106) (0.0901) (0.0874) (0.0895) (0.0893)
Marketing stock / assets 0.207***
(0.0674)
Sales -0.0548 -0.111** -0.120*** -0.114*** -0.138***
(0.0576) (0.0428) (0.0420) (0.0436) (0.0394)
Constant 1.398*** 1.871*** 1.970*** 1.912*** 2.167***
(0.509) (0.377) (0.365) (0.392) (0.341)
Observations 1,346 2,246 2,246 2,246 2,246
R-squared 0.300 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.306
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression with the dependent variable 
Log(Tobin’s Q). All variables are defined in the Appendices 2.1 and 2.3. Standard errors are clustered by firm 
and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (all two-
tailed), respectively. 
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In a last step, we aim to identify the effect that state tax avoidance opportunities have on 
the investor’s perceived value. Therefore, we analyze the effect of valuable trademark stocks 
and provide the results in column (5). We gain two insights from this regression. First, we 
find that valuable trademarks located in Delaware have a positive effect on firm value, while 
we cannot show that the number of valuable trademarks located in other states significantly 
influences firm value. This implies that the investors particularly value the decision to go to 
Delaware, additionally to the finding that firms primarily locate their valuable trademarks to 
Delaware. This might result from the increased tax planning potential stemming from this 
trademark stock. Second, the effect of valuable trademarks in Delaware is 2.6 times higher 
than the effect of all trademarks in Delaware. The tax planning potential which might be re-
sponsible for this increase in value is higher when using valuable trademarks. Thus, these 
results also conform to our expectations.
2.5. Conclusion
In this study, we explore the impact of tax considerations on the geographical allocation 
of the ownership of the trademarks of U.S. multinationals within the U.S. In particular, we 
shed light on the question of whether group consolidation, which has recently been adopted in 
several U.S. state tax codes (i.e., combined reporting), is an effective countermeasure against 
Delaware-based state tax avoidance strategies.
We empirically show that the U.S. state of Delaware strongly dominates in the alloca-
tion of trademark ownership. Overall, 53.7 percent of all trademarks successfully registered 
by the S&P 500 firms between 2003 and 2012 are allocated to a subsidiary located in Dela-
ware. However, Delaware’s share in the U.S. trademark portfolio diminishes from 2004 to 
2012 by approximately 12 percent. The decline coincides with waves of combined reporting 
adoption by some major U.S. states such as New York and Michigan during our sample peri-
od. We document that a high business presence in combined reporting states negatively af-
fects the probability of choosing Delaware as a trademark holding location. Quantitatively, 
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our results suggest that, on average, a 10 percent increase in business activity under combined 
reporting reduces the probability of filing a trademark in Delaware by 0.36 percentage points.
In an additional analysis, we moreover find that investors reward the decision to allocate 
trademarks to Delaware as it increases firm value.
While statistically significant, the empirical estimates explain only part of the observed 
aggregate trend. After all, while the negative effect from the uptake of combined reporting 
and correlating downward trends in Delaware registrations are remarkable, the magnitude of 
these developments does not suggest that Delaware-based tax avoidance strategies using in-
tangible assets have been fully abandoned.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. The study underlines 
Delaware’s role as a domestic U.S. state tax haven. Therefore, we complement the finance 
and legal literature regarding Delaware’s dominance in parent and subsidiary incorporations 
by providing direct evidence at the intangible assets level, which ultimately are the vehicle for 
tax strategies that are used to generate tax savings. We also provide quantitative evidence of 
the impact of group consolidation that is informative to the public finance and international 
taxation literature. Specifically, we inform the ongoing debate over the adoption of a CCCTB 
in the European Union comprising a system of formula apportionment based on group-
consolidated profits. Policy makers in the European Union might draw conclusions regarding 
the potential effect of such a reform from this study’s results and derive a prediction that the 
consolidation of a groups’ tax base might effectively reduce, though not entirely eliminate, the 
allocation of intangible property to tax havens.
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Appendix Chapter 2
Table 2.9: Appendix 2.1: Variable definitions.
Delaware
1 if trademark ownership is assigned to an affiliate of the MNE 
located in the U.S. state Delaware; 0 otherwise
Source: USPTO
N Subs. in CR-states
The number of subsidiaries located in combined reporting states
Sources: 
- Firms’ state-level subsidiary information based on their Ex-
hibit 21 disclosures: Scott Dyreng’s website
a
- State tax system: own research
N Subs. in EN-states
The number of subsidiaries located in combined reporting or eco-
nomic nexus states
Sources: 
- Firms’ state-level subsidiary information based on their Ex-
hibit 21 disclosures: Scott Dyreng’s website
a
- State tax system: own research, Dyreng et al. (2013).
N Subs. in for. TH
The number of subsidiaries located in foreign tax havens
Sources: 
- Firms’ state-level subsidiary information based on their Ex-
hibit 21 disclosures: Scott Dyreng’s website
a
- See Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) for a country classifications
Avg. state CIT
The weighted-average statutory tax rate of states (excl. Delaware) 
in which the MNE discloses subsidiaries, in decimals:
[stat. tax rate for given state * count(subs. in that state) ] / 
[count(total US subs.) − count(subs. in DE) ]
Sources: 
- Firms’ state-level subsidiary information based on their Ex-
hibit 21 disclosures: Scott Dyreng’s website
a
- Statutory tax rates: own research
Size
The natural logarithm of the amount of the MNE’s total assets (log 
(at))
Source: Compustat
Marketing intensity
The amount of the MNE’s advertising expenses, scaled by total 
assets (xad/at)
Source: Compustat
Profitability
The ratio of the MNE’s gross profit to total sales (gp/sale)
Source: Compustat
PIC
Binary variable indicating if a firm is suitable to implement a Del-
aware-based PIC strategy with trademarks or not:
1 for firms in the upper tercile of the ratio of N Subs. in DE to N 
Subs. in US, in the lower tercile of the ratio of N Subs. in CR-states
to [N Subs. in US – N Subs. in DE], and in the upper half of Mar-
keting intensity; 0 otherwise
Sources: 
- Firms’ state-level subsidiary information based on their Ex-
hibit 21 disclosures: Scott Dyreng’s website
a
- Firms’ cons. financial statement information: Compustat
- State tax system: own research
(The appendix is continued on the next page.)
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Table 2.9: Appendix 2.1 (continued).
PIC (EN)
Modified version of PIC:
1 for firms in the upper tercile of the ratio of N Subs. in DE to N 
Subs. in US, in the lower tercile of the ratio of N Subs. in EN-states
to [N Subs. in US – N Subs. in DE], and in the upper half of Mar-
keting intensity; 0 otherwise
Sources: 
- Firms’ state-level subsidiary information based on their Ex-
hibit 21 disclosures: Scott Dyreng’s website
a
- Firms’ cons. financial statement information: Compustat
- State tax system: own research
Valuable
1 if the trademark is cited by subsequently registered trademarks 
(until 2015) or if the trademark is registered worldwide using the 
Madrid Protocol; 0 otherwise
Source: USPTO
a Scott Dyrengs website is available at https://sites.google.com/site/scottdyreng/.
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Appendix 2.2: Sample Selection.
The data on the trademarks registered by the S&P 500 firms is obtained from the 
USPTO case file dataset. The group structures of S&P 500 firms are publicly disclosed in 
Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K which every U.S. company has to file to the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Committee (SEC). We consider all trademarks that were successfully registered for 
the first time between January 2003 and December 2012 by a U.S. subsidiary. We then match 
these trademark data with that SEC Exhibit 21’s subsidiary data of the year 2007 (i.e., the 
median year of our sample). As identifiers, we use the entities' legal names and their countries 
of incorporation. To be considered a match, we require the country of incorporation in the 
trademark registration data and the in Exhibit 21 data to be perfectly identical. Subsidiary 
names of Exhibit 21 entities and legal trademark owners have to match to 99 at least percent.
In the data, there are some human errors such as minor misspellings or a lack of stand-
ardization. To overcome those obstacles of the unstandardized usage of abbreviations for legal 
forms in company names, we replaced all commonly used abbreviations of legal forms by its 
written out forms. Moreover, we deleted space characters from the spelling and changed it to 
the use of small letters only. 
In total, we matched the trademark data to 497 different U.S. multinationals. After ex-
cluding all trademarks held offshore, our final dataset contains 81,488 observations represent-
ing all trademarks that have been successfully registered between 2003 and 2012 by any S&P 
500 U.S. affiliate for use in U.S. commerce.
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Appendix 2.3: Variable construction for additional analysis (firm value).
In line with Hall et al. (2005) and Hall et al. (2007), we compute the R&D stock by ap-
plying a declining balance formula of the following form, i.e. scale the firm’s R&D expendi-
ture history by the firm’s total assets and depreciate the resulting stock to account for (i) in-
herent obsolescence which occurs over time for knowledge assets and (ii) the limited time of 
legal protection of knowledge due to the regular expiration of patents. 
 &         =  &           ∗ (1 −     .     ) +  &              
(Eq. 2.3)
Following Hall (2007) and others, we use a commonly accepted 15 percent depreciation 
rate. As the initial stock, we apply the following formula assuming that prior to the sample
R&D expenditure has been increasing at a constant annual growth rate of 8 percent (Hall et al. 
2007).
 &         =  &            (    .      +      ℎ     )⁄
(Eq. 2.4)
Second, we construct a corresponding measure capturing the capitalized advertising ex-
penses (Marketing Stock) scaled by the firm’s total assets to test if this figure follows the 
same pattern. To calculate Marketing Stock, we use a similar approach as for the R&D
Stock.
30
The corresponding formula is the following. 
                 =                    +                         
(Eq. 2.5)
As initial Marketing Stock, we consistently use the following formula, again with a con-
stant annual growth rate of 8 percent.
                 =                            ℎ     ⁄
(Eq. 2.6)
                                                
30 The only difference is that we refrain from depreciating this stock. This is in line with Sandner and Block 
(2011) who argue that trademarks do not become obsolete due to technological progress. They even tend to 
become more valuable over time. Moreover, trademark protection is infinitely valid as it does not expire as pa-
tents do. In an untabulated robustness test, we use a depreciated measure and come to similar results.
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Next, we construct several variables measuring the output of marketing activities, i.e. 
trademark stocks. This enables us to analyze if different types of trademarks have different 
firm value implications. In line with Hall et al. (2005), Hall et al. (2007), and Sandner and 
Block (2011), we use a similar approach for the computation of the measures of input and 
output factors and scale it by the firm’s total assets. Thus, we apply the following formula to 
compute the different trademark stocks.
          =             +                  
(Eq. 2.7)
Again, we need an approximation for an initial value of TM stock. Therefore, we use the 
average growth rate of the total trademark stock in the USPTO trademark database from 1963 
on, which is 11.8 percent per year.
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The initial stock is accordingly calculated under the use 
of the following formula.
          =                   0.118⁄
(Eq. 2.8)
                                                
31 This is the year when the trademark data coverage considerably improved to a rate of over 70 percent in the 
USPTO database. In prior years, it was only 16 percent.
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3 Chapter 3: Effective Transfer Pricing and Infor-
mation Technology – Evidence from the Field
Abstract
Managerial and tax objectives of transfer pricing typically conflict within multinational firms. 
We examine the role of firms’ information environment in mitigating that conflict. We exploit 
unique survey data to study whether a more intensive use of information technology (IT) im-
proves transfer pricing outcomes when the underlying objectives conflict. We document that 
firms with conflicting objectives are less profitable and less successful tax planners. If firms 
facing conflicting objectives make intensive use of IT, they are more profitable, report lower 
effective tax rates, and face lower tax risk. These findings are consistent with theory suggest-
ing that in the extreme case of perfect information, firms circumvent the trade-off between tax 
efficiency and optimal resource allocation. We also find support for theory predicting higher 
profits under cost-based transfer pricing if the information environment is superior. Overall, 
our results suggest that IT facilitates transfer pricing strategies that reconcile managerial con-
trol with tax efficiency.
This chapter is joint work with Sven-Eric Bärsch and Marcel Olbert.
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3.1. Introduction
International transfer pricing refers to the valuation of transactions between affiliated 
entities of the same multinational firm. Its core function is to facilitate internal trade between 
business units in decentralized firms to maximize overall firm profit (Eccles 1985; Horngren
et al. 2015, 862). Thus, transfer pricing is a key instrument of managerial control and affects 
performance measurement. Transfer pricing also allows shifting pre-tax profits to low-taxed 
subsidiaries to minimize a firm’s overall tax burden (Sansing 2014; Klassen et al. 2017).
32
For 
both purposes, firms typically determine only one transfer price (Labro 2019),
33
leading to an 
immanent trade-off between strategies that achieve the highest tax efficiency and those that 
establish profit-maximizing levels of production and intrafirm trade (Shackelford and Shevlin 
2001; Baldenius et al. 2004; Cools et al. 2008; Labro 2019).
34
Göx and Schiller (2007) for-
malize that perfect information might resolve the tension between managerial and tax objec-
tives in the transfer pricing function resulting from this trade-off. Our paper builds on this 
prediction and examines the association between the intensity of multinational firms’ use of 
information technology (IT) within the transfer pricing function and the effectiveness of trans-
fer pricing systems. 
To overcome the limited observability of firms’ internal transfer pricing systems, we 
exploit unique survey data collected from transfer pricing managers at 166 multinational firms 
in 2017. In particular, we study whether the intensity of IT use within the transfer pricing 
function is associated with better transfer pricing outcomes from a managerial and tax per-
spective when the respective objectives conflict. Despite its limitations, we consider our sur-
vey as an appropriate instrument to study the black-box of transfer pricing which allows us to 
                                                
32 See Dharmapala (2014) and Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) for reviews of the empirical literature.
33 See also Baldenius et al. (2004), Cools et al. (2008), Nielsen and Raimondos-Moller (2012), Hiemann and 
Reichelstein (2012), Klassen et al. (2017). For recent evidence based on a similar survey sample as used in this 
paper, see Bärsch, Heckemeyer, and Olbert (2019).
34 Baldenius et al. (2004) also show that even if firms use two distinct prices for managerial and tax purposes, 
emphasizing tax-minimizing prices can have adverse outcomes on profitability and only focusing on optimal 
managerial incentives might come at the cost of a higher tax burden.
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test theoretical predictions and to address research questions that are not possible to answer 
with archival data (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Bloomfield et al. 2016). The focus of our 
study lies in the intensity of IT use within a firm’s transfer pricing function. We measure such 
intensity with a questionnaire item directly asking to what extent a firm’s typical transfer pric-
ing processes are supported by IT. We directly observe the extent to which firms use IT to 
support their processes of determining tax-compliant price ranges, calculating prices, docu-
menting prices, maintaining databases, transmitting and reporting information internally and 
to tax authorities, and defending prices during tax audits.
Studying the design and the outcomes of transfer pricing is economically important as 
the volume of transactions within multinational firms account for more than 50 percent of 
global trade (OECD 2013a; Sansing 2014). The economic importance of intrafirm trade and 
its implications for tax authorities and firms’ financial performance have led to continuous 
calls for research on how firms implement their transfer pricing strategies (Shackelford and 
Shevlin 2001; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Sansing 2014; Dyreng and Maydew 2018). Our 
study particularly builds on the well-known fact that optimal transfer pricing strategies bal-
ance the trade-off between managerial and tax objectives (Scholes et al. 2014; Labro 2019)
and we aim to extend prior research that has studied managerial and tax aspects of transfer 
pricing mostly separately (Labro 2019).
35
In transfer pricing, information on intrafirm transactions is revealed and communicated 
to decision-makers at varying rates, creating varying degrees of information friction 
(Swieringa and Waterhouse 1982; Holmstrom and Tirole 1991; Dikolli and Vaysman 2006). 
Consistent with prior theoretical and empirical work (Dikolli and Vaysman 2006; Bloom et al. 
2012), we view the extent of a firm’s use of IT as an attempt to overcome informational fric-
tions, potentially improving the internal information quality that supports optimal decision 
                                                
35 Exceptions are Baldenius et al. (2004) and Hiemann and Reichelstein (2012) who show that one single price 
cannot achieve both optimal tax outcomes and efficient resource allocation. Baldenius et al. (2004) explicitly 
model the interdependency of transfer prices for tax and managerial purposes under a two-book system.
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making (Gallemore and Labro 2015). Transfer pricing managers’ intensive use of IT facili-
tates information flow within a firm (i.e., across business units, geographical regions, and 
hierarchical levels) and to its external stakeholders (such as consultants and tax authorities). 
Moreover, it enables the use of information that would be otherwise unobservable or not 
transmittable. Thus, IT systems support managers to quantify costs, set internal prices, 
benchmark those against market prices, monitor and document internal prices, and defend 
them during tax audits. Consequently, a better information environment in transfer pricing 
through more intensive use of IT should be associated with superior firm performance if the 
additional information makes an incremental contribution to the decision-making process. 
This is typically the case when a firm is dispersed and information asymmetries between 
functional departments are high (Chenhall and Morris 1986; Gallemore and Labro 2015). 
We consider conflicting managerial and tax objectives within a firm’s transfer pricing 
function as a particular example of such an information asymmetry that could be alleviated 
through using IT to a greater extent. We argue that the tension due to conflicting objectives is 
particularly prevalent if firms only employ pre-tax key performance indicators (KPIs) for per-
formance evaluation and managerial control purposes. As managers generally aim to maxim-
ize their incentive-based performance indicators and act accordingly (Balachandran 2006), 
they might neglect the consequences of their decisions for a firm’s tax strategy. Since these 
managers have no incentive to integrate tax-related outcomes in their decisions because they 
are compensated based on pre-tax KPIs, firms are less likely to implement successful tax 
strategies, plausibly due to the conflicting objectives and the lack of cooperation between di-
visional managers (Phillips 2003; Holzhacker et al. 2019). The firm’s tax department, howev-
er, typically aims at optimal tax outcomes (Armstrong et al. 2012) and might ignore the con-
sequences of their decisions on firm-wide operational profits on a pre-tax basis.
When divisional managers act to maximize pre-tax KPIs but tax managers strive to low-
er a firm’s global tax burden, the central management should benefit from a better information 
50
environment through more intensive use of IT to balance these objectives. The theoretical 
model in Göx and Schiller (2007) explicitly states that managers can mandate optimal re-
source allocation through intrafirm trade despite setting tax-efficient prices if they have access 
to perfect information about internal costs and tax planning opportunities. We therefore ex-
pect transfer pricing to be more effective in terms of better non-tax and tax outcomes if firms 
with conflicting transfer pricing objectives use IT more intensively.
The explorative analysis of our survey data reveals that the use of IT within the transfer 
pricing function is premature and expected to become more intensive in the future, with firms 
in the automotive and engineering sectors currently being the frontrunners in the intensity of 
IT support. Calculating transfer prices is the task that is most intensively supported by IT, 
followed by maintaining a database to capture relevant information for pricing intrafirm trade.
We also enquire firms about specific KPIs that are used for managerial control purposes. In 
our sample, 54 percent of our sample firms do not use any form of after-tax KPIs to measure 
and evaluate performance, suggesting a stronger tension between tax and managerial transfer 
pricing objectives within these firms. The prevalence of such tension is equally distributed 
among firms that do or do not intensively use IT. 
In our regression analysis, we control for firm size, international exposure, age, and in-
dustry-year specific shocks and find that firms which rely only on pre-tax KPIs for perfor-
mance evaluation have, on average, 1.5 percentage points lower pre-tax returns on assets 
(ROA). Holding common tax planning opportunities constant, we also document that these 
firms report 3.2 percentage points higher GAAP effective tax rates (ETRs). These results sug-
gest that a conflict of tax and managerial transfer pricing objectives is associated with adverse 
non-tax and tax outcomes. Lower profitability plausibly mirrors suboptimal investment deci-
sions because tax managers favor tax-efficient prices for intrafirm trade, which distort effi-
cient capital allocation (Baldenius et al. 2004; De Simone et al. 2018). Higher tax burdens are 
potentially the consequence of non-tax managers’ incentive to price intrafirm trade to maxim-
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ize operational profits on a pre-tax basis that can result in a higher share of firm-wide profits 
attributed to legal entities in countries with high tax rates (Baldenius et al. 2004; Johnson 
2006). The finding is consistent with compensation schemes affecting financial outcomes 
(Balachandran 2006) and the lack of incentives for business unit managers to participate in 
tax planning efforts in the presence of pre-tax compensation schemes (Phillips 2003). 
We then find support for our hypothesis that the intensive use of IT attenuates the asso-
ciation between adverse transfer pricing outcomes and conflicting tax and managerial objec-
tives. Our results suggest that this relationship is driven by firms that do not intensively use IT 
within their transfer pricing function. Our proxy of conflicting objectives is associated with 
2.2 (2.7) percentage points lower pre-tax (after-tax) profitability and 7 percentage points 
higher ETRs while these associations are completely attenuated for firms that use IT inten-
sively. While an intensive use of IT in transfer pricing-related decision-making might not 
necessarily establish a perfect information environment, this finding is consistent with the 
view that firms can establish tax-efficient transfer pricing schemes and profit-maximizing 
levels of intrafirm trade if sufficient information on internal costs and transactions is available 
(Göx and Schiller 2007).
We also study tax risk as an outcome because effective transfer pricing does not only 
lower tax burdens but should also establish sustainable tax strategies at lower risk (Dyreng et 
al. 2019). Consistent with high-quality information for transfer pricing purposes allowing 
firms to identify sustainable tax planning strategies (Gallemore and Labro 2015) and to pre-
pare high-quality documentation for tax authorities, we find that the intensive use of IT within
the transfer pricing function is associated with lower tax risk. Furthermore, we find that firms 
exclusively using pre-tax KPIs for performance evaluation face, on average, significantly 
higher tax risk. The intensive use of IT for transfer pricing processes attenuates this result. We 
conclude that firms in which managers have no incentives to support tax planning not only 
forgo tax benefits but also lack focus on tax-compliant transfer prices.
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Our data also allows us to test the effectiveness of cost-based transfer pricing depending 
on the intensity of IT use within firms’ transfer pricing function as modeled in Dikolli and 
Vaysman (2006). We document that the cost-plus method is the most frequently applied trans-
fer pricing method in our sample among the methods recommended in internationally accept-
ed tax guidelines (OECD 2017). Consistent with the notion that cost-based pricing is informa-
tionally demanding (Dikolli and Vaysman 2006), we find a more frequent use of the cost-plus 
method among firms intensively using IT. The regression results provide novel empirical evi-
dence on the theoretical prediction of Dikolli and Vaysman (2006) and suggest that these 
firms report, on average, 2 percentage points higher pre-tax profits.
We conduct several robustness tests. First, we validate our measure of conflicting man-
agerial and tax transfer pricing objectives. In particular, we show that it is not associated with 
a cashflow-based financial outcome that should be unaffected by the conflict as cashflow does 
not proxy for (accounting) profitability or tax benefits due to its non-accrual nature. We fur-
ther acknowledge that observations are not randomly assigned to firms with and without in-
tensive use of IT. We address potential bias arising from this selection by an instrumental 
variables (IV) approach.
36
We use the appearance of a firm and its transfer pricing managers 
on the professional online network platform LinkedIn.com as instruments for the propensity 
to invest in IT for transfer pricing. We argue that the affinity towards IT proxied by the 
LinkedIn profiles is a valid instrument in that it affects financial outcomes only through a 
firm’s use of IT.
37
The two stages least squares (TSLS) results are in line with the main find-
ings based on OLS regressions. We still caution the reader when interpreting our results since 
it is not possible to address all the shortcomings of our survey data and the limited sample 
                                                
36 We acknowledge the design of a compensation system, including the definition of pre- or after-tax KPIs, is 
also a non-random choice of the firm (Phillips 2003). We find pre-tax only KPI users are more intangible in-
tensive, slightly larger, and somewhat more international. However, we interpret this feature of the manage-
ment control system as given and stickier and focus on the (potentially) recent adoption of IT systems in the 
transfer pricing function. Therefore, we particularly address endogeneity concerns of the IT variable with our 
outcome variables. 
37 Although we discuss this approach thoroughly in Section 3.4, we caution the reader when interpreting our 
results because our cross-sectional survey data does not allow us to exploit true exogenous variation in the use 
of IT.
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size.
38
While we address several endogeneity issues, we view our results as valuable in-depth 
descriptive evidence on a largely unexplored but fundamental aspect of accounting research 
(Gow et al. 2016).
Our findings contribute to the accounting literature in several ways. First, we provide 
direct evidence on the intensity of IT use within multinational firms’ transfer pricing function. 
Such insights are typically unobservable to researchers and shed light on the relevant question 
of how information supports decision-making from a managerial accounting perspective 
(Labro 2015). We argue that investing in IT for transfer pricing produces higher quality in-
formation on intrafirm trade, fostering the decision-facilitating role of management account-
ing information (Dierynck and Labro 2018). Our study also validates theory that firms partic-
ularly benefit from the use of IT when using cost-based transfer pricing (Dikolli and Vaysman 
2006).
Second, we show that the decision-facilitating role of IT is valuable within the transfer 
pricing function. By studying both tax and non-tax outcomes, we not only offer novel insights 
that help to understand transfer pricing as part of the black-box of tax planning (Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010; Klassen et al. 2017; Dyreng and Maydew 2018) but we also bridge the gap 
between two inherently interrelated disciplines in accounting research (Shackelford and 
Shevlin 2001; Labro 2015). Our evidence suggests that investments in IT for transfer pricing 
might resolve the tension between managerial and tax objectives. We thus provide one possi-
ble answer to a fundamental research question which has so far only been studied in theory 
(Baldenius et al. 2004; Baldenius 2009). Our results are of interest to consultants and manag-
ers that currently view investments in technology-enabled transfer pricing solutions a pressing 
concern with ambiguous costs and benefits (Deloitte 2018).
                                                
38 We also confirm the robustness of our results when estimating a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model 
to account for the correlation of residuals in our regression models since we relate multiple transfer pricing 
outcomes to the use of IT and other characteristics of the same firm.
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Finally, we contribute to the recent tax literature suggesting that a firm’s overall quality 
of internal information is positively associated with profit shifting (McGuire et al. 2018) and 
overall global and state tax avoidance (Gallemore and Labro 2015; Laplante et al. 2017; Ham-
ilton and Stekelberg 2017),
39
all of which possibly capture some extent of tax-efficient trans-
fer pricing. Our paper complements these studies as we focus on the specific role of IT in 
transfer pricing from both a managerial and a tax perspective. Unlike prior studies, we direct-
ly observe the extent to which firms’ different transfer pricing processes are supported by IT 
and document how the extent of such support enhances effective transfer pricing strategies. In 
supplemental tests, we find that the intensive use of IT within the transfer pricing function 
drives tax efficiency through reporting and defending transfer prices vis-à-vis tax authorities. 
Higher profitability seems to be driven by intensive IT support of several operational aspects 
such as calculating, documenting, and reporting of internal prices. Overall, our findings sug-
gest that firms might use IT more intensively to avoid the unintended consequences of purely 
tax-motivated transfer pricing strategies that can lead to suboptimal resource allocation and 
lower investment efficiency (De Simone et al. 2018).
3.2. Background and hypothesis development
3.2.1. The conflicting objectives of transfer pricing
The managerial goal of transfer pricing is to establish levels of intrafirm trade and re-
source allocation that maximize firm-wide profits. There is a large body of literature modeling 
optimal pricing in a tax-free world. However, counterfactual trades between external parties 
rarely exist and the world is not tax-free. As transfer prices affect the profits of each company 
within a multinational firm (separate entity accounting and taxation), they also have a direct 
impact on the taxable income of each affiliated entity and, thus, the firm’s global tax burden. 
                                                
39 While Hamilton and Stekelberg (2017) use an indicator variable for a firm’s inclusion in the InformationWeek
500 list, all other listed studies use proxies for internal information quality based on publicly available ac-
counting data.
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Given the international tax rate differentials, firms have an incentive to price intrafirm
trade to shift profits from high- to low-tax jurisdictions (see, e.g., Sansing 2014). Despite the 
diverging managerial and tax objectives, firms typically do not decouple managerial from tax-
compliant transfer prices (Baldenius et al. 2004; Labro 2019). If firms set transfer prices that 
are tax-motivated, resource allocation might be distorted (Baldenius et al. 2004; De Simone et 
al. 2018) and the effectiveness of management control systems might be deteriorated (Cools 
et al. 2008). A transfer price that optimizes resource allocation, however, can lead to unfavor-
ably high tax burdens because profits are allocated to a firm’s divisions in high-tax countries. 
As transfer pricing are typically organization-wide (in particular with respect to tax planning), 
it is challenging to design a pricing schemes with a high scope of customization that allowing 
optimal performance measurement of divisional units (Holzhacker et al. 2019). Thus, those 
coexisting objectives of transfer pricing possibly create a substantial tension among divisional 
and functional managers within the same firm.
One way to align conflicting objectives is the strategic use of KPIs for performance 
evaluation and compensation (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Sloan 1993). Divisional managers 
typically respond to explicit incentives that KPIs create and act to maximize the respective 
financial figures (Guidry et al. 1999; Balachandran 2006). Consistently, Phillips (2003) finds 
that using after-tax KPIs in accounting-based bonus plans of divisional managers is associated 
with lower ETRs. Thus, compensation plans that factor in a firm’s tax liabilities should incen-
tivize divisional managers to consider tax outcomes of transfer pricing. If, in contrast, manag-
ers are solely evaluated on a pre-tax basis, tension is likely to arise when determining transfer 
prices for at least two reasons. First, operational managers aim to maximize pre-tax KPIs and 
might refrain from supporting the central tax management in making transfer pricing deci-
sions that lead to an optimized ETR. Second, pre-tax profitability should suffer under exclu-
sive pre-tax compensation since tax managers still have an interest to emphasize transfer pric-
ing strategies that distort efficient intrafirm trade that would otherwise have maximized firm 
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profits (Baldenius et al. 2004; De Simone et al. 2018). As a consequence of both divisional 
and tax managers’ behavior, a firm’s ETR might increase and profitability might decrease.
3.2.2. The role of IT in transfer pricing
Decision makers require internal information to formulate and pursue firm-wide organi-
zational goals through transfer pricing (Hirshleifer 1956; Swieringa and Waterhouse 1982; 
Horngren et al. 2015). Theory in industrial organization and management science commonly 
assumes that the quality and flow of internal information are central to corporate decision-
making since they determine managers’ ability to exert authority and base decisions on more 
accurate information (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005). Maximizing the 
revelation of information (Holmstrom and Tirole 1991) and reducing the cost of processing 
relevant information (Swieringa and Waterhouse 1982) are considered essential for optimal 
transfer pricing. Dikolli and Vaysman (2006) formalize that perfect information on intrafirm
trade increases the capability of generating and communicating to the decision-makers which 
ultimately leads to higher profitability. From a tax perspective, recent empirical evidence sug-
gests that higher quality of a firm’s overall internal information environment can translate into 
more successful tax planning (Gallemore and Labro 2015; Laplante et al. 2017; Hamilton and 
Stekelberg 2017), part of which is the result of transfer pricing such as profit shifting strate-
gies (McGuire et al. 2018). 
Adopting advanced information and communication technologies is a common strategy 
to improve the firms’ information environment (Dorantes et al. 2013; Chae et al. 2014). We 
base our view of the role of using IT to a greater extent in transfer pricing on Bloom et al.
(2014) who find that IT can unfold two effects on corporate decision-making. First, it im-
proves information acquisition and enables the incremental use of information. Intensive IT 
support of the typically very data- and fact-intensive transfer pricing analyses can facilitate
data processing and enables the typically small transfer pricing workforce to handle large da-
tasets, reveal inefficiencies, identify opportunities, and develop relevant insights. Moreover, it 
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can enable managers to understand issues which are not in their field of expertise. For in-
stance, non-tax managers can detect tax-planning opportunities related to transfer pricing and 
assist the tax department in establishing tax-efficient transfer prices if advanced IT tools exist 
(Gallemore and Labro 2015). Second, Bloom et al. (2014) find that IT enhances communica-
tion by facilitating the flow of relevant private information across legal entities, business 
units, and hierarchical levels. Advanced transfer price reporting tools increase the accuracy 
and frequency of the local managers’ reports and reduce the cost of transferring knowledge 
(Dikolli and Vaysman 2006). Moreover, transfer pricing departments typically consist of 
globally dispersed teams that need to collaborate in a way that the central department can 
make strategic decisions (KPMG 2018a). Therefore, more intensive use of IT within firms’ 
transfer pricing function can make decision-relevant information accessible in a complete and 
accurate manner when needed and where needed.
Practitioners report that IT in transfer pricing particularly supports the compilation of 
input data (e.g., collecting and processing supporting documents such as transaction types and 
financial amounts), analysis of data (e.g., analyzing cost centers, calculating profit level indi-
cators, benchmarking studies), creation of output data (e.g., preparing transfer pricing reports, 
using modular text blocks, archiving), and workflow management (e.g., notifications, remind-
ers, and communication tools) by means of standardization, automation and implementation.
40
Examples of IT tools for transfer pricing are relational databases, business intelligence appli-
cations, and tax data warehouses that allow combined access to relevant data from the firms’
multiple general ledger systems and country-specific regulation.
41
                                                
40 An expert interview by the World Finance Magazine exemplifies these management and tax-related benefits of 
IT in transfer pricing. For instance, “Technology further improves data gathering and quality of information 
which supports the enhanced integrity and monitoring of inter-company transactions” and “Benefits can in-
clude improved data quality and enhanced monitoring and reporting capabilities, which can enable companies 
to promptly identify and mitigate areas of risk”. See https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/transfer-pricing-
using-technology-to-avoid-the-pitfalls. 
41 See, e.g., https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/publications/transfer-pricing/perspectives/assets/tp-16-analytics.pdf.
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3.2.3. Using IT to resolve the conflict between transfer pricing objectives
Greater availability of information driven by the intensive use of IT in a firm’s account-
ing system does not necessarily lead to improved decision-making and better financial out-
comes at the firm level (Dierynck and Labro 2018; Li and Sandino 2018). A positive associa-
tion between firm-level outcomes and IT requires that firms use IT appropriately, managers 
are capable of processing the additional information, or that additional information can make 
an incremental contribution to the decision-making process, for example when a firm is dis-
persed and information asymmetries between functional departments are high (Chenhall and 
Morris 1986; Gallemore and Labro 2015). 
We consider conflicting managerial and tax objectives within a firm’s transfer pricing 
function as a particular example of such information asymmetry. Specifically, the theoretical 
framework in Göx and Schiller (2007) suggests that complete information of the central man-
agement and unlimited communication between central and divisional management can solve 
the problem of conflicting managerial and tax objectives of transfer pricing. Perfect infor-
mation would enable central managers to determine tax-optimal transfer prices and to instruct 
divisions to implement production and sales policies that maximize after-tax profits. While 
perfect information is an extreme, unrealistic scenario, we argue that a more intensive use of 
IT within the transfer pricing function at least enhances the information environment and, 
thus, might alleviate the problem of conflicting transfer pricing objectives. 
If the transfer pricing function is more intensively supported by IT which improves in-
formation acquisition and communication (Bloom et al. 2014), firms should be able to in-
crease the effectiveness of transfer pricing in that both the managerial objective of efficient 
resource allocation and the tax objectives of lower tax burdens can be reconciled. From a 
managerial perspective, a more intensive IT use within a firm’s transfer pricing function 
should be associated with higher pre-tax profitability through more efficient resource alloca-
tion and better investment decisions. If internal prices are set at a tax-optimal level because of 
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the tax management’s objectives, central managers can use IT to back out tax-induced pricing 
and mandate levels of intrafirm trade that maximize a firm’s pre-tax profit, thereby circum-
venting the drawbacks of one-book systems (Göx and Schiller 2007). More intensive IT use 
might also enable managers to formalize inventive criteria that are not financially affected by 
transfer prices if those are largely tax-driven and thus restore efficient resource allocation 
(Cools et al. 2008). Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that the intensive use of IT within a 
firm’s transfer pricing function, even if implemented for tax purposes, will improve the quali-
ty of decision-making concerning the allocation of resources and global investment policy 
across a firm’s operations (PwC 2016; Deloitte 2018; Thomson Reuters 2018). 
For tax planning purposes, firms depend on divisional knowledge to identify intrafirm
transactions that generate tax benefits. Given the pre-tax-based compensation scheme, divi-
sional managers typically have this information but possibly lack incentives to support the 
realization of these tax benefits (Holzhacker et al. 2019). However, central managers might 
still be able to exploit tax planning opportunities if they use IT more intensively as they can 
access more and more accurate divisional data in real-time and integrate the relevant infor-
mation in their decision-making. The following hypothesis summarizes our conjectures.
More intensive use of IT within the transfer pricing function mitigates the association between 
conflicting managerial and tax objectives and adverse transfer pricing outcomes.
3.3. Survey data on transfer pricing and IT
3.3.1. Survey methodology and sample test
We draw on confidential survey data of multinational firms in the German-speaking 
market.
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Our survey methodology overcomes the challenge that transfer pricing systems are 
typically unobservable to outside parties and researchers. This approach enables us to contex-
tualize data on managers’ practices about previously unobserved facts and to explore the in-
tensity of IT use within firms’ transfer pricing function (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Graham
                                                
42 We conducted the survey in collaboration with the management accounting consultancy firm Horváth & Part-
ners and the tax law firm Flick Gocke Schaumburg. The questionnaire was developed by the authors as well as 
tax and management accounting consultants with practical transfer pricing experience.
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et al. 2014; Bloomfield et al. 2016). Our data comes from a questionnaire with 26 questions. 
The survey opened on June 6, 2017, with an e-mail request to transfer pricing managers at 
1,979 firms and closed on October 31, 2017.
43
166 firms provided usable responses. The re-
sponse rate of 8.4 percent is comparable to those in other studies that survey executives.
44
We 
match hand-collected consolidated financial data for the period from 2011 to 2016.
45
Figure 3.1: Survey respondents by functional departments and industries.
Notes: This figure shows to which functional department within a firm the responding transfer pricing managers 
belong to on the y-axis (tax department or managerial/other) and to which industries the companies belong to on 
the x-axis (Automotive/Engineering, Chemical/Pharmaceutical, Industrial Goods/Energy, Consumer Goods, and 
Others). The fractions are the percentages of all respondents to the respective questions (N=134 for the function-
al department, N=165 for the industries). The sample mean of survey responders working in the tax department 
is 53.71.
                                                
43 After several feedback rounds among academics, consultants, and practitioners, the questionnaire was pro-
grammed by an external service provider specialized in field surveys. A reminder was sent on September 16.
44 For instance, Graham et al. (2015) analyze the extent to which executives delegate financial decisions based 
on two surveys with response rates of 6 and 11 percent, respectively. Klassen et al. (2017) report a response 
rate of 8.1 percent. Yet, our response rate lies behind that of Graham et al. (2014) (26.5 percent).
45 This data collection is limited to firms that willingly disclosed their identity for this study (i.e., 81 firms). The 
data is handled strictly confidential and the data collection process was handled at Flick Gocke Schaumburg. 
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Figure 3.1 shows that survey respondents are distributed among the tax and accounting 
departments with a slightly higher share of tax managers (53.7 percent). The figure also
shows that sample firms are distributed across all major industries. Our sample includes firms 
listed in the German blue chip stock market index (DAX) and other large and medium-sized 
firms. 40 of the responding firms generated revenues of more than 5 billion euros in 2016, and 
12 firms have more than 100,000 employees (untabulated). 
Although survey data can provide unique insights, there are several caveats to our re-
search methodology (Graham et al. 2014). In particular, our survey sample might not be rep-
resentative of the total population of firms. Also, firms deciding to participate in the study 
might be systematically different from firms that do not respond, leading to biased results. We 
thus test for representativeness and for systematic differences between responders and non-
responders. To this end, we use consolidated financial information of all companies in the 
corporate universe in Germany with consolidated financial statement information available in 
the Orbis database provided by Bureau van Dijk.
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of (1) the average German firm, (2) the average 
firm contacted for the survey, and (3) the average non-respondent and (4) respondent firm. 
Columns 5 and 6 compare our average contacted and responding firm with the average Ger-
man Orbis firm and reveal that both our average contacted and our average responding firm 
are more profitable, larger, have a higher ETR and also differ across several other dimensions.
However, the Orbis database also contains smaller domestic and financially distressed firms. 
While our findings might not generalize towards the corporate universe, it should be repre-
sentative of the average large or medium-sized non-distressed firm with major operations in 
Germany.
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Table 3.1: Tests on representativeness, sample selection bias, and non-response bias. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All German
Orbis Firms
All Contact-
ed Firms 
with Availa-
ble Data
Survey Non-
Responders 
with Availa-
ble Data
Survey Re-
sponders 
with Availa-
ble Data
1 vs. 2 1 vs. 4 3 vs. 4
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean Diff. p-value Diff. p-value Diff. p-value
Pre-tax ROA 24,836 0.05 1,538 0.07 1,096 0.07 442 0.07 -0.02*** (0.00) -0.01** (0.01) 0.00 (0.70)
After-tax ROA 24,441 0.03 1,483 0.05 1,041 0.05 442 0.05 -0.02*** (0.00) -0.01** (0.01) 0.00 (0.31)
ETR 24,238 0.23 1,452 0.28 1,040 0.28 412 0.29 -0.05*** (0.00) -0.05** (0.03) -0.01 (0.64)
ETR_Vola 19,664 0.37 1,134 0.26 859 0.28 275 0.18 0.12*** (0.00) 0.19*** (0.01) 0.09 (0.11)
Cashflow/Assets 24,216 0.08 1,475 0.09 1,035 0.09 440 0.09 -0.01*** (0.00) -0.00 (0.43) 0.01 (0.18)
Log(Assets) 25,374 18.66 1,601 20.63 1,127 20.33 474 21.35 -2.10*** (0.00) -2.74*** (0.00) -1.02*** (0.00)
Leverage 24,941 0.18 1,520 0.16 1,073 0.16 447 0.17 0.02*** (0.00) 0.01 (0.44) -0.01 (0.22)
Intangibles 24,943 0.07 1,547 0.09 1,073 0.08 474 0.10 -0.02*** (0.00) -0.04*** (0.00) -0.02*** (0.01)
Log(Age) 24,708 3.05 1,686 3.49 1,152 3.20 534 4.13 -0.48*** (0.00) -1.11*** (0.00) -0.93*** (0.00)
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics of the following samples:
Column (1): all firms on Bureau von Dijk Orbis incorporated in Germany and available consolidated financial information in any year between 2011 and 2016.
Column (2): all firms contacted for the survey with available financial information in the databases that we could match to Orbis and available consolidated financial infor-
mation in any year between 2011 and 2016.
Column (3): all firms contacted for the survey that did not respond with available financial information in the databases that we could match to Orbis and available consolidated 
financial information in any year between 2011 and 2016
Column (4): all firms that responded and provided their firm name.
Columns (5) to (7) provide the p-values of a t-test for differences in means.
For Columns (1) to (3), we use the data from the Orbis databases of consolidated financial information for the years 2011 to 2016. For column (4), we use hand-collected data 
(each firm’s consolidated financial statement) for the years 2011 to 2016. All variables are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent of the distribution. *, **, and *** denote sig-
nificance using a t-test at the p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (all two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.1.
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To mitigate concerns of non-response bias, we compare our survey respondents to the 
non-respondents and present the results in column (7). We find that the average respondent 
firm is statistically no different than the average non-respondent firm in terms of Pre-tax 
ROA, After-tax ROA, ETR, ETR_Vola, Cashflow/Assets, and Leverage. Participating firms are 
larger, have a higher share of intangibles assets, and are older. We do not expect these (eco-
nomically modest) differences to cause sample selection bias in our empirical estimates.
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Yet, to the extent that responding and non-responding firms differ, our findings do not gener-
alize to all firms.
Another concern is that respondents may provide false answers. This concern was ad-
dressed by explicitly avoiding questions involving potential reputational issues such as tax 
avoidance and ensuring the confidential use of the data. Moreover, we asked some questions 
for which we could check the answers on their validity, such as the firm’s total sales, the share 
of foreign sales, or the number of employees and affiliates. We compared the answers with 
publicly available data and found no evidence for a false answers bias by examining the 
untabulated t-statistics. To prevent survey participants from misunderstanding questions or 
expressing beliefs that are not necessarily in line with actions (Graham and Harvey 2001), we 
emphasized clarity by providing a glossary on all topics covered in the questionnaire and by 
integrating practical examples in many of the questions.
3.3.2. Exploratory analysis
We start our analysis by providing novel descriptive evidence on firm’s design of trans-
fer pricing systems. We directly ask transfer pricing managers to what extent they use IT to 
support specific processes within the transfer pricing function. The questionnaire covers seven 
relevant processes which constitute regular tasks within the transfer pricing function: (1) 
                                                
46 In untabulated results, we test for non-response bias by examining differences in responses between early and 
late responders because late responses proxy for non-participation (Klassen et al. 2017). Results suggest that a 
possible non-response bias is minimal since there is only weak statistically significant evidence that late re-
sponding firms are, on average, less leveraged than early responding firms.
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search for benchmark data, (2) calculation of transfer prices, (3) documentation of the arm’s 
lengths nature of those prices, (4) compliance with external reporting obligation for transfer 
prices, (5) internal reporting of transfer prices, (6) management of transfer pricing audits, and 
(7) operation of internal transfer pricing databases. Possible answers to this ordinal scale 
question regarding the intensity of IT support for those seven specific transfer pricing pro-
cesses were: very low (1), low (2), high (3), or very high (4) intensity. 
As depicted in Table 3.2, we observe that our sample firms are most likely to use IT in-
tensively when calculating transfer prices, while most firms defend their transfer prices in tax 
audits without intensive use of IT. Less than a third of our sample firms intensively use IT 
support for processes which are most relevant for complying with regulation of reporting and 
documenting internal prices. We observe a large and statistically significant difference be-
tween the current and future (expected) use of IT support for transfer pricing. This finding 
stresses the relevance of our research questions. It is also consistent with recent reports by 
accounting firms that suggest that updating and managing transfer pricing-related IT systems 
is a key pressure area (EY 2017; Deloitte 2018). We find the largest difference for the exter-
nal reporting and documentation of transfer prices, which is consistent with the preparation, 
filing, and exchange of Country-by-Country Reports mandated by both the European Union 
and the OECD for financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2016 as well as the prepara-
tion and filing of a master file and local file elements of the transfer pricing documentation 
standard recommended by the OECD only in 2015 (OECD 2015).
We use responses to the question on the current use of IT to construct our primary vari-
able of interest TP_IT as follows. We measure the degree of the use of IT with an index rang-
ing from 7 to 28 which is the sum of the ordinal values of the seven responses to the questions
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Table 3.2: Current and future use of IT in transfer pricing processes.
Current use Future use Δ in means
TP_IT Process Rank % High Rank % High 
Comp. Search 6 21.01% 7 57.69% 36.68% ***
Calculation 1 37.78% 1 78.46% 40.68% ***
Documentation 5 24.26% 1 78.46% 54.20% ***
External Reporting 3 29.41% 1 78.46% 49.05% ***
Internal Reporting 4 27.61% 4 73.85% 46.24% ***
TA Enforcement 7 10.45% 6 61.24% 50.79% ***
TP Database 2 30.08% 5 71.54% 41.46% ***
Notes: This table presents the answers to the survey questions ‘Which transfer pricing management processes 
are currently supported by IT systems in your organization?’ (Current IT support, N=138), and ‘To what extent 
should your transfer pricing management processes be supported by IT systems in the future?’ (Future IT sup-
port, N=130). For both questions, the survey provides a four-point ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 4 with a rating 
of 1 labeled ‘Very low support’ and a rating of 4 labeled ‘Very high support’. This table presents the percentages 
of firms that gave a rating of 3 or 4 for each factor. The last column reports the differences in means between the 
answers to the two questions and the statistical significance of these differences with t-statistics in parentheses. 
*, **, *** Denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Figure 3.2: Use of IT in transfer pricing in different industries.
Notes: This figure describes the fractions of responding firms that use IT more extensively in the transfer pricing 
functions (i.e., TP_IT=1. For a definition, see Appendix 3.1) across different industries (N=133). For the industry 
classifications, we use the information retrieved from the survey. The dashed line is the overall sample average 
of firms that use IT more extensively in the transfer pricing functions (i.e., TP_IT=1).
0.52
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0.45
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outlined above. TP_IT then takes the value 1 if this index measure is above the median (i.e., 
14).
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We interpret this variable as a proxy for the overall degree of IT intensity in the transfer 
pricing function and argue that variation across firms might explain financial outcomes. As 
Figure 3.2 shows, firms in the automotive and engineering sectors seem to be at the IT fron-
tier. 
Figure 3.3 presents differences in the use of KPIs and transfer pricing methods between 
sample firms which intensively rely on IT support and those that do not. We observe which 
KPIs firms use for management control. Panel A illustrates the use of different KPIs depend-
ing on the intensity of IT support. We generally note that firms use growth- and EBIT-based 
KPIs most frequently for evaluating divisional managers, while KPIs based on after-tax earn-
ings (EAT) are used the least. We find no systematical difference in the use of EAT-based 
KPIs if we split the sample firms by our indicator variable TP_IT. However, our sample firms 
relying on intensive IT support employ, on average, all other types of KPIs more often than 
firms that do not rely on intensive IT support, consistent with evidence that firms relying on 
more IT employ more sophisticated contemporary performance management systems (Fran-
co-Santos et al. 2012). We also observe which of the transfer pricing methods recommended 
by the OECD firms apply for different types of intrafirm transactions, i.e., (1) primary prod-
ucts, (2) end products, (3) commodities (trade), (4) service, (5) IP development and (6) IP 
exploitation. Panel B presents the relative frequency of the use of cost-based transfer pricing 
methods depending on the intensity of IT support.
48
Dikolli and Vaysman (2006) argue that 
fewer limitations of a firm’s information systems are associated with higher expected firm 
profits, particularly under cost-based transfer pricing. Consistently, we observe a higher frac-
tion of firms using cost-based methods among those firms that intensively rely on IT support.
                                                
47 While dichotomizing is a simplified partitioning of the sample, it allows us to rely on the OLS assumptions 
and to produce interpretable regression results based on linear probabilities.
48 In untabulated results, we find that the cost-based transfer pricing methods are, by far, used most frequently.
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Figure 3.3: Use of IT in transfer pricing and firm characteristics.
Panel A: Use of KPIs
Panel B: Use of transfer pricing methods 
Notes: Panel A presents the answers to the survey question “Which of the following KPIs is used at your firm to 
pursue managerial control?” The survey provides four types of KPI (growth-, EBIT-, EAT-, and cashflow-based) 
on three different consolidation levels (legal entity, business unit, and consolidated group level). This figure 
presents the percentages of firms that indicated the use of a specific type of KPI on any consolidation level, de-
pending on the level of IT support of the transfer pricing function (TP_IT=1/0. For a definition, see Appendix
3.1). Panel B presents the answers to the survey question “Which transfer pricing methods are used at your firm 
for the following types of transaction?” For this question, the survey provides six types of transaction (primary 
products, end products, commodities (trade), service, IP development, and IP exploitation) and five transfer 
pricing methods (cost-plus, resale, comparable uncontrolled price, transactional net margin method, and profit 
split method). It provides the percentages of firms that indicated the use of the cost-plus method for each type of 
transaction depending on the level of IT support of the transfer pricing function (TP_IT = 1/0).
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3.4. Multivariate analysis
3.4.1. Empirical model
To gauge the relationship between transfer pricing outcomes and IT, we follow Klassen 
et al. (2017) and estimate several versions of a pooled cross-sectional model using ordinary 
least squares for firm i in year t for the period 2011-2016.
TP Outcomei,t = β0 + β1TP_Tensioni + β2 TP_ITi + β3 TP_Tensioni*TP_ITi
            + ∑   
 
  Xi,t + ∑   
 
 
Indi*Yeart + ϵi,t (Eq. 3.1)
In our main test, we focus on dependent variables measuring financial performance and
tax avoidance. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. Our dependent variable to proxy for 
financial performance is the return on assets (before and after taxes) which is one of the most 
commonly used measures of financial performance (Robinson and Stocken 2013). The ROA-
measures Pre-tax ROA and After-tax ROA are defined as earnings before and after taxes 
scaled by total assets and express pre- or after-tax profitability at the consolidated level. To 
measure tax avoidance, we use the GAAP ETR (ETR) as transfer pricing strategies map into 
permanent tax savings (or reversals) (compare, e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, Graham et 
al. 2014).
The first variable of interest is TP_Tension. Similar to Phillips (2003), we define 
TP_Tension as a binary variable taking the value of one if the firm’s KPIs do not take EAT
into account to proxy for the presence of conflicting objectives of transfer pricing. Our second 
variable of interest is the indicator TP_IT as defined in the previous section.
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To test our hy-
pothesis, we include the interaction term of TP_Tension and TP_IT. When one of the two 
profitability measures is the dependent variable, we follow Robinson and Stocken (2013) and 
include Size (i.e., the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets), Age (measured as the natural 
                                                
49 This approach neglects the use of IT in a specific transfer pricing process. In supplemental analyses, we use 
the answers on the individual questions as variables of interests to work out the associations with the digitali-
zation of specific transfer pricing processes. In untabulated tests, we find that all those proxies are positively 
correlated, consistent with these variables capturing the same construct.
69
logarithm of the firm’s age), and Foreign sales (a categorical variable indicating the percent-
age of foreign sales over total sales) as control variables. When ETR is the dependent variable, 
we additionally include long-term debt scaled by total assets (Leverage) and intangible assets 
scaled by total assets (Intangibles) as common drivers of tax avoidance. All regression speci-
fications also include a set of industry-specific year dummies to control for all observable and 
unobservable industry-, time-, and industry-time-specific factors that potentially correlate 
with characteristics of a firm’s transfer pricing system as well as performance and tax avoid-
ance.
3.4.2. Empirical results
We report summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables in Table 3.3. 
All hand-collected continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level, except ETR 
which is winsorized at 0 and 1 to ensure a reasonable economic interpretation.
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The average 
(median) is 6.5 (6.0) percent for Pre-tax ROA, 4.7 (4.7) percent for After-tax ROA, 28.9 (26.4) 
percent for ETR, and 18.2 (4.1) percent for ETR Vola. Table 3.4 contains the Pearson correla-
tions for all variables.
                                                
50 This procedure is in line with Gallemore and Labro (2015) and Guenther et al. (2017).
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics for main regression.
N Mean SD Min p10 Median p90 Max
Outcome Variables
Pre-tax ROA 430 0.07 0.06 -0.14 0.01 0.06 0.14 0.21
After-tax ROA 430 0.05 0.05 -0.17 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
ETR                 400 0.29 0.18 0.00 0.13 0.26 0.42 1.00
ETR Vola            267 0.18 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.45 2.56
Cashflow/Assets     428 0.09 0.06 -0.17 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.33
Variables of Interest
TP_IT               430 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
TP_Tension          430 0.54 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cost_method         430 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Control Variables
Log(Assets)         430 21.24 2.20 17.13 18.66 20.97 24.50 26.58
Leverage            415 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.35 1.01
Intangibles         430 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.28 0.56
Foreign sales       430 2.76 1.10 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.00 4.00
Log(Age)            430 4.20 0.82 2.20 2.94 4.38 5.14 5.33
Instrumental Variables
LinkedIn1           348 0.69 1.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 5.00
LinkedIn2           348 0.79 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The summary 
statistics are based on the baseline regression of the ROA (Column (1) in Table 3.5). All variables are defined in 
Appendix 3.1 and are either hand-collected from the firms’ consolidated financial statements from 2011 to 2016 
or drawn from this study’s survey conducted in 2017. Hand-collected continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1 percent level, except ETR which is winsorized at 0 and 1.
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Table 3.4: Correlation matrix.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Pre-tax ROA 1      1.00   
After-tax ROA 2      0.90***      1.00   
ETR             3     -0.12       -0.18**      1.00   
ETR Vola        4     -0.17*      -0.25***      0.43***      1.00   
Cashfl./Assets 5      0.49***      0.50***     -0.10       -0.13*       1.00   
TP_IT           6     -0.21**     -0.13*      -0.05       -0.17*      -0.07        1.00   
TP_Tension      7     -0.20**     -0.13       -0.02        0.08       -0.08        0.12        1.00   
Cost_method     8      0.10        0.17**      0.05       -0.09        0.19**      0.32***      0.16*       1.00   
Log(Assets)     9     -0.33***     -0.20**     -0.18**     -0.23***     -0.21**      0.40***      0.32***      0.12        1.00   
Leverage        10     -0.30***     -0.35***     -0.07       -0.01       -0.11       -0.05        0.16*       0.06        0.11        1.00   
Intangibles     11     -0.00        0.12       -0.10       -0.12        0.05        0.34***      0.31***      0.27***      0.43***      0.02        1.00   
Foreign sales   12      0.10        0.14*       0.00       -0.08        0.16*       0.25***      0.23***      0.48***      0.16*       0.02        0.32***      1.00   
Log(Age)        13      0.15*       0.17*       0.01       -0.02        0.10        0.38***      0.08        0.31***     -0.01       -0.25***      0.26***      0.24***      1.00   
LinkedIn1       14     -0.08       -0.00       -0.10       -0.16*      -0.01        0.31***      0.18**      0.10        0.45***     -0.05        0.48***      0.24***     -0.06        1.00   
LinkedIn2       15     -0.20**     -0.18**     -0.06      -0.19**     -0.07        0.14*       0.06        0.08        0.16*       0.17*      -0.07       -0.09        0.01       -0.14*       1.00   
Notes: This table presents the Pearson correlations for the variables used in the empirical analysis. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.1 and are either hand-collected from 
the firms’ consolidated financial statements from 2011 to 2016 or drawn from this study’s survey conducted in 2017. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 
1 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.5 reports the results of our main analysis. We find a significantly negative asso-
ciation between TP_Tension and profitability both before and after taxes (columns (1) and 
(3)). Firms that do not consider after-tax earnings for their managers’ evaluation, our proxy 
for firms facing conflicting managerial and tax objectives in the transfer pricing function, 
have, on average, 1.5 percentage points lower pre-tax and a 1.2 percentage points lower after-
tax returns than firms that do use after-tax KPIs. In these baseline specifications, we do not 
find that firms with a more intensive use of IT within their transfer pricing function are more 
or less profitable. This result indicates that the availability of an information sharing system 
alone is not associated with an increase in financial performance consistent with the view that 
the impact of information depends on cross-sectional differences of firms’ decision makers 
(Dierynck and Labro 2018).
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In columns (2) and (4), we test our hypothesis whether the neg-
ative association between conflicting transfer pricing objectives and profitability is attenuated 
by the intensive use of IT. After including an interaction term of TP_Tension and TP_IT, we 
document baseline coefficients on TP_Tension that are almost twice as large as compared to 
the coefficient in column (1) and (3). The statistically significant and positive interaction co-
efficients of 0.024 (column 2) and 0.022 (column 4) suggest that the negative association be-
tween TP_Tension and both ROA-measures is completely attenuated for firms with TP_IT
equal to one. Thus, our results support our hypothesis with respect to managerial outcomes of 
transfer pricing as pre-tax profitability is not mechanically affected by lower ETRs due to tax 
efficient transfer pricing.
We then look at tax avoidance as transfer pricing outcome. Column (5) reports the base-
line specification when ETR is the dependent variable. Consistent with our expectation, the 
coefficient on TP_Tension is statistically significant and positive. The point estimate suggests 
that firms that do not incentivize their divisional managers to maximize after-tax
                                                
51 This finding is in line with the recent experimental evidence in Li and Sandino (2018). Despite its different 
context (information sharing in sales stores), the study shows that there is not necessarily a causal link between 
better or more information and performance for the average firm.
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Table 3.5: Conflicting objectives, IT, and transfer pricing outcomes.
Pre-tax ROA After-tax ROA ETR
Variables Pred. (1) (2) Pred. (3) (4) Pred. (5) (6)
TP_Tension - -0.015** -0.027*** - -0.012** -0.022*** + 0.032* 0.070**
(-2.51) (-3.36) (-2.20) (-3.24) (1.67) (2.50)
TP_IT -0.008 -0.022*** 0.001 -0.013* - -0.025 0.022
(-1.09) (-2.75) (0.09) (-1.87) (-1.13) (0.70)
TP_Tension*TP_IT + 0.024** + 0.022** - -0.082**
(2.26) (2.35) (-2.20)
Log(Assets) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003** -0.002** - -0.011** -0.012***
(-4.63) (-4.40) (-2.33) (-2.09) (-2.52) (-2.78)
Foreign sales + 0.010*** 0.011*** + 0.008*** 0.009*** - 0.004 0.002
(4.63) (4.86) (4.26) (4.48) (0.38) (0.21)
Log(Age) 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.016 0.016
(0.61) (0.69) (0.33) (0.41) (1.21) (1.22)
Leverage - -0.146*** -0.153***
(-2.72) (-2.76)
Intangibles - -0.050 -0.051
(-0.64) (-0.67)
Observations 430 430 430 430 391 391
adj. R2 0.0870 0.0962 0.0540 0.0648 0.0237 0.0335
Ind-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression of Pre-tax ROA, After-tax ROA, and ETR on a set of independent variables. All variables are defined 
in Appendix 3.1 and are either hand-collected from the firms’ consolidated financial statements from 2011 to 2016 or drawn from this study’s survey conducted in 2017. The 
regressions are based on a panel on the level of firms and year. Constants are untabulated but included. Standard errors are robust and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
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profits have, on average, a 3.2 percentage points higher ETR. The baseline coefficient on 
TP_IT is not significant at the conventional levels but directionally consistent with evidence 
in Gallemore and Labro (2015). In column (6), we test our hypothesis on the role of intensive 
IT usage for firms’ tax avoidance when transfer pricing objectives conflict. After including 
the interaction of TP_Tension and TP_IT, we find that conflicting transfer pricing objectives 
are associated with 7.0 percentage points higher ETRs if firms do not rely on intensive IT 
support within their transfer pricing function. However, the strongly positive relationship be-
tween ETR and TP_Tension is fully attenuated by the intensive use of IT, as the statistically 
significant coefficient on the interaction term of -0.082 suggests. This result is consistent with 
our hypothesis concerning the ETR as the major tax-related outcome of transfer pricing.
3.4.3. Supplemental analyses
3.4.3.1. Tax risk and IT
Aggressive transfer pricing strategies for income shifting purposes are associated with 
significant tax risk (Dyreng et al. 2019; Towery 2017; KPMG 2018b). Companies thus typi-
cally aim to balance the financial benefits of a low ETR and the risk of unsustainable tax posi-
tions that likely result in disputes with tax authorities, penalties, adjustments of transfer prices 
and, thus, double taxation (Scholes et al. 2014; Towery 2017; Dyreng et al. 2019). 
IT in transfer pricing is important to manage such risk given the increasingly important 
documentation and reporting function (see OECD 2017 for tightening regulation). Tax com-
pliance in transfer pricing depends on the quality of local information and the transmission of 
this information to the central tax department. Particularly if divisional managers are not in-
centivized to support activities related to tax compliance aspects of transfer pricing, IT ena-
bles firms to gather the information necessary to defend tax-motivated transfer prices during 
tax audits by local authorities. In this context, IT might help firms to enhance the persuasive-
ness of the arm’s lengths nature of a firm’s transfer prices as tax positions are typically risky 
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if they are supported by a weak set of facts (Frischmann et al. 2008; Mills et al. 2010).
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However, tax risk could also increase if firms use more IT as tax authorities are typically 
granted access to the firm’s enterprise system during tax audits. They might use the more de-
tailed transaction-based information to challenge companies’ tax positions more frequently 
and more aggressively (Deloitte 2018). 
To explore this empirical question, we follow Gallemore and Labro (2015) and Guen-
ther et al. (2017) and examine the tax rate volatility as a proxy of tax risk. We use ETR Vola
as the firm’s standard deviation of the annually reported ETRs over a three-year period as the 
dependent variable to study the association between TP_IT and tax risk. We apply the same 
model as for the ETR-regression and use a three-year average matching the period over which 
we calculate ETR Vola of each control variable based on financial information from the com-
panies’ consolidated accounts. We present the results of this model in Table 3.6. We find a 
significant negative association between TP_IT and ETR Vola (column (1)). Directionally and 
quantitatively consistent with Gallemore and Labro (2015), this finding suggests that inten-
sive IT use particularly within the transfer pricing function supports firms in their tax risk 
management. TP_IT firms face, on average, a 14.5 percentage points lower tax rate volatility. 
Moreover, we observe a positive association between TP_Tension and ETR Vola, comple-
menting our finding that tension in the transfer pricing objectives is associated with a higher 
tax burden and further consistent with our proxy for TP_Tension capturing firms in which 
managers have little incentives to optimize tax outcomes. In column (2), we include the inter-
action term of TP_Tension and TP_IT. The baseline coefficient on TP_Tension is significantly 
                                                
52 In its Draft Handbook on Transfer Pricing Risk Assessment, the OECD (2013b) explicitly states: Where tax-
payers are compliant, readily provide the tax administration with the relevant information, documents and 
analysis, engage principally in routine and readily understood commercial transactions, and make reasonable 
efforts to implement appropriate transfer pricing policies, they generally need not be subjected to a thorough 
transfer pricing audit every year. In its current update of the Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Devel-
oping Countries, the United Nations (2019) further note: Such documentation should demonstrate that the 
transfer pricing method and its application provide the most reliable measure of an arm’s length price. This 
represents the first opportunity for the taxpayer to persuade the examiners that the transfer pricing is appro-
priate. Incomplete or inaccurate contemporaneous documentation may provide the examiners with a “road 
map” for their transfer pricing audit. 
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positive and larger than in column (1), indicating that this positive association is driven by 
sample firms with a non-intensive IT support for their transfer pricing processes. In line with 
our expectation, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative (-0.246) and statistically 
significant. This result indicates that IT does not only help firms to implement successful tax 
avoidance strategies but also to establish tax certainty, particularly when facing conflicting 
transfer pricing objectives.
Table 3.6: IT and tax risk in transfer pricing.
ETR Vola.
Variables Pred. (1) (2)
TP_Tension + 0.183*** 0.297***
(3.22) (2.93)
TP_IT - -0.145*** -0.004
(-2.71) (-0.07)
TP_Tension*TP_IT - -0.246**
(-2.15)
Log(Assets_3) -0.033*** -0.035***
(-3.10) (-3.19)
Leverage_3 0.040 -0.003
(0.34) (-0.03)
Intangibles_3 -0.436* -0.463*
(-1.83) (-1.95)
Foreign sales 0.006 0.001
(0.25) (0.05)
Log(Age) 0.085** 0.086**
(2.43) (2.42)
Observations 264 264
adj. R2 0.0919 0.1083
Ind-Year FE Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression of ETR Vola on a set of independent 
variables. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.1 and are either hand-collected from the firms’ consolidated 
financial statements from 2011 to 2016 or drawn from this study’s survey conducted in 2017. Constants are 
untabulated but included. The regressions are based on a panel on the level of firms and year. Standard errors are 
robust and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
3.4.3.2. Profitability under cost-based transfer pricing methods and IT
The choice of transfer pricing methods for different types of intrafirm transactions is a
crucial transfer pricing system design decision as it directly influences the determination of 
prices and, thus, the effectiveness of performance management (e.g., Baldenius 2009; Hie-
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mann and Reichelstein 2012). While firms can choose among a range of transfer pricing 
methods, the literature has predominantly studied the merits transfer prices based on costs, 
negotiations, or market prices. Dikolli and Vaysman (2006) formalize that the ability to com-
municate knowledge from local managers to the central management and the accuracy of 
transmitted information determine the preferred transfer pricing method. Although transfer 
prices set by the central management based on internal costs typically avoids the drawbacks 
of negotiated pricing such as haggling costs and delayed decision-making, cost-based transfer 
pricing is typically associated with suboptimal decision-making. Common reasons are double-
marginalization problems (Baldenius 2009) misallocating indirect costs, failing to calculate 
normal or budgeted costs, incorrectly identifying intrafirm activities, failing to factor in inef-
ficiencies and idle capacities, and accounting inconsistencies (Horngren et al. 2015, 53, 874). 
However, as Dikolli and Vaysman (2006) show, perfect IT overcomes these drawbacks of 
cost-based transfer pricing. The quicker and less costly relevant information on intrafirm
transactions can be transmitted, the more accurately costs are estimated. Managers can then 
mandate optimal levels of intrafirm trade which increases profitability (Dikolli and Vaysman 
2006).
Our data allows us to empirically test if a more intensive use of IT is indeed associated 
with the higher profitability under cost-based transfer pricing as predicted in Dikolli and 
Vaysman (2006). We observe which transfer pricing method a firm uses for different types of 
intrafirm transactions.
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If the firm applies cost-based transfer pricing in more than two of six
transactions (i.e., above the sample median), we define it as a frequent user of the cost-based 
transfer pricing method and the indicator variable Cost_method takes on the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. We use the same model as presented in equation (1) with Pre-tax ROA as depend-
                                                
53 We asked firms about intrafirm transactions concerning (1) primary products, (2) end products, (3) commodi-
ties (trade), (4) service, (5) IP development, and (6) IP exploitation. As potential methods, we offered five 
transfer pricing methods recommended in the OECD guidelines (OECD 2017): three traditional transaction-
related methods, the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP), the resale price method, and the cost plus 
method; and two transactional profit-related methods, the transactional net margin method (TNMM) and the 
profit split method.
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ent variable and include Cost_method and the interaction term of Cost method and TP_IT as 
independent variables. 
Table 3.7: Profitability, IT, and cost-plus methods in transfer pricing.
Pre-tax ROA
Variables Pred. (1) (2) (3)
TP_Tension - -0.015** -0.017*** -0.018***
(-2.55) (-2.81) (-2.83)
TP_IT -0.009 -0.020** -0.034***
(-1.45) (-2.53) (-2.79)
Cost_method 0.008 -0.002
(1.31) (-0.26)
Cost_method*TP_IT + 0.020*
(1.88)
Cost_method_count -0.004
(-1.39)
Cost_method_count* + 0.009**
TP_IT (2.49)
Log(Assets) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(-4.62) (-4.39) (-3.38)
Foreign sales + 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(3.94) (3.89) (3.05)
Log(Age) 0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.48) (0.76) (0.95)
Observations 430 430 430
adj. R2 0.0886 0.0929 0.0956
Ind-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression of Pre-tax ROA on a set of inde-
pendent variables. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.1and are either hand-collected from the firms’ consol-
idated financial statements from 2011 to 2016 or drawn from this study’s survey conducted in 2017. The regres-
sions are based on a panel on the level of firms and year. Constants are untabulated but included. Standard errors 
are robust and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 
1 percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
We report results in Table 3.7. We find that Cost_method is, on average, not significant-
ly associated with a firm’s profitability (column (1)). In line with theory, we document a coef-
ficient of 0.02 on the interaction term which is significant at the 10 percent level (column (2)). 
Given a baseline coefficient of -0.002 on Cost_method, the use of cost-based transfer pricing 
methods is associated with a 1.8 percentage point higher Pre-tax ROA if firms use IT inten-
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sively to support the transfer pricing function.
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In column (3), we replace the binary variable 
Cost_method capturing the intensity of the use of the cost-based method by the count variable 
we used to construct Cost_method indicating the number of transaction types for which the 
firm frequently applies the cost-plus method and find consistent results.
3.4.3.3. IT in specific transfer pricing processes
In the main analysis, we use a proxy aggregating the overall use of IT within the trans-
fer pricing function. This approach does not explicitly capture which specific transfer pricing 
processes are supported by IT. To investigate which process-specific IT most likely drives our 
results on the different outcomes, we run separate regressions coding the TP_IT variable sepa-
rately for the seven transfer pricing processes discussed in Section 3.3 and reported in Table 
3.2.
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Table 3.8 presents the regression results that are based on this detailed breakdown. Pan-
els A and B show the results for the regressions with the dependent variables After-tax ROA
and ETR including the interaction of TP_Tension and the process-specific TP_IT variable. 
Panel C and D replicate the analyses of tax risk and of profitability under cost-based transfer 
pricing. The results of our main tests are reported as baseline in each panels’ column (1). Col-
umns (2) to (8) report the results of our process-specific regressions.
In Panel A, the coefficients on the interaction term TP_Tension*TP_IT suggest that in-
tensive IT support for the calculation of transfer prices, documentation, and the external and 
internal reporting seem to drive the attenuation of the relationship between the conflicting 
objectives and lower profitability. This result is intuitive given that more accurately calculated 
and well-documented prices as well as sophisticated reporting tools should increase the deci-
sion-usefulness for managers dealing with conflicting transfer pricing objectives. 
                                                
54 In untabulated robustness tests, we do not find significant associations between the other transfer pricing 
methods and profitability, for instance the CUP method. 
55 The respective variables are binary. They take the value of one if the respondent answers the questions regard-
ing the intensity of IT support on the scale of 1 to 4 with either 3 (“high”) or 4 (“very high”).
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When ETR is the dependent variable (Panel B), empirical results suggest that the posi-
tive association between TP_Tension and ETR is only significantly attenuated when the pro-
cess of external reporting of transfer prices is supported by the intensive use of IT (Column 
(5)). Thus, our main finding on tax avoidance is most likely driven by firms with a generally 
intensive IT support within their transfer pricing function (baseline result). However, we find 
that external reporting being supported by IT helps firms to report lower ETRs under conflict-
ing transfer pricing objectives. This result suggests that convincingly reporting arm’s-length 
transfer prices to the tax authorities is essential for the success of tax-motivated transfer pric-
ing strategies, particularly when managerial objectives might not be aligned with tax-
motivated transfer prices. This finding is consistent with anecdotal evidence on the increasing 
scrutiny in international tax audits, tighter documentation requirements, and on well-
documented prices avoiding transfer pricing adjustments in the course of tax audits that ulti-
mately increase a firm’s ETR (KPMG 2018b; Baker McKenzie 2018). Moreover, the analysis 
reveals negative baseline coefficients on TP_IT particularly when the transfer pricing process 
is most relevant for gaining acceptance for pricing schemes by tax authorities (using IT during 
tax audits and maintaining a database). This finding sheds light on which specific aspects of a 
firm’s information environment help to implement successful tax strategies as documented, 
on average, in Gallemore and Labro (2015) and McGuire et al. (2018).
We also find intuitive results when studying process-specific IT and tax risk (Panel C). 
Our main result is most likely driven by intensive IT support for the documentation of transfer 
prices. Such documentation is relevant for tax risk management as tax authorities typically 
audit transfer pricing schemes for several past years at once and if prices are not documented 
appropriately, price adjustments will have one-time effects on the ETR and, thus, increase its 
volatility. Also, sound documentation enhances the persuasiveness of tax positions and de-
creases their risk of being challenged by auditors (Frischmann et al. 2008; Mills et al. 2010).
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Table 3.8: IT support of specific transfer pricing processes and transfer pricing outcomes.
Panel A: Dependent Variable: After-tax ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(Baseline) Comp. Search Calculation Docu. Ext. Rep. Int. Rep. TA Enf. TP Database
TP_Tension -0.022*** -0.012** -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.011** -0.013**
(-3.24) (-2.07) (-3.10) (-2.66) (-2.97) (-2.95) (-1.98) (-2.13)
TP_IT Process -0.013* -0.006 -0.005 -0.011 -0.015** -0.010 0.004 -0.009
(-1.87) (-0.95) (-0.81) (-1.56) (-2.15) (-1.62) (0.51) (-1.41)
TP_Tension*TP_IT Process 0.022** -0.001 0.030*** 0.016* 0.023*** 0.022*** -0.006 0.002
(2.35) (-0.13) (3.29) (1.74) (2.78) (2.73) (-0.57) (0.24)
Observations 430 430 430 430 430 424 430 430
adj. R2 0.0648 0.0554 0.0868 0.0565 0.0642 0.0595 0.0522 0.0574
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Dependent Variable: ETR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(Baseline) Comp. Search Calculation Docu. Ext. Rep. Int. Rep. TA Enf. TP Database
TP_Tension 0.070** 0.043* 0.049** 0.053** 0.056** 0.040 0.025 0.037
(2.50) (1.84) (2.02) (2.21) (2.35) (1.54) (1.09) (1.42)
TP_IT Process 0.022 0.039 0.000 0.031 0.028 -0.046* -0.080** -0.052**
(0.70) (1.09) (0.01) (0.86) (0.70) (-1.91) (-2.47) (-2.08)
TP_Tension*TP_IT Process -0.082** -0.015 -0.057 -0.073 -0.078* -0.020 0.014 -0.006
(-2.20) (-0.34) (-1.43) (-1.43) (-1.74) (-0.52) (0.32) (-0.18)
Observations 391 391 391 391 391 385 391 391
adj. R2 0.0335 0.0232 0.0278 0.0233 0.0285 0.0265 0.0356 0.0374
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel C: Dependent Variable: ETR Vola
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(Basline) Comp. Search Calculation Docu. Ext. Rep. Int. Rep. TA Enf. TP Database
TP_Tension 0.297*** 0.221*** 0.183** 0.258*** 0.240*** 0.211** 0.200*** 0.194**
(2.93) (2.99) (2.34) (3.12) (2.99) (2.40) (2.95) (2.50)
TP_IT Process -0.004 0.082 -0.039 0.103* 0.066 0.026 0.018 -0.096**
(-0.07) (1.51) (-0.81) (1.71) (1.15) (0.58) (0.33) (-2.17)
TP_Tension* -0.246** -0.037 0.041 -0.215* -0.134 -0.034 0.094 0.018
TP_IT Process (-2.15) (-0.38) (0.43) (-1.93) (-1.40) (-0.31) (0.87) (0.22)
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 260 264 264
adj. R2 0.1083 0.0711 0.0677 0.0759 0.0720 0.0694 0.0706 0.0756
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Dependent Variable: Pre-tax ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(Basline) Comp. Search Calculation Docu. Ext. Rep. Int. Rep. TA Enf. TP Database
Cost_method 0.008 0.000 -0.007 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 0.003 0.008
(1.31) (0.04) (-0.84) (-0.31) (-0.75) (-0.52) (0.47) (1.01)
TP_IT Process -0.020** -0.030*** -0.016* -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.013 -0.012 -0.012
(-2.53) (-3.02) (-1.94) (-3.35) (-3.63) (-1.60) (-1.36) (-1.59)
Cost_method* 0.020* 0.028** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.026** 0.022* 0.001
TP_IT Process (1.88) (2.30) (2.88) (3.51) (3.65) (2.40) (1.79) (0.12)
Observations 430 430 430 430 430 424 430 430
adj. R2 0.0886 0.1008 0.0981 0.1018 0.1058 0.0830 0.0852 0.0894
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: These tables present the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression of After-tax ROA (Panel), ETR (Panel B), ETR Vola (Panel C), and Pre-tax ROA (Panel D) on a set 
of independent variables. The definition of the variable Process differs in columns (2) to (8); it is a binary variable capturing all firms that use “high” (3) or “very high” (4) IT 
support for each of the seven transfer pricing processes we consider in the survey, each as indicated in the specification title. All other variables are defined in Appendix 3.1 and 
are either hand-collected from the firms’ consolidated financial statements from 2011 to 2016 or drawn from this study’s survey conducted in 2017. The regressions are based on 
a panel on the level of firms and year. Standard errors are robust and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
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In Panel D, we repeat this process-specific analysis to test which kind of IT support en-
ables more profitable cost-based transfer pricing. Again, we are particularly interested in the 
coefficients of the interaction term of Cost method*TP_IT. Consistent with the argumentation 
in Dikolli and Vaysman (2006), IT support of the calculation of transfer prices and internal 
reporting seem to be the drivers of our main findings.
3.4.4. Robustness tests
3.4.4.1. Validating the proxy for conflicting transfer pricing objectives
Capturing the different and even conflicting objectives within the transfer pricing func-
tion is not a trivial and might be prone to measurement error. We therefore assess the plausi-
bility of the baseline result based on our proxy for conflicting tax and managerial objectives 
(TP_Tension). First, we exploit an additional survey question asking whether transfer pricing 
managers think that the transfer pricing system within their firm integrates the tax function
and the managerial control system to a sufficient extent. We code the indicator variable GAP
TP-MCS as one if their answer was no. We interpret GAP TP-MCS as an alternative measure 
to TP_Tension since a firm with a transfer pricing system that poorly integrates the tax plan-
ning and managerial control should be likely to face conflicting transfer pricing objectives. 
Consistent with this conjecture, the result reported in column (1) of Table 3.9 is in line with 
the main result when TP_Tension is the variable of interest. Second, we look at cash-flow 
scaled by total assets as an alternative outcome measure. While cash-flows might be correlat-
ed with effective tax rates and profitability, we interpret it as a placebo outcome and do not 
expect to replicate the significant baseline results. Our proxy TP_Tension is supposed to cap-
ture conflicting objectives stemming from managers aiming to minimize either the ETR or the 
accounting-based profitability. Both measures are affected by accrual accounting while cash-
flows are not. Consistently, we document no statistically significant relationship between 
TP_Tension or the interaction of TP_Tension*TP_IT and the placebo outcome.
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Table 3.9: Cross-sectional validation of main results.
After-tax ROA Cashflow/Assets
Variables (1) (2) (3)
TP_Tension -0.010** -0.004 -0.011
(-2.04) (-0.67) (-1.12)
TP_IT -0.007 0.004 -0.004
(-0.97) (0.62) (-0.41)
TP_Tension*TP_IT 0.013
(1.16)
GAP TP-MCS -0.021**
(-1.97)
GAP TP-MCS*TP_IT 0.052***
(4.84)
Observations 430 428 428
adj. R2 0.0946 0.0779 0.0784
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Ind-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression of After-tax ROA and Cash-
flow/Assets on a set of independent variables. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.1 and are either hand-
collected from the firms’ consolidated financial statements from 2011 to 2016 or drawn from this study’s survey 
conducted in 2017. The regressions are based on a panel on the level of firms and year. Standard errors are ro-
bust and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
3.4.4.2. Instrumental variables approach to address potential endogeneity of the 
use of IT
We acknowledge that our proxy for the intensity of IT use is a potentially endogenous 
variable. Selection bias might arise since firms are not randomly sorted into “low” and “high” 
intensity IT users (Lennox et al. 2011).
56
If unobserved determinants of intensive IT use also 
affect profitability and tax planning outcomes, regression results might be biased (Larcker and 
Rusticus 2010). We do not claim that our results based on OLS regressions and the cross-
sectional survey data allow for a causal interpretation. However, we validate our results and 
aim to address selection-into-IT and reverse causality concerns by an instrumental variables 
(IV) approach. IV methods can, if they meet certain requirements, eliminate the bias stem-
ming from simultaneity, selection, or omitted variables (Larcker and Rusticus 2010).
                                                
56 We interpret such selection bias to possibly arise due to unobserved factors that drive firms’ decision to em-
ploy IT and also influence transfer pricing outcomes. In untabulated tests, we find that firms scoring 1 on 
TP_IT are, on average, larger, more intangible-intensive, more internationalized, and more mature (older).
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One requirement is to find variables that are correlated with the endogenous regressor 
(TP_IT) but uncorrelated with the error in the structural equation (  ,  in (1)). We use hand-
collected information from the professional social online network platform LinkedIn.com to 
construct two variables as instruments for TP_IT. First, we code a binary variable as one if 
firms have a corporate profile on LinkedIn. Second, we search for LinkedIn profiles of em-
ployees that work at firms’ transfer pricing departments and capture the number of these em-
ployees in a continuous variable. We use both variables in our first stage regressions to pre-
dict the use of IT in our sample firms.
57
We expect and find that the LinkedIn variables are 
positively associated with a firm’s use of IT in transfer pricing as the first stage regressions 
results in Panel B of Table 3.10 show. The significant and directionally expected coefficients 
on our LinkedIn variables, relatively high partial R-squared, and an F-statistics between 6 and 
23 for all specifications suggest that the instruments should be relevant and not weak (Larcker 
and Rusticus 2010).
The IV approach then uses the predicted values of TP_IT in the second stage regression 
and considers the variation of this variable exogenous. The economic justification for the un-
derlying exclusion criterion to be fulfilled (Larcker and Rusticus 2010; Lennox et al. 2011) in 
our analysis requires that the LinkedIn variables have no direct influence on the transfer pric-
ing outcomes such as the profitability, ETR, and tax risk. A counterargument is that technolo-
gy-intensive firms differ in profitability and are more tax aggressive and that (probably 
younger) employees who are more open-minded towards IT are also better tax planners and 
decision makers. Yet, firms striving for high profits and an aggressive tax strategy might 
avoid being on LinkedIn to avoid public scrutiny. Also, older employees whose working ex-
perience can be a driving factor of favorable firm outcomes (Simsek 2007) are less likely to 
                                                
57 When the second stage includes an interaction term of the TP_IT variable and another variable, we also in-
strument for these interaction terms with the interactions of the LinkedIn variables and the other variable of in-
terest.
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have a LinkedIn profile.
58
Importantly, we intend to capture variation in terms of transfer pric-
ing managers’ affinity with IT rather than the size of the transfer pricing department.
59
We 
implicitly assume that the variation in the LinkedIn variables is itself exogenous to the use of 
IT within the firm’s transfer pricing function. However, we cannot formally test this assump-
tion. Nevertheless, we can follow the recommendation in Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and 
test over-identifying restrictions as we include more than one instrumental variables. Condi-
tional on our model including at least one valid instrument, results of the tests suggest that our 
instruments seem appropriate, at least when After-tax ROA and ETR are the dependent varia-
bles.
60
We finally report the second stage regression results when validating the specifications 
of our main analysis using TSLS in Panel A of Table 3.10. Overall, we confirm our main 
findings based on OLS which is consistent with the industrial economics literature that has
documented only a small IT selection bias, if any (Tambe and Hitt 2012).
61
                                                
58 For the age distribution of LinkedIn users in the US, statistics suggest that almost half of the LinkedIn users 
are between 25 and 45 years old, while only 25 percent are older than 55 (https://www.statista.com/statistics/ 
192700/ age-distribution-of-us-users-on-linkedin/).  
59 Our interpretation and the use of the LinkedIn data is thus different compared to the setting of Chen, Cheng, 
Chow, and Liu (2017) who look at the number of employees in the tax department as their variable of interest.
60 Results of the Hausman test further suggest that bias, if any, from endogeneity of the TP_IT variable appears 
to be most severe in our analysis of tax risk (columns (6) and (7)).
61 However, some TSLS estimates differ in magnitude from the OLS results and the TSLS estimate seems unrea-
sonably large when the outcome variable is ETR. These results might be due to low power of the instruments 
(Larcker and Rusticus 2010) when studying the relationship between TP_IT and tax avoidance and tax risk. 
We again stress the IV approach only serves as a robustness test of our main empirical approach and provides 
comforting evidence in terms of the sign and the significance of the estimates. 
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Table 3.10: Robustness tests: TSLS IV regressions.
Panel A: Second stage (TSLS results)
After-tax ROA ETR ETR Vola.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TP_Tension -0.018*** -0.041*** -0.022*** 0.017 0.172** 0.126** 0.699***
(-2.87) (-2.91) (-3.61) (0.72) (2.57) (1.96) (3.02)
TP_IT 0.008 0.010 -0.022 -0.118 -0.009 -0.669** -0.271
(0.27) (0.43) (-1.28) (-1.30) (-0.14) (-2.28) (-0.94)
TP_Tension* 0.057* -0.341** -1.249***
TP_IT (1.87) (-2.57) (-2.75)
Cost_method -0.043***
(-2.67)
Cost_method* 0.070***
TP_IT (2.93)
Observations 348 348 348 340 340 229 229
adj. R2 0.0593 . 0.0059 . . . .
Over-id. Chi2 0.82 5.21 5.38 0.00 1.72 4.22 6.26
Over-id. p 0.3648 0.0739 0.0680 0.9814 0.4232 0.0401 0.0438
Hausman F 0.86 5.72 3.90 2.16 4.86 7.00 9.78
Hausman p 0.3532 0.0572 0.1420 0.1417 0.0880 0.0082 0.0075
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: First stage results and diagnostics
TP_IT TP_IT TP_IT
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LinkedIn1 0.163*** 0.041** -0.033** 0.079*** 0.181*** 0.076*** 0.173***
(4.71) (2.04) (-2.24) (4.55) (5.23) (3.52) (3.99)
LinkedIn2 0.087 0.392*** -0.036 0.150*** 0.034 0.151** 0.064
(1.21) (6.00) (-0.97) (2.72) (0.44) (2.26) (0.71)
Observations 348 348 348 340 340 229 229
partial R2 0.0542 0.0758 0.1286 0.0566 0.0884 0.0525 0.0793
F 13.83 10.87 23.27 11.75 10.23 7.09 6.22
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV-Interactions No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Ind-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the second (Panel A) and first (Panel B) stage results of estimating TSLS IV-regression model 
of the baseline specifications with After-tax ROA, ETR, and ETR Vola as dependent variables and the same set of inde-
pendent variables as in Tables (5) to (7). The instruments for TP_IT are LinkedIN1 and LinkedIn2. All variables are de-
fined in Appendix 3.1 and either hand-collected from the firms’ consolidated financial statements from 2011 to 2016, 
from LinkedIn in 2018, or drawn from this study’s survey conducted in 2017. When the models include interactions of 
the instrumental variables (given that the variables of interests TP_Tension and TP_IT are interacted in the baseline mod-
els) the partial R squared and F-statistics from the first stage are based on the baseline instruments for TP_IT. Standard 
errors are robust and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
3.4.4.3. Seemingly unrelated regression framework
In our regression analysis, we relate multiple transfer pricing outcomes to the use of IT 
and other transfer pricing system characteristics of the same firm. In doing so, we use more 
than one regression model while each equation explains variation in a different economic 
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phenomenon (outcome variable) for a given firm. Our main transfer pricing outcome variables 
(ROA vs. ETR) and their residuals might be correlated across the various regressions at a giv-
en firm. We thus test the robustness of our main results based on a seemingly unrelated re-
gressions (SUR) model established by Zellner (1962) to account for the correlation of the po-
tentially interdependent residuals and potentially improve our models’ estimation efficiency
(Aitchison 1986; Abernethy et al. 2013). Results are reported in Table 3.11 and are quantita-
tively and qualitatively comparable to the main OLS results.
Table 3.11: Robustness tests: Seemingly unrelated regressions model.
After-tax ROA ETR
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
TP_Tension -0.021*** -0.026*** 0.031 0.070***
(-4.46) (-4.19) (1.64) (2.78)
TP_IT -0.008 -0.015** -0.024 0.024
(-1.52) (-2.00) (-1.15) (0.80)
TP_Tension*TP_IT 0.012 -0.084**
(1.31) (-2.32)
Log(Assets) -0.001 -0.001 -0.013** -0.013***
(-1.21) (-1.11) (-2.52) (-2.69)
Foreign sales 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.004 0.002
(3.95) (4.06) (0.40) (0.21)
Log(Age) 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.011
(1.62) (1.60) (0.88) (0.90)
Leverage -0.204*** -0.209***
(-3.80) (-3.91)
Intangibles 0.014 0.011
(0.16) (0.13)
Observations 391 391 391 391
R2 0.1884 0.1919 0.1884 0.1919
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ind-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression of the seemingly unrelated regres-
sions (Zellner 1962) using After-tax ROA and ETR as dependent variables and the respective set of independent 
variables. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.1 and are either hand-collected from the firms’ consolidated 
financial statements from 2011 to 2016 or drawn from this study’s survey conducted in 2017. The regressions 
are based on a panel on the level of firms and year. Constants are untabulated but included. Standard errors are 
robust and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
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3.5. Conclusion
Multinational firms use transfer pricing to maximize overall profits but also to shift pre-
tax profits to low-tax jurisdictions. A fundamental, yet empirically unexplored question is 
how firms implement transfer pricing strategies that balance the often-underlying conflict 
between managerial control and tax efficiency within their transfer pricing function. We find 
that the intensive use of IT within firms’ transfer pricing function helps to achieve higher 
profitability, lower ETRs, and lower tax risk if managerial and tax objectives likely conflict. 
Moreover, our evidence confirms theory that more intensive IT use is associated with higher 
profitability under cost-based transfer pricing. Our results suggest that investments in IT can 
increase the effectiveness of transfer pricing strategies in particular when decision-making is 
difficult because of a high tension between the tax and managerial accounting department and 
when granular information is necessary to determine optimal prices based on internal costs.
Our study contributes to several lines of research and offers implications for the practice
of transfer pricing. To our knowledge, we are the first to provide empirical evidence on the 
use of IT within firms’ transfer pricing function and its association with non-tax and tax-
related outcomes, thereby bridging the gap between managerial and tax accounting research. 
Our findings are of primary interest to practitioners and researchers alike given the rising up-
take of specific IT solutions and the increasing data availability and relevance in the digital 
economy.
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Appendix Chapter 3
Table 3.12: Appendix 3.1: Variable definitions.
Outcome Variables
Pre-tax ROA
Return on assets before taxes in year t, defined as firm’s earnings 
before taxes scaled by total assets, acc. to cons. fin. statements
After-tax ROA
Return on assets after taxes in year t, defined as firm’s earnings after 
taxes (EAT) scaled by total assets, acc. to cons. fin. statements
ETR
Effective tax rate in year t, defined as tax expense over earnings be-
fore taxes, acc. to cons. fin. statements
ETR Vola Standard deviation of ETR over three-year period ending in t
Cashflow/Assets
Cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets in year t, 
acc. to cons. fin. statements
Variables of Interest
TP_IT
1 if index measuring the degree of the firms' use of IT for transfer 
pricing (ranging from 7 to 28) is above median, 0 otherwise
TP_Tension 1 if MNE uses no KPI based on EAT
Cost_method
1 if MNE uses cost-based transfer pricing methods for more than 
two (out of nine) types of transactions (i.e., above median), 0 other-
wise
Control Variables
Log(Assets)
Natural logarithm of firm’s total assets in year t, acc. to cons. fin. 
statements
Log(Assets_3)
Natural logarithm of firm’s average total assets over three-year peri-
od ending in t
Leverage
Firm’s long-term debt scaled by its total assets in year t, acc. to cons. 
fin. statements
Leverage_3
Average firm’s long-term debt scaled by its total assets over three-
year period ending in t
Intangibles
Firm’s intangible assets scaled by its total assets in year t, acc. to 
cons. fin. statements
Intangibles_3
Average firm’s intangible assets scaled by its total assets over three-
year period ending in t
Foreign sales
Share of firm’s foreign revenue, as indicated in survey; 1 if < 25%, 2 
if 25%-50%, 3 if 50%-75%, 4 if > 75%
Log(Age) Natural logarithm of firm’s age in year 2017 (year of the survey)
GAP TP-MCS
1 if managers do not think that the transfer pricing system within 
their firm integrates the tax function and the managerial control sys-
tem to a sufficient extent, 0 otherwise
Instrumental Variables
LinkedIn1 1 if MNE has a corporate LinkedIn profile
LinkedIn2 No. of the MNE’s transfer pricing managers with a LinkedIn profile
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Figure 3.4: Appendix 3.2: Questions from the survey instrument used in this study [translated 
from German].
1.1. Which key financial ratios are primarily used for steering and managing in your organiza-
tion? [Multiple choices possible]
No usage
Yes, use in terms 
of legal entities 
(individual finan-
cial statement –
financial figures)
Yes, use in terms of 
management-units
(e.g. business units)
Yes, use in terms 
of group level 
(consolidated 
financial figures)
Growth indicators    
EBIT-based key figures    
Earnings-After-Tax (EAT)-
based key figures 
   
Cash Flow-based key figures    
Other (please specify) ______________________________________________________________
1.5. Which transfer pricing methods are used in your organization for the following transac-
tions? [Multiple choices possible]
Unfinished 
products
Sales (Fin-
ished prod-
ucts)
Sales 
(Mer-
chandise)
Services
Develop-
ment of IP
Use of IP
Cost-plus method      
Resale price method      
Comparable uncontrolled price me-
thod
     
Transactional net margin method      
Transactional profit split method      
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Figure 3.4: Appendix 3.2 (continued)
3.1. To what extent are your transfer pricing management processes currently supported by IT 
systems?
Support with very 
low intensity 
Support with low 
intensity 
Support with high 
intensity
Support with very 
high intensity
Search of comparables    
Calculation of transfer prices    
Documentation of transfer prices    
External reporting of transfer prices 
(incl. CbCR)
   
Internal reporting of transfer prices    
Enforcement of transfer prices vs. 
tax authorities 
   
Transfer of transfer pricing data 
within organization 
   
3.2. To what extent should your transfer pricing management processes be supported by IT 
systems in the future?
Support with very 
low intensity 
Support with low 
intensity 
Support with 
high intensity
Support with very 
high intensity
Search of comparables    
Calculation of transfer prices    
Documentation of transfer prices    
External reporting of transfer prices 
(incl. CbCR)
   
Internal reporting of transfer prices    
Enforcement of transfer prices vs. 
tax authorities 
   
Transfer of transfer pricing data 
within organization 
   
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Figure 3.4.: Appendix 3.2 (continued)
3.3. For which topics do you see a need for change in your organization in the next five years?
Very little change Little change Strong change Very strong change
Transfer pricing system for estab-
lished products and services
   
Transfer pricing system for
digital products and services
   
Linkage of transfer pricing and 
steering system
   
IT-support of transfer pricing 
processes
   
Enforcement of transfer pricing 
system vs. tax authorities 
   
Others (please specify) _____________________________________________________________
5.1. In which department are you currently working?
Controlling 
Accounting 
Tax 
Others: __________________________________________________
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Figure 3.4.: Appendix 3.2 (continued)
5.2. To which industry does your group/group division primarily belong?
Automotive  Trade  Public Administration 
Ban-
king/Insurance/Finance
 IT  Pharmaceuticals 
Construction/Facility 
Management
 Industrial Goods  Telecommunications 
Biotechnology 
Consumer Goods and Groce-
ries
 Transportation/Logistics 
Chemicals  Media  Engineering 
Energy  Medical Technology  Other (please specify) ____
5.4. In the past financial year, what share of external turnover did your group generate abroad 
(i.e. outside the state of residence of the parent company)?
≤ 25 %  > 25% to 50%  > 50% to 75%  > 75% 
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4.Chapter 4: Transfer Pricing Strictness and Cross-
Border Intrafirm Trade:  Evidence from U.S. Mul-
tinational Firms
Abstract
International tax rate incentives are important determinants of U.S. multinationals’ cross-
border intrafirm trade patterns and transfer pricing strategies. This study examines the role of
the heterogeneity across countries’ transfer pricing strictness for this determination. Utilizing
a panel dataset containing aggregate intrafirm trade flows of U.S. multinational firms, I inves-
tigate whether a higher transfer pricing strictness is associated with a reduced tax rate sensi-
tivity of intrafirm trade. Confirming prior literature, I document that U.S. multinationals con-
duct more intrafirm trade with low-tax countries. Moreover, I find that particularly U.S. in-
trafirm imports are higher and intrafirm trade balances lean to imports with low-tax countries. 
However, if stricter transfer pricing applies, those associations are mitigated as the sensitivi-
ties of these measures of intrafirm trade to tax rate incentives are significantly reduced.
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4.1. Introduction
Intrafirm trade is of high economic importance. For instance, the volume of transactions 
within multinational firms is estimated to account for more than 50 percent of global trade 
(OECD 2013a; Sansing 2014). Given this magnitude, a thorough understanding of the deter-
minants of intrafirm trade is essential. Thus, this study analyzes whether transfer pricing 
strictness of countries affects intrafirm trade patterns and transfer pricing strategies of U.S. 
multinational firms. Utilizing intrafirm trade data of U.S. multinational firms aggregated at 
the country-level and matching it to a measure capturing the countries’ transfer pricing strict-
ness over time, I investigate whether stricter transfer pricing reduces the tax rate sensitivity of 
intrafirm trade. 
Until the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act passed in 2017, the U.S. imposed a corporate income 
tax rate of 35 percent making it a high-tax jurisdiction relative to most other countries. Alt-
hough the U.S. traditionally applied a credit system eliminating tax savings from cross-border 
profit shifting upon distribution of foreign profits, the U.S. taxation of worldwide profits can 
be avoided by the deferral of these foreign profits. Thus, from a tax perspective, U.S. multina-
tional firms have a strong incentive to generate and report the highest possible share of its 
group-wide profits in low-tax jurisdictions. A large body of literature empirically documents 
that U.S. multinational firms engage in cross-border income shifting (e.g., Grubert and Mutti 
1991; Klassen and Laplante 2012).
There are two main types of income shifting that multinational firms engage in. First, 
there is artificial income shifting. One way to achieve this is the strategic manipulation of
transfer prices to allocate a larger share of their profits to low-tax jurisdictions (De Simone et 
al. 2017; Blouin et al. 2018). In fact, a meta-study by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) finds 
that transfer pricing is a predominant income shifting channel. Second, there is real income 
shifting which can be achieved by an allocation of production facilities, sales forces, or ser-
vice centers to countries with lower tax rates (e.g., Hines 1999; Overesch 2009; Feld and 
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Heckemeyer 2011). This increasing business activity in low-tax countries is typically associ-
ated with a higher volume of intrafirm trade (Clausing 2006). Thus, intrafirm trade and trans-
fer pricing play a key role in both types of income shifting. Consistently, prior literature 
shows that international tax avoidance and the exploitation of tax rate differentials is indeed a 
determining factor for intrafirm trade patterns of U.S. multinationals (Clausing 2006).
Given this tax planning potential that intrafirm trade carries and its economic im-
portance, the regulation of transfer pricing is very high on the international tax policy agenda, 
especially since the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) initiative put forward by the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In this plan of actions, the 
fight against transfer pricing schemes which are purely tax-driven is a central concern, putting 
countries with lenient transfer pricing under pressure (OECD 2015).
However, independently of the BEPS initiative, a large number of jurisdictions have in-
troduced regulations explicitly governing the way how multinational firms have to set prices 
for their intrafirm transactions to limit the tax planning potential of transfer pricing. Already 
in 1928, Sweden was the first country to ever establish transfer pricing regulations. Australia 
was the first to follow as it developed transfer pricing regulations in 1981. Since then, there 
was a large wave of such introductions. Nowadays, almost all OECD countries and many de-
veloping countries have transfer pricing regulations in place.
Those regulations typically postulate that transfer prices must comply with the arm’s 
length principle requiring transfer prices to mirror prices set for transactions between inde-
pendent parties.
62
Although the arm’s length principle is a common ground for the various 
transfer pricing regimes in the world’s international tax system, national transfer pricing 
strictness is very heterogeneous across countries and time. The regulations vary in their de-
sign, scope, and flexibility. Moreover, the level of enforcement is diverging. Tight regulations 
                                                
62 This principle is, for instance, positioned in Article 9 of the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital
of the OECD. Moreover, the OECD has developed its Transfer Pricing Guidelines to shape a worldwide 
standard of the arm’s length principle and to enhance the countries’ implementation.
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which are consequently audited and enforced constitute high transfer pricing strictness, while 
lax regulations or a low degree of auditing and enforcement establish a lower transfer pricing 
strictness. This study exploits the heterogeneity of transfer pricing strictness and investigates
its impact on intrafirm trade of U.S. multinational firms.
63
Therefore, I draw upon the theoretical considerations of Clausing (2006) who elaborates 
on the potential effects of tax rate incentives on intrafirm trade, i.e., a location effect, a price 
effect, and a quantity effect. I extend her predictions and add the important dimension of trans-
fer pricing strictness. In particular, I predict that the tax rate sensitivity of intrafirm trade de-
pends on the transfer pricing strictness of the foreign affiliate’s home country. Based on these 
considerations, I measure the effects of those important tax characteristics (i.e. the tax rate, 
the transfer pricing strictness, and the interaction of both) on different dimensions of the in-
trafirm trading patterns of U.S. multinationals in the subsequent empirical analysis. To cap-
ture transfer pricing strictness, I use an index variable developed by Klassen and Mescall 
(2018) that measures the transfer pricing strictness of countries by evaluating a country’s 
transfer pricing regulations and the level of the enforcement of these regulations based on 15 
dimensions over time. 
I find empirical support for the prediction that transfer pricing strictness is a determinant 
for the intrafirm trading behavior of U.S. multinational firms. My results confirm prior litera-
ture that U.S. multinationals trade more with affiliates resident in low-tax countries and that 
U.S. intrafirm trade balances with low-tax countries are leaning towards imports (Clausing 
2006). In an additional analysis, I find that imports are more tax-sensitive than exports. How-
ever, my analyses suggest that all of these relationships seem to be primarily driven by affili-
ates resident in countries that have particularly lenient transfer pricing regimes and that the
associations are mitigated for countries with higher transfer pricing strictness.
                                                
63 Throughout this paper, I use the term transfer pricing strictness to refer to the countries’ overall level of strict-
ness, considering their transfer pricing regulations, their level of enforcement, and the countries’ transfer pric-
ing audit practices.
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This study supports the understanding of the determinants of intrafirm trade patterns and 
transfer pricing strategies of U.S. multinationals. Thereby, it contributes to the literature on 
tax-induced multinational income shifting and the impact of anti-avoidance measures. In par-
ticular, prior empirical evidence indicates that higher transfer pricing strictness reduces profit 
shifting to low-tax countries (e.g., Klassen and Laplante 2012; Beer and Loeprick 2015; 
Breuselinck et al. 2015; Riedel et al. 2015; Saunders-Scott 2015; Marques and Pinho 2016). 
In their analyses, these studies all focus on profit measures (i.e., earnings before interest and 
taxes) which are likely to be also affected by other profit shifting channels, such as intragroup 
financing.
64
None of those studies investigate whether the heterogeneity of transfer pricing 
strictness directly affects intrafirm trade patterns and transfer pricing of multinational firms. I
argue that parts of the intrafirm trade volumes that are disproportionate to the respective coun-
try’s economic size may directly result from tax-motivated transfer pricing strategies and may
thus be a more direct proxy to measure these strategies compared to the profit-measures used 
in prior literature. Hence, this study extends this strand of literature by providing novel empir-
ical evidence of the effects of transfer pricing strictness on tax avoidance using intrafirm trade 
and transfer pricing.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides some institu-
tional background on transfer pricing strictness and the role of taxation for international trade. 
Against this background, it develops a set of hypotheses on the effects of transfer pricing 
strictness on intrafirm trade. Section 4.3 presents the data and provides a descriptive analysis. 
Section 4.4 contains multivariate analyses testing the study’s hypotheses. Section 4.5 con-
cludes.
                                                
64 For instance, Grubert (2003) finds that U.S. multinationals use financial and non-financial profit shifting tech-
niques to a similar extent.
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4.2. Background and hypothesis development
4.2.1. Tax rate differentials and intrafirm trade 
From a tax perspective, a multinational firm has an incentive to shift profits from high-
tax to low-tax countries to maximize its overall after-tax profitability. Accordingly, U.S. mul-
tinationals typically aim to shift profits out of their home country as it was a high-tax jurisdic-
tion relative to most other countries for the study’s sample period (2000 to 2015).
65
Since in-
trafirm trade has a substantial impact on each entity’s profit and, consequently, on a multina-
tional’s overall tax burden, tax considerations play an important role in determining cross-
border intrafirm trade patterns and transfer pricing of U.S. multinationals. Clausing (2006) 
theoretically identifies three main mechanisms through which tax rate differentials influence
cross-border intrafirm trade volumes. 
First, the location effect implies that low-tax jurisdictions are more attractive locations 
for foreign direct investments as compared to high-tax countries because subsequent profits 
resulting from such investments are subject to a lower tax rate. This effect is well-documented 
in the empirical literature (e.g., Hines 1999; Overesch 2009; Feld and Heckemeyer 2011; 
Buettner et al. 2018; De Mooij and Liu 2018).
66
However, the consequences of this invest-
ment-related location effect on cross-border intrafirm trade are ambiguous. On the one hand, 
foreign direct investments may decrease intrafirm trade by substituting production in the 
home country (Dunning 1981; Markusen 1984; Markusen 1995). On the other hand, foreign 
direct investments may also increase intrafirm trade. For instance, a vertical integration of the 
production process can increase the trade flows of components produced in the home country. 
                                                
65 The U.S. corporate tax rate was set to 35 percent in 1993 and remained unchanged until the recent reform 
passed in 2017, i.e. the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, when the tax rate was adjusted to 21 percent. The sample’s av-
erage corporate income tax rate varied between 24.2 (2015) and 28.9 (2000), see Section 4.3.1 for detailed in-
formation on my data. Until the reform, the U.S. applied a credit system which ultimately eliminates the tax 
saving potential of international income shifting. However, as worldwide taxation can be avoided by deferral 
of these profits, firms under this tax system also engage in cross-border income shifting (Grubert and Mutti 
2001; Klassen and Laplante 2012; Markle 2015).
66 Theoretically, a counterargument against this notion is that investments in high-tax countries lead to tax-
deductible expenses in that high-tax country and, when distributed, capital income in low-tax countries. How-
ever, empirical evidence clearly documents that this effect is outweighed.
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Moreover, the relocation of the production for the home market can increase intrafirm trade. 
Additionally, multinational firms may enter new markets through foreign direct investments 
(Lipsey and Weiss 1984; Rugman 1990). Prior empirical evidence suggests that the comple-
mentary relationship of investment and trade outweighs the substitution effect.
67
Accordingly, 
the location effect leads to more intrafirm trade with affiliates located in low-tax countries 
compared to affiliates which are resident in high-tax jurisdictions. 
Second, a price effect may influence intrafirm trade patterns. The strategic use of trans-
fer prices enables firms to exploit tax rate differentials by charging affiliates in low-tax coun-
tries with the lowest possible prices while the highest possible transfer prices are applied for 
intrafirm transactions with affiliates located in high-tax countries. Thereby, a higher share of 
the multinational’s overall profits is subject to lower tax rates. This manipulation of transfer 
prices is a common way to shift profits to low-tax countries. For instance, a meta-study by 
Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) shows that transfer pricing is a dominant profit-shifting 
channel. Moreover, extant literature investigates the prevalence of tax-related transfer pricing.
These studies particularly analyze if there are systematical price differences between prices
set for transactions among unrelated parties and transfer prices used for transactions among 
related affiliates, and if such price differences depend on tax rate differentials. For instance, 
Clausing (2003) examines U.S. intrafirm trade prices by exploiting a dataset collected by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). She finds that exports to affiliates in low-tax countries are 
under-invoiced while imports to the U.S. high-tax affiliates are over-invoiced. Complemen-
tary, Bernhard et al. (2006) analyze the Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Data-
base (LFTTD) and find that prices U.S. exporting firms set for their unaffiliated customers are 
                                                
67 With respect to U.S. exports, already Horst (1978) and Lipsey and Weiss (1981) both find support for such a 
complementarity relationship with foreign affiliate activity and foreign direct investments. Resulting from an 
investigation of overall trade statistics of U.S. multinationals, Grubert and Mutti (1991) show that U.S. firms 
conduct more trade with trading partners located in low-tax countries This complementary effect has been con-
firmed by several subsequent studies, also for intrafirm trade, e.g. by Graham (2000) or Clausing (2000) using 
aggregate data or Head and Ries (2001), Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1998), Swedenborg (2000), or Blonigen 
(2001) using firm-level data. 
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significantly higher than the prices set for their related affiliates, particularly those that are 
resident in low-tax countries. Additionally, several other studies back the intuition of tax-
motivated transfer pricing and multinational profit shifting with supportive empirical evidence
analyzing transaction data from the U.S. (Flaaen 2017), Denmark (Cristea and Nguyen 2016), 
the United Kingdom (Liu et al. 2017), or France (Vicard 2015; Davies et al. 2018).
Third, a quantity effect directly arises from the price effect. As outlined above, a multi-
national firm derives tax savings from strategic transfer pricing. These tax savings are scala-
ble. For instance, if a multinational firm increases the number of goods traded internally from 
affiliates in high-tax countries to related affiliates in low-tax countries charging an artificially 
high transfer price, it can generate higher tax savings. Thus, multinational firms are incentiv-
ized to engage in more intrafirm trade between two countries in case of a prevailing tax rate 
differential.
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4.2.2. Transfer pricing strictness
Tax legislators are aware of the tax revenue losses stemming from tax-related transfer 
pricing strategies (compare, e.g., OECD 2015). To curtail corporate tax planning and tax 
avoidance, transfer pricing regulations have been implemented in the tax codes of a vast ma-
jority of countries. In Table 4.1, I provide an overview of countries that implemented such 
transfer pricing regulations and the respective year of implementation.
Transfer pricing regulations limit the opportunities of transfer pricing for tax planning 
and profit shifting. However, there is substantial variation across countries and time with re-
spect to the transfer pricing regulations’ design, scope, and flexibility. For instance, the coun-
try-specific transfer pricing regulations specify different methods permitted to determine 
arm’s length transfer prices, define documentation requirements to validate the arm’s lengths 
                                                
68 In addition to tax planning, transfer pricing is also used for coordination of decentralized firms. If a firm uses 
one set of books, i.e. uses the same transfer price for both internal and tax purposes, the quantity and price de-
cisions may also be driven by managerial control considerations which are not considered here.  
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Table 4.1: Effective years of adoption of transfer pricing regulations in sample countries.
Country TP Regulation Country TP Regulation Country TP Regulation
Argentina 1998 Greece 1994 Peru 2001
Australia 1981 Hong Kong 2009 Philippines 2013
Austria 1996 Hungary 1992 Poland 1997
Belgium 2004 India 2001 Portugal 2002
Brazil 1997 Indonesia 1984 Russia 2012
Canada 1998 Ireland 2011 Singapore 2006
Chile 1997 Israel 2006 South Africa 1995
China 2008 Italy 1986 Spain 1995
Colombia 2004 Japan 1986 Sweden 1928
Czech Republic 1993 Korea 1996 Switzerland -
Denmark 1998 Luxembourg 2011 Taiwan 2004
Ecuador 2005 Malaysia 2003 Thailand 2002
Egypt 2005 Mexico 1997 Turkey 2007
Finland 2007 Netherlands 2002 United Kingdom 1999
France 1996 New Zealand 1997 Venezuela 2001
Germany 1983 Norway 1999
Notes: This table presents the effective years of adoption of transfer pricing regulations for all countries included 
in the study’s sample until 2015 (i.e., the end of the sample period). For more detailed information on my sam-
ple, see Section 4.3.1.The years are collected from various sources (PwC (2013); PwC (2015); Deloitte (2008); 
KPMG (2016)).
nature of the transfer price,
69
and determine penalties for non-compliant behavior with respect 
to mispricing or inadequate documentation. Additionally, the tax authorities’ auditing practic-
es and their level of enforcement vary substantially. In case of a detected non-compliance, tax 
authorities can modify the filed taxable income and, thus, the tax liability in their country
which may ultimately lead to double taxation.
70
Generally, theory suggests that arm’s lengths prices are not necessarily optimal and ef-
ficient and that it distorts managerial decision-making (Baldenius et al. 2004; Keuschnigg and 
Devereux 2013). A broad strand of literature examines the effects of differences in the strict-
ness of transfer pricing. The empirical literature has primarily focused on the impact of trans-
                                                
69 Intrafirm transfers are frequently very firm-specific, particularly for cases involving unfinished goods or in-
tangibles. Thus, it can be difficult to gather data on similar transactions to document the arm’s length nature of 
transfer prices (Durst and Culbertson 2003).
70 Firms can call for a so-called competent authority relief from double taxation which is part of several tax trea-
ties. However, double taxation is a severe problem in transfer pricing. Therefore, a large majority of firms fo-
cuses on tax compliance in their transfer pricing system instead of tax minimization (Klassen et al. 2017; 
Cools and Slagmulder 2008).
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fer pricing strictness on profit- and investment-related measures. In the profit-shifting litera-
ture, Beer and Loeprick (2015), Breuselinck et al. (2015), Riedel et al. (2015), Saunders-Scott 
(2015), and Marques and Pinho (2016) provide empirical evidence that stricter transfer pric-
ing in a low-tax country (i) decrease a firm’s profit allocation to that country and/or (ii) have a 
mitigating effect on the responsiveness of profit shifting to tax incentives in that country, i.e. 
decrease the sensitivity of profits (earnings before interest and taxes) to tax rate differentials.
Moreover, Klassen and Laplante (2012) show that a decrease in the strictness of the U.S. 
transfer-pricing regulation leads to more profit shifting by U.S. multinationals to foreign low-
tax affiliates. 
Concerning investments, there are several studies examining the question of whether 
transfer pricing strictness has an effect on investment decisions. In particular, a theoretical 
framework presented in De Mooij and Liu (2018) indicates that transfer pricing regulations 
increase the costs of shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions. As a consequence, the optimal 
supply of intermediate products and the return on investment in the foreign affiliate are re-
duced. Buettner et al. (2018) and De Mooij and Liu (2018) empirically investigate whether
transfer pricing strictness in a country affect investments of foreign multinationals in affiliates 
there. While the former study cannot confirm a statistically significant effect of countries’ 
transfer pricing strictness on foreign direct investment, the latter shows that multinationals 
decrease, on average, investment in countries that implement transfer pricing regulations or
when transfer pricing strictness increases.
71
The impact of transfer pricing strictness on intrafirm trade patterns has not been empiri-
cally identified yet. Solely theoretical research by Schjelderup and Weichenrieder (1999)
                                                
71 Büttner et al (2018) examine the value of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) of German multinational firms, 
measured at the firm-level by exploiting the MiDi dataset. De Mooij and Liu (2018) investigate on investment 
spending divided by lagged capital stock of multinationals from 27 countries, measured at the firm-level by 
exploiting the Orbis database.
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states that transfer pricing regulations lead to an anti-trade bias and reduce intrafirm trade. 
Moreover, they predict that the trade-reducing effect is stronger for imports than for exports.
72
4.2.3. Hypotheses development
In this study, I extend existing literature that investigates cross-border intrafirm trade 
and examine the implications of transfer pricing strictness. Therefore, I draw upon theory es-
tablished by Clausing (2006) who derives three hypotheses on the influence of international 
taxation on U.S. international trade flows. Specifically, she predicts the influence of a coun-
try’s low tax rate on its total bilateral intrafirm trade with the U.S., the share of intrafirm trade 
relative to total trade, and the intrafirm trade balance.
73
In her hypotheses, she takes into ac-
count the effects of tax rate differentials, i.e. the location effect, the quantity effect, and the 
price effect. However, her predictions focus solely on tax rate differentials and do not consid-
er the impact of the heterogeneity of transfer pricing strictness across countries. Since strict 
transfer pricing restricts tax planning possibilities and prior work has stated that firms put a 
high emphasis on complying with tax law (e.g., Klassen et al. 2017, Cools and Slagmulder 
2009), stricter transfer pricing may change the implications of tax rate differentials for cross-
border interfirm trade. Therefore, I add another important dimension by also considering the 
level of transfer pricing strictness as a determinant of U.S. international trade.
First, Clausing (2006) predicts and empirically confirms that intrafirm trade flows are 
higher with countries levying a lower tax rate than the U.S. This prediction is based on the 
quantity effect and the location effect as outlined in Section 4.2.1.
74
However, transfer pricing 
strictness in a country may have an impact on this association. First, transfer pricing discre-
tion is reduced by stricter transfer pricing. Accordingly, the tax-saving potential of mispricing 
intrafirm transactions is, in the extreme case of perfect anti-avoidance legislation, eliminated. 
                                                
72 In their analysis, they differentiate the case of price-related and profit-related transfer pricing regulations. 
However, the trade-reducing effect is predicted for both types of regulation using the arm’s length principle.
73 See Section 4.3.1 for detailed variable descriptions.
74 For the total intrafirm trade flows, the implications of the price effect are ambiguous as it works in different 
directions for imports and exports. Thus, it does not generate a prediction.
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Hence, the incentive to boost intrafirm transactions to scale tax savings (i.e., the quantity ef-
fect) decreases when transfer pricing strictness increases. Second, a low-tax jurisdiction be-
comes less attractive for multinationals’ investment activity when transfer pricing strictness 
increases. Although the general notion of the location effect still holds if a multinational has 
no possibility to use tax-induced transfer pricing strategies, prior empirical literature suggests
that foreign investments and operations of U.S. multinationals in tax attractive locations are 
typically associated with income shifting (e.g., Hines and Rice 1994; Grubert and Slemrod 
1998; or Desai et al. 2006). Specifically, stricter transfer pricing reduces the attractiveness of 
low-tax countries for investment (De Mooij and Liu 2018). Consequently, I expect lower vol-
umes of intrafirm trade.
75
Thus, I hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 1: Stricter transfer pricing mitigates the association between lower tax rates and 
higher intrafirm trade flows.
Complementary to this conjecture, Clausing (2006) predicts and shows that the shares
of U.S. intrafirm trade flows relative to total trade flows are higher for countries with a lower 
tax rate compared to high-tax countries. This prediction is, again, based on (i) the quantity 
effect which constitutes only an incentive for intrafirm trade and not for total trade, and (ii) the 
location effect which leads to disproportionally high intrafirm trade volumes with countries
levying a lower tax rate as literature suggests that particularly intrafirm trade is complemen-
tary to multinational activity (Clausing 2000). However, stricter transfer pricing may reduce 
those effects in the same way as described above. Therefore, I predict the following.
Hypothesis 2: Stricter transfer pricing mitigates the association between lower tax rates and 
higher shares of intrafirm trade flows relative to total trade. 
                                                
75 To see this, imagine a U.S. multinational firm that considers two countries with a lower tax rate, A and B, for a 
foreign direct investment. Both countries are identical except that country A has not enacted any transfer pric-
ing regulation while country B requires transfer prices to be set in line with the arm’s length principle, deter-
mines specific valuation methods to set prices, frequently audits compliance, and imposes high penalties for 
non-compliance. Although income resulting from this investment is taxed at an equally low rate, the firm 
might choose country A over B as investment location as the firm is able to implement profit-shifting strate-
gies using tax-optimal transfer pricing there which is not possible in country B and saves compliance costs. 
This investment decision may, in turn, lead to an increase of intrafirm trade between the U.S. and country A.
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Third, Clausing (2006) hypothesizes and finds that intrafirm trade balances are lower 
with countries levying a lower tax rate than the U.S. due to the price effect. These intrafirm 
trade balances are measured as the bilateral U.S. intrafirm exports minus imports relative to 
the total bilateral U.S. intrafirm trade. As firms aim to under-invoice exports and over-invoice 
imports when trading with countries from low-tax jurisdictions, the intrafirm trade balance 
should lean to imports for low-tax countries and, accordingly, turn negative. The trade bal-
ance measures the relative importance and magnitude of exports vs. imports, irrespective of 
the absolute volumes of total intrafirm trade. Thus, neither the location effect nor the quantity 
effect applies here. However, if stricter transfer pricing applies, the range of possible transfer 
prices gets narrower (Reineke and Weiskirchner-Merten 2018) and the profit shifting potential 
of transfer prices is reduced. Consequently, I conjecture the following.
Hypothesis 3: Stricter transfer pricing mitigates the association between lower tax rates and 
lower intrafirm trade balances. 
In the first three hypotheses, I directly draw on the predictions and findings of Clausing 
(2006). In addition to her work, I moreover investigate the effects of tax considerations on 
imports and exports separately.
Similar to the gross intrafirm trade flows, the location effect and the quantity effect fos-
ter both intrafirm exports and intrafirm imports. However, the price effect works in different 
directions for import and export flows. It constitutes an incentive for multinational firms to set
low prices for intrafirm exports and high prices for intrafirm imports if the multinational is 
resident in a high-tax country like the U.S. and the affiliate is located in a low-tax country. 
For imports, it thus further supports the location effect and the quantity effect. Accordingly, I 
expect that imports are higher with low-tax countries. For exports, the price effect generates 
an incentive to decrease the transfer price with trading partners in low-tax countries which, 
consequently, reduces the export flows as they are calculated as the product of price and 
quantity. This incentive is contrary to the positive incentive resulting from the location effect
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and the quantity effect. Thus, ultimately, it is an empirical question which of the effects is 
prevalent. Altogether, the tax rate sensitivity of imports is stronger than of exports.
When considering transfer pricing strictness, stricter transfer pricing reduces the tax at-
tractiveness of low-tax countries for multinational activity and, in turn, for high volumes of 
intrafirm imports and exports (location effect). Furthermore, the leeway in setting transfer 
prices is reduced which reduces the price effect and the quantity effect. Thus, I expect the tax 
rate sensitivity of intrafirm trade with low-tax countries to be weakened by an increasing 
transfer pricing strictness for both directions of trade flows. Following theoretical findings of
Schjelderup and Weichenrieder (1999), I moreover expect that the effect of stricter transfer 
pricing on intrafirm trade is particularly strong for imports.
Hypothesis 4: Due to the price effect, the tax rate sensitivity of U.S. multinationals is higher 
for imports than for exports. Stricter transfer pricing mitigates the tax rate sensitivities of 
both types of intrafirm trade flows.
4.3. Data and exploratory analysis
4.3.1. Data
To analyze this set of hypotheses, I utilize the Outward Activities of Multinational En-
terprises (Outward AMNE) intrafirm trade statistics which are published by the U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA).
76
This dataset includes bilateral country data on cross-border 
intrafirm trade of goods between U.S. multinational parent firms and their majority-owned 
foreign affiliates
77
and is based on the answers of U.S. parent firms on the mandatory BE–
11A survey form; thus, the dataset includes the full universe of U.S. multinationals and their 
foreign majority-owned affiliates. The database constitutes an unbalanced panel for 63 coun-
tries. Using this data, I construct the dependent variables I need to test my hypotheses: Int. 
Tradeit as the total amount of exports shipped from U.S. multinational parent firms to foreign 
                                                
76 For each year, a report on the multinational activity of U.S. multinationals is made available for download at 
https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdop. The dataset is retrieved from each year’s report.
77 Majority-owned foreign affiliates are foreign affiliates in which U.S. parents have (direct or indirect) owner-
ship of at least 50 percent.
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affiliates in country i (Int. Exportsit) plus U.S. imports shipped by the foreign affiliates in 
country i to U.S. multinational parent firms (Int. Importsit) within year t;
78
Int. Trade Shareit
as Int. Tradeit relative to the total bilateral trade between the U.S. and country i in year t; and 
Int. Trade Balanceit as Int. Exportsit minus Int. Importsit relative to Int. Tradeit.
79
Since the countries’ transfer pricing strictness varies across countries and time, I capture
the heterogeneity of transfer pricing strictness by utilizing an index modeled by Kenneth 
Klassen and Devan Mescall.
80
They developed this measure by regressing expert assessments 
of strictness and potential sources of risk related to transfer pricing on quantifiable character-
istics of countries’ transfer pricing system. Using a survey instrument, they extract an assess-
ment of 15 characteristics of transfer pricing regulations and their enforcement from 76 Big 
Four employees on management and partner level working in 33 countries that provide con-
sulting services on tax-related transfer pricing issues. Building on that survey data from 2010, 
they develop a model that weights each regulatory factor and apply those weights over time 
on observable transfer pricing characteristics taken from the Deloitte Strategy Matrix for 
Global Transfer Pricing and the EY Transfer Pricing Global Reference Guides reporting 
transfer pricing country characteristics in a standardized format over time.
81
As a result, they 
obtain a time-variant index ranging from -0.37 to 5.08 that measures a country i’s transfer 
                                                
78 Thus, the terms import and export are both defined from the U.S. perspective. 
79 These variable descriptions are consistent with those used by Clausing (2006) who also derives her data cover-
ing the period 1982-2000 from this dataset.
80 They developed this model ‘which incorporates and weights strictness of transfer pricing policy and aggres-
siveness of transfer pricing enforcement’ to investigate whether the premiums paid for targets of mergers and 
acquisitions located in countries with stricter transfer pricing (as a source of risk) are significantly lower (Klas-
sen and Mescall 2018). Kenneth Klassen shared an updated and extended version of their measure with me via 
e-mail (Dec. 20th, 2018).
81 The transfer pricing characteristics that Klassen and Mescall (2018) consider are information on whether: (1) 
rules are adopted and the age of the rules (not part of the survey); (2) advance pricing agreements are allowed; 
(3) benchmark data are available to taxpayers; (4) contemporaneous documentation is required; (5) cost-
contribution arrangements are allowed; (6) commissionaire arrangements are allowed; (7) foreign comparables 
to determine transfer prices are allowed; (8) related party setoffs (bundling of transactions) are allowed; (9) the 
payment of the tax assessment before going to competent authority is required; (10) the government dictates an 
order of transfer pricing methods to use; (11) disclosure on the tax return concerning related party transactions 
is required; (12) self-initiated adjustments are allowed; (13) specific transfer pricing documentation is re-
quired; (14) the government has discretion over penalty reduction; (15) proprietary tax data to calculate a ‘re-
vised’ transfer price is used; and (16) the assessed degree of transfer pricing enforcement.
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pricing strictness in year t for an unbalanced panel of 61 countries for the years 2000 to 2015 
(TP Strictit).
I match these data on intrafirm trade and transfer pricing strictness resulting in an un-
balanced panel of 47 countries between 2000 and 2015.
82
In addition to TP Strictit, the statuto-
ry corporate income tax rate of country i in year t in percent (CITit) is the second variable of 
interest. The tax rates are taken from the OECD database and, if not available there, from 
KPMG.
83
Moreover, I include additional country characteristics in my dataset.
84
Table 4.2 reports summary statistics of all dependent and independent variables that the 
study’s final dataset contains. It turns out that the intrafirm trade statistics Int. Trade, Int. Im-
ports, Int. Exports, and Int. Trade Share are all positively skewed as the means are substan-
tially larger than the median. Table 4.3 presents a pairwise Pearson correlation matrix for all 
used variables. As expected, CIT is negatively correlated with the absolute and with the rela-
tive intrafirm trade statistics, with statistically significant correlation coefficients ranging be-
tween -0.153 and -0.436. Moreover, there is a negative correlation between TP Strict and Int. 
Trade Share. 
                                                
82 See Table 4.1 for a list of all sample countries. 
83 The OECD provides data on the combined corporate income tax rate which presents the central and sub-
central corporate income tax rates minus deductions for sub-national taxation plus the sub-central rate and is 
made available for download at https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE_II1#. KPMG has a 
comparable offer downloadable at https://home.kpmg/dk/en/home/insights/2016/11/tax-rates-online/corporate-
tax-rates-table.html.
84 For a full list of variable definitions and the respective data sources, see Appendix 4.1.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics.
N Mean SD Min Median Max
Dependent Variables
Int. Trade (in th)          431 13,875,053 28,391,510 10,000 4,568,000 178,941,002
Int. Trade Share    431 0.18 0.16 0.01 0.12 0.93
Int. Trade Balance  431 0.04 0.41 -0.89 0.07 1.00
Int. Imports (in th)                431 7,613,297 16,862,429 0 1,782,000 105,742,000
Int. Exports (in th)                 431 6,261,756 11,865,589 6,000 1,520,000 73,199,000
Variables of Interest
TP Strict 431 2.34 1.17 -0.37 2.55 5.08
CIT            431 26.37 7.24 8.50 28.00 42.20
Control Variables
Log(GDP)            431 26.94 1.14 24.20 26.75 29.46
Log(GDP pc)         431 10.03 0.92 6.92 10.31 11.66
FTA                 431 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00
Log(Ext. Trade)     431 23.78 1.37 18.97 23.67 26.93
Unemployment        431 7.46 4.52 0.66 6.78 27.48
Log(Distance)       431 8.81 0.62 6.31 8.75 9.69
Overall Non-Int. Trade Balance 426 0.00 0.46 -0.94 -0.02 1.00
Unaffiliated Trade Balance 431 -0.13 0.59 -0.86 -0.22 9.43
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The summary 
statistics are based on a regression of Log(Int. Trade) (Column (1) in Table 4.5). All variables are defined in 
Appendix 4.1.
Table 4.3: Correlation matrix.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Int. Trade      1         1   
Int. Trade Share 2 0.301*** 1
Int. Trade Balance 3 -0.164*** -0.295*** 1
Int. Imports    4 0.992*** 0.328*** -0.241*** 1
Int. Exports    5 0.983*** 0.254*** -0.0499 0.952*** 1
TP              6 0.244*** -0.252*** 0.0397 0.221*** 0.270*** 1
CIT        7 -0.190*** -0.436*** 0.274*** -0.213*** -0.153** 0.208*** 1
Notes: This table presents the pairwise Pearson correlations for all dependent and independent variables of inter-
est. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively. A 
full pairwise Pearson correlation matrix for all variables used in the empirical analysis as well as a definition of 
all variables are presented in the Appendix.
4.3.2. Exploratory analysis
In the following, I provide descriptive and graphical evidence on the impact of the 
countries’ tax and transfer pricing characteristics on intrafirm trade. Table 4.4 shows several 
average univariate statistics of intrafirm trade activity and tax characteristics for the top in-
trafirm trading countries in my sample between 2000 and 2015.
85
Intrafirm trade activity is 
                                                
85 The full table including all sample countries is provided in Appendix 4.2.
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highly skewed among the study’s sample countries. For instance, column (1) shows that the 
total intrafirm trade flows between U.S. multinationals and their affiliates located in the two 
U.S. neighboring states Canada and Mexico have been almost as large as the combined in-
trafirm trade flows with affiliates located in all other 45 sample countries. While this fact 
might be explained by factors derived from classic trade literature, such as two countries’ 
large economic sizes, relatively small distances to the U.S., or the free trade agreement 
NAFTA which was in place for the entire sample period, (e.g., Isard 1954; Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro 2006) the top positions of Singapore and Ireland in this shortlist are remarkable and 
are likely to result from different reasons. For example, when setting their intrafirm trade vol-
umes in relation to the countries’ gross domestic product (GDP) as displayed in column (2), 
the respective ratios of Singapore or Ireland are approximately 30 (60) times the ratio of Ger-
many (China). Particularly the U.S. intrafirm import statistics with Ireland as displayed in 
column (3) are salient as they are comparable in size to the combined value of the U.K., Ja-
pan, Germany, and China. Consistently, this is reflected in an intrafirm trade balance heavily 
leaning to imports in Ireland (compare column (6)).
Since Ireland and Singapore are both known as corporate tax havens, these findings in-
dicate a considerable impact of the respective countries’ tax systems.
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Ireland has, on aver-
age, the sample’s lowest tax rate (column (7)) and the second-lowest TP Strict score (column 
(8)). Thus, U.S. multinational firms face a suitable environment to overprice goods sold by 
the Irish affiliate to increase the tax base in the low-tax country Ireland (price effect) and 
boost those intrafirm sales to scale the tax savings (quantity effect). Moreover, the location 
effect attracts multinational activity and intrafirm trade. 
Altogether, the four least strict transfer pricing countries (i.e., Hong Kong, Ireland, Sin-
gapore, and Switzerland) are all part of the shortlist provided in Table 4.4. Moreover, they are 
                                                
86 Both countries are on the “Big-7” list of the most important tax havens (Hines and Rice 1994). Moreover, 
Ireland has long been suitable for intangible licensing models (e.g., Fuest et al. 2013)
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all low-tax countries as they rank among the top ten countries of the lowest average CIT rates 
in my sample (1st Ireland, 2nd Hong Kong, 5th Singapore, and 9th Switzerland) and have an 
extraordinarily high share of intrafirm U.S. trade relative to their total trade with the U.S. 
Thus, intrafirm trade patterns are likely to be affected by tax-induced transfer pricing behav-
ior.
Table 4.4: Intrafirm trade and tax characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Country
Int. Trade 
(in m)
Int. Tr. / 
GDP 
(in %)
Int. Im-
ports
(in m)
Int. Ex-
ports
(in m)
Int. Trade 
Balance
Int. Tr. 
Share   
(in %)
CIT 
(in %)
TP Strict
(K/M)
Canada 136,284 10.17 79,270 57,013 -0.165 26.53 32.37 3.73
Mexico 70,266 7.09 42,132 28,134 -0.193 20.57 30.94 2.95
Singapore 24,054 12.61 12,798 11,256 -0.073 56.91 18.62 0.86
Ireland 23,410 11.03 20,311 3,497 -0.706 62.00 13.91 0.81
United Kingdom 20,971 0.85 9,713 11,257 0.077 21.79 27.38 2.74
Switzerland 14,657 2.92 6,828 7,829 0.176 39.61 22.22 0.92
Netherlands 14,249 1.96 4,656 9,593 0.413 29.37 28.85 2.91
Japan 12,658 0.26 2,397 10,261 0.627 6.52 39.09 2.88
Germany 11,998 0.39 5,197 6,801 0.137 9.44 34.86 3.44
China 10,071 0.20 5,144 4,928 -0.068 2.67 28.08 2.87
Hong Kong 8,688 4.00 4,649 4,039 -0.073 29.31 16.77 0.68
All others (Ø) 1,946 0.38 945 1,025 0.13 9.4 28.39 2.33
Notes: In this table, I present the average values from 2000 to 2015 of the top eleven intrafirm trading countries 
and the average of the remaining 36 countries of the sample for the following variables: (1) Int. Trade, (2) Int. 
Trade / GDP, (3) Int. Imports, (4) Int. Exports, (5) Int. Trade Balance, (6) Int. Trade Share, (7) CIT, and (8) TP 
Strict. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.1. The full table including all sample countries is provided in 
Appendix 4.2.
In Figure 4.1, I show the association between intrafirm activities and the countries’ tax 
characteristics. In particular, I aim at the interaction between a tax rate incentive and the trans-
fer pricing strictness.
87
Therefore, I create four two-way plots consisting of each country-year 
observation of two dependent variables of my analysis, i.e. the countries’ natural logarithm of 
intrafirm trade (Log (Int. Trade)) on the y-axis and the share of intrafirm trade relative to their 
total U.S. trade (Int. Trade Share) on the x-axis. I group each country-year observation into 
four categories with each combination of two dimensions: (1) country-years with a CIT rate 
                                                
87 In Section 4.2.3, I argue that, due to the location effect and the quantity effect, firms are incentivized to have 
higher trading volumes in terms of absolute and relative values with low-tax countries. However, this effect 
should be particularly evident for countries with lenient transfer pricing.
114
below and above the median representing low-tax and high-tax countries and (2) country-
years with a transfer pricing strictness index below and above the median representing coun-
tries with lenient and strict transfer pricing. Then, I plot them across the countries’ Log (Int. 
Trade) and Int. Trade Share. 
Figure 4.1 suggests that affiliates in countries with relatively low tax rates (i.e., country-
year observations in the lower two plots) are more likely to have high intrafirm trade with 
their U.S. parents. In absolute terms, the total intrafirm trade flow of U.S. multinationals with 
their affiliates in low-tax countries amounts to, on average, 1.5 times the intrafirm trade flow 
with affiliates in high-tax countries (i.e., 15.1 bn USD vs. 10.1 bn USD).
88
Those increased 
volumes are reflected in relative shares of U.S. intrafirm trade as compared to the countries’ 
total U.S. trade (i.e., 19.6 percent vs. 13.0 percent). Interestingly, considering the transfer 
pricing dimension, Figure 4.1 shows that this attractiveness of low tax rates for intrafirm trade 
is reduced if the country enforces strict transfer pricing (i.e., the bottom right vs. the bottom 
left quadrant). This finding provides first descriptive evidence that strict transfer pricing at-
tenuates the positive association of a low CIT rate with intrafirm trade.
                                                
88 This relationship is disproportional to economic size. An untabulated analysis reveals that the average GDP of 
the country-years defined as observations of low-tax countries is twelve percent lower than the average GDP 
of observations labeled as high-tax countries, i.e. 869 bn USD vs. 983 bn USD.
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Figure 4.1: Relation between intrafirm trade and tax characteristics.
Notes: This figure depicts the distribution of two intrafirm trade variables, i.e., the natural logarithm of each 
sample country’s bilateral gross intrafirm trade with the U.S. (Log(Int. Trade)) and its share of U.S. intrafirm 
trade relative to total U.S. trade (Int. Trade Share). Each dot represents one country-year observation. I group 
observations into four groups: country-year observations with a relatively high or low corporate tax rate (CIT
above or below sample median) and country-year observations with a high or a low level of transfer pricing
strictness (TP Strict above or below sample median). The dotted lines mark the mean of Log(Int. Trade) and the 
90th percentile of Int. Trade Share on their respective axis. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.1.
4.4. Multivariate analysis of intrafirm trade patterns
4.4.1. Intrafirm trade volumes, level of taxation, and transfer pricing strictness
In the first part of the empirical analysis, I test Hypothesis 1 predicting that stricter 
transfer pricing mitigates the association between higher intrafirm trade flows and lower tax 
rates. To assess this relationship, I follow Clausing (2006) and estimate a linear cross-
sectional model using ordinary least squares for country i in year t for the period of 2000 to 
2015.
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(Eq. 4.1)
As the dependent variable, I use the natural logarithm of Int. Trade.
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I expect negative 
coefficients on CIT (compare Clausing 2006) and TP Strict (compare De Mooij and Liu 
2018). To test Hypothesis 1, I include the interaction term between CIT and TP Strict. Thus, I 
can jointly test the effects of both the level of taxation and transfer pricing on intrafirm trade. 
Stated in a formal way, the marginal effect of CIT on Log(Int. Trade) dependent on the level 
of TP Strict can be interpreted as 
    (   .       )
      
=    +    ∗            .
(Eq. 4.2)
I predict a positive coefficient β3 to provide evidence for a mitigating effect of transfer pricing 
strictness on the association between higher intrafirm trade flows and lower tax rates. This 
tax-sensitivity is, for a particularly low level of transfer pricing strictness, expressed by a co-
efficient β1 which I predict to turn out negative.
Moreover, I control for a set of further country characteristics that might have an impact
on intrafirm trade volumes between the U.S. and country i in year t depicted by the vector Vit. 
Specifically, I include the natural logarithms of GDPit and GDP pcit (per capita) for country i
in year t, FTAit as a binary variable capturing whether country i has a foreign trade agreement 
with the U.S. in year t, the natural logarithm of Ext. Tradeit as the total trade between country 
i and the U.S. in year t minus intrafirm trade between country i and the U.S. in year t, Unem-
ploymentit as the unemployment rate of country i in year t, and Distancei as the natural loga-
rithm of the distance between country i and the U.S. in kilometers. All regression specifica-
tions include a set of year dummies to control for all observable and unobservable time-
specific trends and factors which potentially correlate with intrafirm trade statistics, the evolu-
                                                
89 All variables are defined in the Appendix.
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tion of tax rates, and transfer pricing strictness. I compute standard errors that are robust to 
clustering within countries.
Table 4.5 presents the results of my empirical analysis of intrafirm trade flows. Panel A 
reports the regression estimates. In line Clausing (2006), I find a significantly negative associ-
ation between the tax rate and the intrafirm trade volume (column (1)). In particular, a one 
percentage point lower tax rate is associated with 3.7 percent (i.e., e
-0.038
– 1) more intrafirm 
trade.
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Unlike my prediction based on the theoretical and empirical evidence provided by De 
Mooij and Liu (2018), I do not find that intrafirm trade is generally lower with countries that 
have stricter transfer pricing in this baseline specification, irrespective of the tax rate. 
In column (2), I test whether stricter transfer pricing mitigates the association between 
higher intrafirm trade flows and lower tax rates (Hypothesis 1). After including the interaction 
term of CIT and TP Strict, I document a baseline coefficient on CIT that is more than doubled
as compared to the coefficient reported in column (1). This indicates that the tax rate semi-
elasticity of intrafirm trade volumes is particularly strong for trading partner countries with 
lenient transfer pricing. However, the statistically significant and positive coefficient on the 
interaction term of 0.032 suggests that the negative association between CIT and Log(Int. 
Trade) is weaker for countries with stricter transfer pricing. 
Panel B takes a closer look at the interaction and reports the marginal effects of CIT on
Log(Int. Trade) at different levels of TP Strict. This reveals that a low tax rate is only associ-
ated with high intrafirm trade flows with a statistical significance at the conventional levels 
when the respective transfer pricing strictness is in the lowest quartile.
91
This finding provides 
evidence suggesting that favorable levels of taxation only attract, on average, more intrafirm 
trade if U.S. multinationals face a certain degree of discretion to manage transfer prices in a 
way to exploit these tax rate differentials. 
                                                
90 This association is 1.8 percentage points higher than the results in Clausing (2006).
91 The 25th percentile value of TP Strict is 1.5474.
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Table 4.5: Regressions explaining intrafirm trade.
Panel A: Estimate results.
Int. Trade
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS Poisson
CIT -0.038* -0.093*** -0.073***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.027)
TP Strict -0.124 -0.935*** -0.627***
(0.109) (0.238) (0.166)
TP Strict * CIT 0.032*** 0.023***
(0.009) (0.007)
Log(GDP) -0.345 -0.320 -0.398*
(0.240) (0.222) (0.214)
Log(GDP pc) 0.395** 0.325* 0.368**
(0.180) (0.167) (0.152)
FTA 0.071 0.119 0.483**
(0.473) (0.442) (0.240)
Log(Ext. Trade) 1.389*** 1.326*** 0.996***
(0.241) (0.225) (0.182)
Unemployment -0.015 -0.021 -0.015
(0.039) (0.035) (0.064)
Log(Distance) 0.160 0.005 -0.119
(0.259) (0.262) (0.166)
Constant -5.547 -1.326 8.807***
(5.449) (5.373) (3.239)
Observations 431 431 431
R
2
0.74 0.76
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Marginal effects of CIT on Log(Int. Trade) at different levels of TP Strict.
Marginal effect of CIT on Log(Int. Trade) – Column (2)
TP Strict dy/dx p-value
-0.5 -0.109*** 0.001
0 -0.093*** 0.001
0.5 -0.077*** 0.002
1 -0.061*** 0.006
1.5 -0.045** 0.025
2 -0.029 0.128
2.5 -0.013 0.504
3 0.004 0.86
3.5 0.020 0.373
4 0.036 0.15
Notes: Panel A presents the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression of the natural logarithm of Int. Trade
in columns (1) and (2) and of Int. Trade in column (3) on a set of independent variables. The regressions are 
based on a panel on the level of countries and years. Panel B presents the estimated overall effect of CIT on 
Log(Int. Trade) at different levels of TP Strict, based on results presented in column (2) of Panel A. All variables 
are defined in Appendix 4.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
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To assure the robustness of these results, I re-estimate the coefficients by using a Pois-
son model as Poisson is commonly used in trade and investment literature (Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro 2006, Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2011).
92
  For this specification, I use the original 
Dollar values of the bilateral intrafirm trade flows as the dependent variable instead of log-
transforming Int. Trade. The results are presented in column (3). The results of the coeffi-
cients of interest turn out to be robust to this alternate econometric approach.
4.4.2. Share of intrafirm trade, level of taxation, and transfer pricing strictness
In Hypothesis 2, I predict that stricter transfer pricing attenuates the association between
a higher share of trade that is conducted internally and a low tax rate. To gauge this relation-
ship, I employ a linear cross-sectional regression model using ordinary least squares for coun-
try i in year t for the period of 2000 to 2015 which is similar to the one presented in Section 
4.4.1.
   .        ℎ      =    +          +                +          ∗            
+       +          +    
(Eq. 4.3)
The dependent variable of this model is Int. Trade Share, i.e. the intrafirm trade relative 
to the total bilateral trade between the U.S. and country i. I expect negative coefficients for 
CIT and TP Strict. I include the interaction term of CIT and TP Strict to test Hypothesis 2. I 
predict a positive interaction coefficient to provide evidence for a mitigating effect of stricter
transfer pricing on the association between higher intrafirm trade flows and lower tax rates. 
The vector of control variables Wit is the same as vector Vit as included in the model explain-
ing intrafirm trade volumes described in Section 4.4.1, except for Ext. Tradeit to avoid an en-
dogeneity issue. I include a full set of year dummies.
                                                
92 See, e.g., Head and Ries (2008), Fally (2015), or Dudar et al. (2015). Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 19) discusses the 
characteristics of Poisson models with nonnegative continuous dependent variables and its robustness and effi-
ciency in case of a violation of the Poisson variance assumption. 
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Table 4.6: Regressions explaining intrafirm trade shares.
Int. Trade Share
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
CIT -0.007* -0.015***
(0.004) (0.005)
TP Strict -0.020 -0.141***
(0.017) (0.040)
TP Strict * CIT 0.005***
(0.001)
Observations 431 431
R
2
0.32 0.39
Controls Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression of Int. Trade Share on a set of inde-
pendent variables. The remaining coefficients on the controls are reported in Appendix 4.3. The regressions are 
based on a panel on the level of countries and years. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.2. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
Table 4.6 displays the regression estimates of my empirical examination of Hypothesis 
2.
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I find a negative association between the tax rate and the intrafirm trade share which is 
statistically significant (column (1)). The point estimate suggests that a one percentage point 
higher tax rate is associated with a 0.7 percentage points lower intrafirm trade share. Com-
plementary to Clausing (2006), this result provides further evidence for a location effect and a 
quantity effect. With respect to transfer pricing strictness, I do not find that the share of in-
trafirm trade is lower at countries with stricter transfer pricing. 
In column (2), I include the interaction term of CIT and TP Strict. The baseline coeffi-
cient on CIT is significantly negative. Taken at face value, a one percentage point higher tax 
rate is associated with a 1.5 percentage points lower intrafirm trade share for countries with a 
particularly low transfer pricing strictness. This result is substantially larger than in column 
(1), indicating that the negative association of tax rates and intrafirm trade shares is driven by 
sample countries with lenient transfer pricing. Matching my prediction, the coefficient on the 
interaction term is positive (0.005) and statistically significant. This result indicates that trans-
                                                
93 For brevity, I present a short version of the regression table showing only the coefficients of interest. The full 
regression results table is provided in Appendix 4.3.
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fer pricing strictness mitigates the tax rate sensitivity of intrafirm trade shares relative to total 
trade. This finding provides evidence confirming Hypothesis 2.
4.4.3. Intrafirm trade balance, level of taxation, and transfer pricing strictness
Hypothesis 3 predicts that stricter transfer pricing mitigates the association between a 
lower intrafirm trade balances and lower tax rates as shown by Clausing (2006). To formally 
test this prediction, I use the following linear cross-sectional regression model using ordinary 
least squares.
   .                 =    +          +                +          ∗            
+       +          +    
(Eq. 4.4)
The dependent variable of this model is Int. Trade Balance.
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I predict a positive coeffi-
cient on CIT, as intrafirm trade balances should be lower (i.e., leaning to imports) with low-
tax countries. To test Hypothesis 3, I include the interaction term of CIT and TP Strict and 
expect a negative interaction coefficient hinting at a mitigating effect of strict transfer pricing. 
Moreover, I control for a set of other country characteristics that may have an impact on in-
trafirm trade balances between the U.S. and country i in year t (Xit). As in the previous mod-
els, this vector includes the natural logarithms of GDP and GDP pc, FTA, and the natural log-
arithm of Distance. Additionally, I follow Clausing (2006) and include the Overall Non-Int. 
Trade Balance and the Unaffiliated Trade Balance into the model as possible controls to cap-
ture general macroeconomic factors and characteristics of affiliates that may have an impact 
on their U.S. trade balance. Both regression specifications also include a full set of year 
dummies.
Table 4.7 reports the regression results of this model. In line with Clausing (2006), I 
find a positive association between the tax rate and the intrafirm trade balance (column (1))
                                                
94 That is, the amount of U.S. exports shipped from parent firms to their foreign affiliates minus the amount of 
U.S. imports by those affiliates to their U.S. parents, relative to the total amount of trade between the U.S. par-
ents and the foreign affiliates.
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Table 4.7: Regressions explaining intrafirm trade balances.
Int. Trade Balance
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
CIT 0.006* 0.015**
(0.003) (0.006)
TP -0.017 0.116**
(0.021) (0.059)
TP* CIT -0.005**
(0.002)
Overall Non-Int. 0.218*** 0.221***
     Trade Balance (0.047) (0.047)
Unaffiliated Trade 0.092 0.092
     Balance (0.070) (0.069)
Log(GDP) 0.115*** 0.120***
(0.022) (0.022)
Log(GDP pc) 0.016 0.024
(0.026) (0.026)
FTA 0.035 0.036
(0.052) (0.053)
Unemployment 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004)
Log(Distance) 0.158*** 0.179***
(0.027) (0.027)
Constant -4.729*** -5.347***
(0.592) (0.614)
Observations 426 426
R
2
0.29 0.30
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression of Int. Trade Balance on a set of 
independent variables. The regressions are based on a panel on the level of countries and years. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 4.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical sig-
nificance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
which is statistically significant. The coefficient on CIT indicates that a one percentage point 
higher tax rate is associated with a 0.6 percentage points higher intrafirm trade balance.
95
This 
finding provides evidence for the price effect. The coefficient of TP Strict in the baseline 
specification is insignificant.
In column (2), I include the interaction term of CIT and TP Strict. The baseline coeffi-
cient on CIT is significant and amounts to -0.015. This suggests that a one percentage point 
higher tax rate is associated with a 1.5 percentage points lower intrafirm trade balance in case 
                                                
95 The result is consistent with Clausing (2006) who finds a 0.2 percentage points lower response.
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of a particularly low transfer pricing strictness. The coefficient of CIT is substantially larger 
than in column (1), indicating that the countries with lenient transfer pricing are the drivers of 
this positive association. Confirming Hypothesis 3, the coefficient on the interaction term is 
negative (-0.005) and statistically significant. 
4.4.4. Intrafirm imports and exports, level of taxation, and transfer pricing strict-
ness
Hypothesis 4 states the conjecture that the tax sensitivity of U.S. multinationals should 
be higher for imports than for exports. However, stricter transfer pricing should mitigate the 
tax sensitivity for both cases. To estimate these associations, I apply the same linear cross-
sectional regression model for country i in year t for the period of 2000 to 2015 as for the 
gross intrafirm trade flows presented in 4.4.1 with the natural logarithms of Int. Imports and 
Int. Exports instead of Int. Trade as dependent variables.
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(Eq. 4.5)
The results are reported in Table 4.8.
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In the baseline specifications displayed in col-
umns (1) and (4), both coefficients describing the tax rate semi-elasticity are negative. While 
they are directionally consistent, the coefficient measuring the tax rate sensitivity of imports is 
considerably larger than the one of exports (-0.048 vs. -0.026). Moreover, it is insignificant in 
the exporting case. Thus, the price effect on exports seems to substantially weaken the posi-
tive location and quantity effects. Overall, the results suggest that the positive association be-
tween a low tax rate and high gross intrafirm trade flows as presented in 4.4.1 stems to a larg-
er extent from increased import flows. Transfer pricing strictness, however, is neither associ-
ated with statistically lower imports nor lower exports. 
                                                
96 In equation 4.5, the dependent variable is depicted as the natural logarithm of Tik which stands for either Int. 
Imports or Int. Exports.
97 I present the full regression results table in Appendix 4.4.
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When considering the interaction between both tax variables by including an interaction 
term of CIT and TP Strict, I document a similar pattern compared to the overall intrafirm trade 
setting presented in 4.4.1. The baseline coefficients on CIT, as displayed in columns (2) and 
(5), are higher compared to the coefficients reported in columns (1) and (4). For both forms of 
intrafirm trade, this means that the tax rate semi-elasticity is particularly strong for countries 
with lenient transfer pricing. The statistically significant and positive coefficients on the inter-
action terms, 0.038 and 0.028, suggest that the negative association between CIT and both 
intrafirm trade variables is weaker for countries with stricter transfer pricing. Overall, this 
analysis confirms Hypothesis 4.
Table 4.8: Regressions explaining imports and exports.
Int. Imports Int. Exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS Poisson OLS OLS Poisson
CIT -0.048* -0.113*** -0.101*** -0.026 -0.074*** -0.038*
(0.025) (0.036) (0.035) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021)
TP Strict -0.093 -1.044*** -0.784*** -0.153 -0.862*** -0.452***
(0.150) (0.336) (0.198) (0.096) (0.235) (0.148)
TP Strict * CIT 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.014**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Observations 430 430 431 431 431 431
R
2
0.65 0.68 0.74 0.75
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression of the natural logarithm of Int. Im-
ports in columns (1) and (2) and of the natural logarithm of Int. Exports in columns (4) and (5), and the results of 
estimating a Poisson regression of Int. Imports in column (3) and of Int. Exports in column (6) on a set of inde-
pendent variables. The remaining coefficients on the controls are reported in Appendix 4.4. The regressions are 
based on a panel on the level of countries and years. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.1. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
4.5. Conclusion
This study investigates whether transfer pricing strictness affects intrafirm trade patterns 
of U.S. multinational firms. First, I provide evidence confirming prior literature that U.S. mul-
tinationals trade more with affiliates resident in low-tax countries. In addition, I find that the 
tax rate sensitivity is higher for imports than for exports. Correspondingly, the intrafirm trade 
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balance of low-tax countries leans towards imports. However, my results also show that coun-
tries with particularly lenient transfer pricing regimes seem to drive the tax rate sensitivity of 
intrafirm trade and that these associations are mitigated under stricter transfer pricing.
Intrafirm trade accounts for a substantial share of overall global trade (OECD 2013a; 
Sansing 2014), a thorough understanding of the main determinants is especially important. 
Besides this contribution to the trade literature, this study adds to a growing literature on prof-
it shifting and public finance by providing direct evidence that transfer price regulations have 
some effectiveness in limiting the exploitation of tax rate differentials via intrafirm trade. It 
highlights an important factor for policymakers to consider when developing tax legislation. 
Thus, my findings are relevant for researchers and policymakers alike.
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Appendix Chapter 4
Table 4.9: Appendix 4.1: Variable definitions.
Variables Definition Source
Dependent Variables
Int. Trade           
Total amount of Int. Exports plus Int. Imports be-
tween U.S. multinational parents and foreign affili-
ates in country i in year t.
BEA
Int. Imports               
Total amount of imports shipped to U.S. multina-
tional parent firms by foreign affiliates in country i 
in year t.
BEA
Int. Exports                  
Total amount of exports shipped from U.S. mul-
tinational parent firms to foreign affiliates in coun-
try i in year t.
BEA
Int. Trade Share    
Int. Trade relative to the total (unaffiliated and 
affiliated) bilateral trade between the U.S. and 
country i in year t.
BEA, IMF
Int. Trade Balance  
Int. Exports minus Int. Imports relative to Int. 
Trade in country i in year t.
BEA
Variables of Interest
TP Strict
A country- and year-specific index measuring the 
strictness of transfer pricing regulations and their 
enforcement in country i in year t with a value from 
-0.37 to 5.08, where a high value indicates a high 
degree of transfer pricing risk and strictness.
Ken Klassen (Klassen/ 
Mescall 2018)
CIT
Statutory corporate income tax rate in percent in 
country i in year t. 
OECD 
(if missing, KPMG)
Control Variables
GDP            Gross domestic product in country i within year t. Word Bank
GDP pc         
Gross domestic product per capita in country i 
within year t. 
Word Bank
FTA                 
Binary variable, 1 if there is a regional trade 
agreement in place between the U.S. and country i 
in year t, 0 otherwise.
WTO, CEPII
Ext. Trade     
External bilateral trade between the U.S. and 
country i in year t, i.e. total trade minus intrafirm 
trade.
IMF, BEA
Unemployment        
Unemployment rate in percent in country i in 
year t.
IMF
Distance       
Distance between country i and the U.S. (from 
each’s most populated city) in kilometers
CEPII GeoDist
Overall Non-Int. Trade 
Balance
Total trade balance between country i and the 
U.S. excluding intrafirm trade [i.e. (overall exports 
– Int. Exports) – (overall imports – Int. Imports) / 
Ext. Trade] in country i in year t.
BEA, IMF
Unaffiliated Trade Bal-
ance
trade balance between foreign affiliates of U.S. 
multinationals in country i and non-affiliated per-
sons in the U.S. in year t.
BEA
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Table 4.10: Full correlation matrix (Table 4.3)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Int. Trade      1         1   
Int. Trade Share 2 0.301*** 1
Int. Trade Balance 3 -0.164*** -0.295*** 1
Int. Imports    4 0.992*** 0.328*** -0.241*** 1
Int. Exports    5 0.983*** 0.254*** -0.0499 0.952*** 1
TP              6 0.244*** -0.252*** 0.0397 0.221*** 0.270*** 1
CIT        7 -0.190*** -0.436*** 0.274*** -0.213*** -0.153** 0.208*** 1
Log(GDP)        8 0.283*** -0.146** 0.230*** 0.223*** 0.360*** 0.539*** 0.167*** 1
Log(GDP pc)     9 0.118* 0.315*** -0.0304 0.0951* 0.148** 0.0568 -0.285*** 0.323*** 1
FTA             10 0.622*** 0.228*** -0.0595 0.610*** 0.622*** 0.0270 -0.103* 0.0496 0.0187 1
Log(Ext. Trade) 11 0.626*** 0.00232 0.0343 0.581*** 0.671*** 0.515*** 0.0961* 0.773*** 0.103* 0.397*** 1
Unemployment    12 -0.147** -0.234*** 0.149** -0.125* -0.174*** -0.0641 0.200*** -0.0166 -0.228*** -0.176*** -0.252*** 1
Log(Distance)   13 -0.773*** -0.0760 0.187*** -0.776*** -0.747*** -0.132** 0.154** -0.222*** -0.220*** -0.291*** -0.374*** -0.0704 1
Overall Non-Int. Trade 
Balance 14 -0.0195 0.00497 0.349*** -0.0361 0.00457 -0.0344 0.0931 0.0958* -0.0722 -0.0379 0.00902 0.127** 0.0770 1
Unaffiliated Trade 
Balance 15 0.0453 0.423*** 0.143** 0.0280 0.0687 -0.0866 -0.00717 -0.112* 0.136** 0.170*** -0.169*** -0.0509 0.0316 0.187*** 1
Notes: This table presents the pairwise Pearson correlations for the variables used in the empirical analysis. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.1. *, **, *** represent statis-
tical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively
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Table 4.11: Appendix 4.2: Full table of intrafirm trade and tax characteristics (Table 4.4).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Country
Int. Trade 
(in m)
Int. Tr. / 
GDP 
(in %)
Int. Im-
ports
(in m)
Int. Ex-
ports
(in m)
Int. Trade 
Balance
Int. Tr. 
Share   
(in %)
CIT 
(in %)
TP Strict
(K/M)
Canada 136,284 10.17 79,270 57,013 -0.165 26.53 32.37 3.73
Mexico 70,266 7.09 42,132 28,134 -0.193 20.57 30.94 2.95
Singapore 24,054 12.61 12,798 11,256 -0.073 56.91 18.62 0.86
Ireland 23,410 11.03 20,311 3,497 -0.706 62.00 13.91 0.81
United Kingdom 20,971 0.85 9,713 11,257 0.077 21.79 27.38 2.74
Switzerland 14,657 2.92 6,828 7,829 0.176 39.61 22.22 0.92
Netherlands 14,249 1.96 4,656 9,593 0.413 29.37 28.85 2.91
Japan 12,658 0.26 2,397 10,261 0.627 6.52 39.09 2.88
Germany 11,998 0.39 5,197 6,801 0.137 9.44 34.86 3.44
China 10,071 0.20 5,144 4,928 -0.068 2.67 28.08 2.87
Hong Kong 8,688   4.00 4,649   4,039   -0.07 29.3 16.8 0.68
Malaysia 8,392   4.09 6,619   1,772   -0.53 20.3 25.9 3.98
France 7,711   0.33 3,888   3,823   0.02 12.3 35.9 2.92
Australia 6,972   0.74 1,797   5,175   0.48 24.6 30.3 2.79
Belgium 6,966   1.66 2,676   4,782   0.26 19.6 35.3 2.14
Brazil 6,220   0.42 2,098   4,122   0.30 12.2 34.0 3.37
Taiwan 4,054   - 1,572   2,483   0.23 6.7 21.3 1.88
Thailand 3,750   1.40 2,719   1,054   -0.37 11.6 27.2 3.10
Sweden 3,608   0.83 2,577   461   -0.65 23.1 26.5 2.33
Korea 3,098   0.32 1,164   2,052   0.35 3.9 26.9 2.70
Italy 3,057   0.16 1,664   1,393   -0.06 6.6 35.0 3.27
Philippines 1,878   1.13 678   1,338   0.28 10.7 31.7 1.23
Argentina 1,687   0.49 816   1,010   0.11 19.4 35.0 2.40
Spain 1,672   0.14 684   988   0.19 9.3 32.2 1.86
India 1,352   0.11 667   683   0.13 3.3 34.3 3.18
Venezuela 1,041   0.42 115   904   0.76 3.2 34.0 2.66
Israel 1,016   0.51 883   219   -0.61 3.5 29.9 1.10
Chile 948   0.56 334   687   0.27 7.6 17.8 1.89
Colombia 910   0.41 251   737   0.48 6.4 31.9 1.93
Luxembourg 904   2.00 399   475   0.28 43.4 30.5 1.23
Norway 874   0.24 629   378   -0.28 10.0 27.9 2.49
South Africa 823   0.30 212   680   0.50 6.7 34.1 3.24
Hungary 623   0.55 464   154   -0.41 14.6 18.5 1.14
Dom. Republic 482 1.09 347 203 -0.25 5.0 26.7 2.18
Poland 462   0.12 199   263   0.17 9.3 21.3 2.00
New Zealand 438   0.34 115   330   0.46 8.0 30.9 2.97
Austria 396   0.11 168   217   0.17 4.1 27.8 2.46
Denmark 379   0.13 199   206   -0.03 5.2 26.9 2.60
Peru 323   0.27 164   179   0.11 5.6 29.6 2.08
Finland 319   0.14 186   114   -0.22 4.8 26.0 1.95
Indonesia 309   0.06 131   169   0.25 1.8 27.5 2.51
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Table 4.11: Appendix 4.2 (continued).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Country
Int. Trade 
(in m)
Int. Tr. / 
GDP 
(in %)
Int. Im-
ports
(in m)
Int. Ex-
ports
(in m)
Int. Trade 
Balance
Int. Tr. 
Share   
(in %)
CIT 
(in %)
TP Strict
(K/M)
Russia 281   0.02 29   327   0.96 1.0 21.9 1.71
Ecuador 280   0.48 203   84   -0.34 6.6 24.1 1.84
Czech Republic 271   0.17 191   92   -0.34 7.3 23.8 2.67
Turkey 230   0.04 53   181   0.58 2.1 24.5 3.76
Portugal 155   0.08 62   92   0.12 4.3 29.8 1.84
Egypt 55   0.03 2   42   0.80 1.3 24.7 1.06
Greece 51   0.02 4   49   0.78 2.3 29.0 1.78
Notes: In this table, I present the average values from 2000 to 2015 of his study’s sample for the following vari-
ables: (1) Int. Trade, (2) Int. Trade / GDP, (3) Int. Imports, (4) Int. Exports, (5) Int. Trade Balance, (6) Int. 
Trade Share, (7) CIT, and (8) TP Strict. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.1.
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Table 4.12: Appendix 4.3: Full regression table explaining intrafirm trade shares (Table 4.6).
Int. Trade Share
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
CIT -0.007* -0.015***
(0.004) (0.005)
TP Strict -0.020 -0.141***
(0.017) (0.040)
TP Strict * CIT 0.005***
(0.001)
Log(GDP) -0.013 -0.018
(0.020) (0.018)
Log(GDP pc) 0.047** 0.040*
(0.021) (0.021)
FTA 0.078 0.076
(0.063) (0.058)
Unemployment -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Log(Distance) 0.010 -0.009
(0.029) (0.029)
Constant 0.217 0.779
(0.539) (0.538)
Observations 431 431
R
2
0.32 0.39
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression of Int. Trade Share on a set of inde-
pendent variables. The regressions are based on a panel on the level of countries and years. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 4.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
*** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
131
Table 4.13: Appendix 4.4: Full regression table explaining imports and exports (Table 4.8).
Int. Trade Imports Int. Trade Exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS Poisson OLS OLS Poisson
CIT -0.048* -0.113*** -0.101*** -0.026 -0.074*** -0.038*
(0.025) (0.036) (0.035) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021)
TP Strict -0.093 -1.044*** -0.784*** -0.153 -0.862*** -0.452***
(0.150) (0.336) (0.198) (0.096) (0.235) (0.148)
TP Strict * CIT 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.014**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Log(GDP) -0.557* -0.531* -0.721** -0.021 0.001 -0.035
(0.300) (0.284) (0.288) (0.228) (0.215) (0.204)
Log(GDP pc) 0.460** 0.386* 0.311* 0.315 0.254 0.427**
(0.217) (0.201) (0.188) (0.195) (0.192) (0.172)
FTA -0.173 -0.114 0.277 0.365 0.407 0.722***
(0.552) (0.516) (0.321) (0.468) (0.447) (0.253)
Log(Ext. Trade) 1.499*** 1.428*** 1.181*** 1.203*** 1.148*** 0.766***
(0.274) (0.253) (0.232) (0.238) (0.235) (0.168)
Unemployment -0.026 -0.033 0.019 -0.015 -0.021 -0.067*
(0.047) (0.044) (0.076) (0.037) (0.033) (0.040)
Log(Distance) -0.011 -0.186 -0.151 0.222 0.087 -0.148
(0.307) (0.304) (0.188) (0.280) (0.292) (0.147)
Constant -2.364 2.490 13.524*** -10.548* -6.864 3.033
(7.000) (6.881) (4.248) (5.407) (5.514) (3.267)
Observations 430 430 431 431 431 431
R
2
0.65 0.68 0.74 0.75
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a pooled OLS regression of the natural logarithm of Int. Im-
ports in columns (1) and (2) and of the natural logarithm of Int. Exports in columns (4) and (5), and the results of 
estimating a Poisson regression of Int. Imports in column (3) and of Int. Exports in column (6) on a set of inde-
pendent variables. The regressions are based on a panel on the level of countries and years. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 4.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. *, **,
*** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (all two-tailed), respectively.
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation, I explore several dimensions of corporate tax planning and the role 
of transfer pricing. In particular, I examine the effectiveness of selected countermeasures 
against the use of intrafirm transactions on the use of those tax planning strategies which I 
identify by observing the allocation of intangibles to and the engagement of intrafirm trade
with low-tax jurisdictions. Moreover, I provide first empirical evidence on the association 
between the intensity of multinational firms’ use of information technology within the transfer 
pricing function and the effectiveness of transfer pricing systems. Thereby, this dissertation
contributes to the existing tax, accounting and public finance literature in several ways by 
providing novel evidence on important and, so far, unexplored fields of research.
The first study investigates the impact of tax considerations on the intra-U.S. allocation 
of trademark ownership. In particular, we show that the State of Delaware strongly dominates 
in the allocation of trademark ownership. We also document that a high business presence in 
combined reporting states negatively affects the probability of choosing Delaware as trade-
mark holding location. However, the magnitude of the identified effect does not indicate that 
Delaware-based tax avoidance strategies using intangible assets have been abandoned. In ad-
dition to the focus of this paper, there are several other related aspects of interest. For in-
stance, less is known about the effects of combined reporting on the allocation patterns of 
intangibles in the states that enacted this regime. Moreover, state taxation and combined re-
porting exerts pressure on the allocation of ‘real’ economic activity and the factors considered 
in the apportionment formulas. Thus, future research may further investigate on these effects.
The second study analyzes the fundamental, yet empirically unexplored question how 
firms implement transfer pricing strategies that balance the often-underlying conflict between 
managerial control and tax efficiency within their transfer pricing function. Our results sug-
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gest that investments in IT can increase the effectiveness of transfer pricing strategies when 
decision-making is difficult due to a high tension between the tax and managerial accounting 
department and when granular information is necessary to determine optimal prices based on 
internal costs. In particular, we find that the intensive use of IT within firms’ transfer pricing 
function helps to achieve higher profitability, lower ETRs, and lower tax risk if managerial 
and tax objectives likely conflict. Moreover, our evidence confirms theory that more intensive 
IT use is associated with higher profitability under cost-based transfer pricing. In general, 
research on the firms’ internal transfer pricing systems is important but scarce, mainly due to 
the issue of limited observability. Despite its limitations, survey data is an appropriate instru-
ment to study the black-box of transfer pricing which allows researchers to address research 
questions that are not possible to answer with archival data. Thus, future research might ex-
plore other related research questions to ensure a thorough understanding of a fundamental 
aspect of accounting research.
The third study investigates whether transfer pricing strictness affects intrafirm trade 
patterns and transfer pricing of U.S. multinational firms. I confirm prior literature that U.S. 
multinationals trade more with affiliates resident in low-tax countries and add to this literature 
by finding that the tax rate sensitivity is higher for imports than for exports. My results show, 
however, that countries with a particularly low transfer pricing strictness seem to drive the tax 
rate sensitivity of intrafirm trade and that these associations are mitigated under stricter trans-
fer pricing. This finding provides evidence on aggregate level considering bilateral trade 
flows at the country-level. Due to confidentiality issues, the access to underlying transfer 
price data is restricted. However, there had been several collaborations between researchers 
and tax authorities in the past. Thus, future research might explore the effects of transfer pric-
ing strictness on transfer price data. 
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